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ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis examines the transformation of the Kurdish national struggle 
in Turkey from a political movement to a social movement. The Thesis 
will argue that the Kurdish national struggle during the Twentieth 
Century in Turkey was largely a failure, and that the emergence of the 
Unions of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) has been a direct and 
concrete response to this failure. The thesis will track how the KCK has 
transformed a one-dimensional political nationalist struggle into a multi-
dimensional one, including politics, culture and society for the Kurds 
living in Turkey. The focus here will be on the period from March 2005, 
when the KCK was established, until July 2011 when the KCK 
announced its Democratic Autonomy project. 
In order to explain how and why the KCK has emerged, the Thesis takes 
an approach based on social movement theories to analyse the KCK as 
a social and cultural nationalist movement that deploys various 
approaches and techniques. The KCK is shown to take this new and 
more popular and successful tact through a comparison of the discourse 
surrounding the Kurdish national struggle before and after the 
establishment of the KCK. The ‘new discourse’ of multi-dimensional 
struggle is, in particular, compared with the old unadulterated discourse 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which was a straight reaction to 
the Turkish state policy towards the Kurds and their struggle. The 
analysis of this process is accomplished through an examination of 
numerous contemporary resources such as the PKK and the KCK 
policies and literatures, government intelligence reports, books, journals, 
and through conducting tens of qualitative interviews alongside 
comprehensive observation during my fieldwork for this thesis. 
Ultimately, the Thesis will argue that the transformation of discourse for 
the KCK from the PKK is evident in its “Democratic Autonomy model”. 
The KCK proposes this model as an alternative to the nation state model 
in Turkey. 
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The main and only question of this thesis is; why has the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) transformed into the Unions of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK’)? 
The thesis is ultimately trying to understand the transformation of the 
organization that is leading the Kurdish national struggle in Northern 
Kurdistan/South-Eastern Turkey. The thesis will document and explain this 
transformation from a one dimensional struggle to a multi-dimensional struggle. 
My contention is that there has been a transformation of the Kurdish national 
struggle from a political, one-dimensional to a cultural, social, multi-dimensional 
movement. The thesis will argue that the transformation brought about a new 
model which is the notion of democratic autonomy as an alternative to the 
nation state model in Turkey. Therefore, this thesis will investigate why this 
transformation happened. 
As ever, simple questions are the most challenging. To get at a proper answer 
to the main question, this thesis  requires many subsequent and dependent 
questions such as: How have political and historical factors, in terms of the 
‘Kurdish question’ or Kurdish national struggle of the Kurds affected the process 
of transformation? Does the institutional transformation from the PKK to the 
KCK represent something deeper within the Kurdish national struggle itself: 
from a popular understanding of this issue as simply a matter of politics to one 
which encompasses cultural and social dimensions as well? Has the Kurdish 
national struggle inside of Turkey really changed from a purely political 
movement of armed struggle to seek a Kurdish state to a social movement 
promoting ethno-national autonomy? Is this transformation still ongoing? Or are 
Kurds still struggling with the same tools and mentality as they dealt with in the 
last century? Why has the KCK changed the course in which social and cultural 
activism became a prominent point rather than political activism as such?  
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The thesis will evidently suggest that the answer to these questions is that the 
PKK failed in achieving its objectives through a purely political struggle. In the 
wake of this failure, the Kurdish national struggle  transformed into the KCK, 
because the KCK, unlike the PKK, delivered on social and cultural development 
and strategies in that promoted Kurdish nation building in the context of the 
Turkish state rather than armed struggle as the only response to establish an 
autonomous and sovereign Kurdish nation state. In order to better understand 
the sequence of the whole process of transformation of the Kurdish national 
struggle; the thesis will examine how this change came about, considering a 
variety of factors, such as the emergence of alternatives – in places like the 
KRG in Northern Iraq, and in terms of changes of the politics of Turkishness 
and Kurdishness in contemporary region. In this way, it will be argued that the 
KCK reflected fundamental changes in the meaning and practice of the Kurdish 
national struggle in 21st century Turkey.  
The scope of this thesis is narrow and specific. The transformation of the 
Kurdish national struggle and its effect on the PKK and the KCK are only 
considered in Turkey, and only once Kurdish social and political entities and 
actors have started to turn to legal and civil activities in addition to the armed 
struggle. The thesis essentially focuses on the KCK as a main actor of the 
Kurdish national struggle only within the borders of Turkey. The time period for 
the focus of this thesis is from March 2005, when the KCK was established, to 
July 2011 when the KCK announced the project of Democratic Autonomy. In 
this respect, the main focus will be on the pro-Kurdish social and political 
characters in Turkey and the direct or indirect power and hegemony in making 
decisions by the KCK over the whole process of the social movements in the 
northern part of Kurdistan, and Turkey in a broader context. 
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What Kinds of Issues Need Further Examination?  
To answer these questions, I first consulted work written on the Kurds and 
Kurdish question including Jwaideh (1961), Olson (1989), Van-Bruinessen 
(1992), Natalie (2005), Ozcan (2006), Romano (2006), Houston (2008), 
Watts (2010), McDowell (2010), Gunes (2012) and Bozarslan (2012). These 
works helped to give me some understanding of the framework used to 
analyse the Kurdish question. It can be argued that this literature has 
covered a good range of the Kurdish concern in relation to the political and 
historical aspects. Yet, there remain several key aspects of the Kurdish 
struggle which need analysis and elaboration. 
Nevertheless, state perspectives on the Kurdish question dominate the 
literature, with the four surrounding states claiming sovereignty and 
international legitimacy to deal with the Kurds as their own ‘internal issue’. 
For instance, the process of mass killing of the Kurds in Turkey  from 1925 
up to 1938 in the city of Dersim, and the Iraqi regime’s mass killing 
campaigns that were known as ‘Al-Anfal’ through chemical attacks on the 
Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988, were all treated as Turkish and Iraqi internal 
security issues. 
The reflection of this statist view on the Kurdish question was not only on 
politics and diplomacy. In fact, it was reflected in academic studies as well. 
The majority of academic works on the Kurds examined the question through 
the window and the legal framework of the states. Therefore, the majority of 
these works have focused on the Kurdish struggle as a matter of security 
and terrorism. With regards to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a new 
and relevantly different movement that started its struggle in Turkey since 
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the 1970s, almost all the academic works refer to the movement through the 
view of the states and with the notion of security and terrorism. However, the 
study of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey has its different aspects and 
elements. It cannot be examined only through the state security 
perspectives. Moreover, the matter of transformation of the Kurdish national 
struggle in its various phases has been always viewed through the theories 
and perspectives that focused on the issue of terror. Therefore, the problem 
of the rights of the Kurdish nation was seen only through the statist 
perspectives. 
 
Contextualising Transformation in a Social Movement 
The concepts of transformation alongside social and cultural concepts are based 
on aspects of social movement theories, as establishing the KCK can be seen as 
“a moment or set of events that bring together a self-aware group to react with a 
sense of agency and urgency to perceived injustice”, (Githens-Mazer, 2006: xiv). 
These concepts are also based on the approach of changing and reproducing 
values as the main characteristics of social movement, (Castells, 2012). It is 
important to suggest that the theoretical engagement of this thesis can be set forth 
from investigating the notion of promotion of a democratic nation building through 
social movement rather than building the nation state through political movement. 
For that, the dynamic of cultural nationalism out of the framework of the state will 
be focused on and examined in this thesis. 
Therefore, this work represents a different academic perspective on the KCK and 
its role in the process of transformation of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey 
through the notion of a democratic nation and out of the nation state framework. 
While there are several other works on the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey, 
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none of those works has been conducted on the KCK and its way of transforming 
the Kurdish national struggle. Moreover, this thesis is an original academic work 
that has analysed in detail the KCK and its cultural and social struggle for the 
Kurds through examining the new project of Democratic Autonomy by the KCK as 
an alternative model for the nation state model of the Turkish state. 
 
Methods and Chapter Breakdown 
 The methods utilised to support these hypotheses are limited to applying 
historical case study for the previous manner of the Kurdish national struggle 
through several revolts and movements. The thesis examines the Kurdish 
national struggle across areas in four countries in the twentieth century. It 
focuses especially on the discourse of the PKK movement in the northern part 
of Kurdistan (south east Turkey) through the KCK as a wider social movement 
for the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. For that, several qualitative 
interviews with the key players of the movement within and outside Turkey have 
been conducted. Likewise, the progress of the policy and practice of the 
movement during a year of fieldwork for this thesis has closely been observed. 
Moreover, several governmental documents and policies on the south east of 
Turkey that are directly related to this thesis have been investigated. Therefore, 
it is arguable that through analysing the discourse of the KCK based on the 
theories of social movement alongside a set of collected data and documents, 
the thesis can examine the notion of transformation of the main actor of the 
Kurdish national struggle since the establishment of the KCK and the reason(s) 
behind that transformation.  
In order to accomplish this, the entire thesis has been broken down into seven 
chapters. The first chapter will elaborate a general overview alongside the key 
 15 
concepts that are used frequently in this work. The chapter will also elaborate 
on the methodology and methods of research that have been used across the 
whole thesis. The second chapter will focus on the two points. 1) It will present 
a literature review of the academic works that have been undertaken prior to 
this thesis. 2) It will also investigate theoretical underpinnings of the 
phenomenon of cultural and social transformation, analysing strengths and 
limitations of the main actor of the movement whilst in the period of 
transformation. 
The third chapter will critically present the historical background of Kurdish 
nationalism. It will show especially, the reasons for and aspects of the failure of 
the Kurdish national struggle throughout the twentieth century in almost all parts 
of Kurdistan. It will place a particular emphasis on the northern part of Kurdistan 
and particularly the notion of the Turkish state and the reflection of the Kurdish 
nation and nationalism due to the Turkish nation state building process. It will 
engage with examination of the notion of Kurdish nationalism in the context of 
Turkey and as a reaction to Turkish nationalism 
The fourth chapter will narrow down the thesis to highlight the main actor of the 
Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. For that, it will critically present the history 
of the PKK as a main actor of the Kurdish national struggle in the northern part 
of Kurdistan from the 1970s until recent years. It will also particularly scrutinize 
the newly established KCK as a multi-dimensional entity that has become a new 
and different representative for the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey and 
explain ‘the Ideology of the PKK’ as a leading social movement for the Kurds in 
Turkey. The fifth chapter will look at the KCK’s civil and legal activisms in 
Turkey and the political activities that have been pursued in a different way 
since the KCK has been established. In order to do that, the Kurdish political 
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and legal activism in Turkey and the steps of the shift of discourse of the PKK 
ideology will be examined. It will also examine the process of de-Turkification as 
a response to the process of Turkification due to the new way of Kurdish 
activism since the KCK has been established. To end with, this chapter will 
highlight cultural and social activities of the KCK through managing 
municipalities and civil society activisms.  
The sixth chapter of this thesis will critically discuss the main projects of the 
KCK. Particularly, based on the theories of social movement, the chapter will 
critically present the ‘Road Map’ project that has been presented by the KCK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan, for the peace and the solution of the Kurdish question 
in the Middle East. It will also critically discuss the main proclaimed project of 
the KCK, the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ that has been recently 
suggested as an alternative to the previous notion of the Kurdish national 
struggle for establishing a Kurdish nation state. This project moreover, was 
suggested as an alternative to the current nation state model in Turkey. 
The seventh chapter will examine an outcome of the new Kurdish national 
struggle by the KCK. The aspects of transformation of the KCK, its policy and 
practice and its new approach for political, cultural, social and societal activisms 
will be evaluated. It will consider the KCK under the examination of social 
movement theories in order to elaborate the extent of social movement 
elements within the KCK. In this chapter, the main question in this thesis will be 
fully answered as the KCK has become the main actor of social movement that 
has made transformation in the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. To 
conclude, the thesis will present the summary of the thesis and critically 
examine the findings. It will suggest the examined reasons behind the transition 
from the PKK to the KCK. It will also briefly discuss and analyse the impacts of 
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the KCK on the communities and societies of Turkey and Kurdistan in general, 
and particularly on Kurdish society in Turkey. Moreover, the thesis will 
recommend some further scholarly works on the KCK and the Kurdish national 
struggle that this thesis doesn’t have a room for investigating them.    
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL OVERVIEW, KEY CONCEPTS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
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General Overview 
The following chapter will elaborate a general overview alongside the key 
concepts that are used in this thesis. It will also explain the methodological 
approaches that have been used across the whole thesis. This chapter will 
provide a summary background for the ‘Kurdish question’, and provide some 
detail of the evolution and emergence of the PKK and the KCK movements 
alongside the key concepts and terminologies that are important for the whole 
thesis. Moreover, methodology in this chapter will allow the reader to see how 
this thesis will develop its process of the research via collecting and analysing 
data. This chapter is a good base for understanding the forthcoming chapters 
of the thesis since it will elaborate important main concepts of the thesis and 
examining methodology that is used across the whole process of the 
research.  
 
Definitions of the Key Concepts 
In the next section of this chapter, there will be an elaboration for the four key 
concepts that are frequently used in this thesis. Yet, before that, it is necessary 
to explain three special terms that are very crucial and much frequently seen 
across the whole thesis. These three terms are defined based on the interviews 
with founders of the PKK and the current KCK. The terms are as follows: 
1- The PKK ‘Kurdistan Workers Party’:  This was a Kurdish political party with a 
Marxist Leninist ideological approach that was established in the 1970s in 
Turkey. Whenever in this thesis, the PKK is mentioned, what is meant by that is 
a Kurdish political movement. Mistakenly, in most academic literatures, the new 
reshaped entity that is the KCK is referred as the PKK. However, at the current 
time the PKK is only a small part of the KCK. 
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2- The KCK: This is a social, cultural, political and communal entity that was 
established by the former leader of the PKK ‘Abdullah Ocalan’ in 2005. It is a 
main actor of the Kurdish national movement that has multi-dimensional 
activism in all parts of Kurdistan. The main focus, activism and power of the 
KCK situated in the northern part of Kurdistan. Currently, the PKK is an 
ideological part of the KCK and it is called ‘the Ideology of the PKK’. 
 3- The Ideology of the PKK: This is a new ideological school within the KCK 
that is used as a name of ideological division within the committee of ideology 
of the KCK. Whenever this concept is mentioned in this thesis, the meaning of it 
is the ideological branch of the KCK.  
Beside the three terms above, before proceeding to the discussion of the 
subjects, it is necessary to make some clarifying remarks on several concepts 
that are crucial to this thesis. Through the course of this thesis, there are some 
key concepts and terminologies that are often used. It is necessary to have 
clear definitions for each of these concepts. At any point, it is essential for the 
reader to bear in mind that these concepts might have particular meanings in 
this thesis. Therefore, despite the definitions based on social theories, the 
particular meaning of these concepts within this thesis might need to be 
explained. However, the following considerations do not represent a general 
theoretical framework that will be examined in the second chapter. The 
concepts are: 
1. Nationalism and Nation 
Nationalism can be defined as “an ideological movement for the attainment and 
maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some 
of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ like 
others”, (Smith, 1971: 17). Smith (1971) has given a great deal of attention to 
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the concept of nationalism. As a doctrine, nationalism is a language and 
symbolism on behalf of the nation, a socio-political movement, and an ideology 
of the nation (Smith 2008: 6). As it can be noted from Smith’s definition of 
nationalism, he treats it as an ideology. The definition of nationalism as an 
ideology is largely at odds with the common sense understanding of the notion, 
which portrays nationalism as lacking any form of ideology or philosophical 
foundation (Smith, 2008: 21). However, the crucial and the most controversial 
question here – one which will have wider implications for understanding of the 
two phenomena (nationalism and nation) – is exactly which comes first, 
nationalism or the nation? Reading through Smith’s works, the reader can easily 
recognise the fact that he has been working hard to counter-argue the 
prevailing proposition within the modernist approach of nationalism and nations 
which consider that nations are just products and creations of nationalism and 
nationalist ideology. 
This view has been expressed explicitly by the well-known modernist scholar of 
nationalism, Ernest Gellner (1969). Gellner suggests that “Nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do 
not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, 
even if, as indicated, they are purely negative”, (Gellner, 1969: 168). While 
Gellner assigns a secondary value to them, for Smith it is these pre-existing 
elements that matter most in the nation-formation process, a position, which 
modernists have ardently dismissed. 
On the other hand, according to Smith, myths, symbols and memories make 
fundamental components of ethnic communities, nationalism and nations as an 
ideology, also that, cultural and political traits coexist in the nation and the 
ideology which claims to represent the nation, namely nationalism. Therefore, 
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for Smith (1996a), nationalism is a culture and identity as well as a political 
quest, hence, ruling out the presumed divided lines between ‘political’ and 
‘cultural’ nationalism (Smith, 1996a: 448). This argument of Smith (1996a) 
follows his critical position to the state-centric account which treats nationalism 
as an overwhelmingly political doctrine with a fatalist relation with the modern 
state. At the same time, despite appreciating the vital role played by culture, 
especially ethnic and nationalist culture, in nation formation and nationalist 
ideologies, he seems to be refraining from subscribing to a purely cultural 
approach to nationalism (Smith, 1996a: 447-448). 
Following these lines of argument, the ‘subjective-objective’ binary seems to 
have gone out of the way in Smith’s theoretical formulation. To elaborate more 
on this point “the concepts employed by ethno-symbolism”, Smith argues “are 
simultaneously ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’”. To illustrate this proposition, he 
goes on by saying “for ethno-symbolism it is culture --and culture in relation to 
politics—that is central, not subjective attitudes or feelings”, (Smith, 2009: 26). 
What is so crucial for this thesis is elaborating both political and cultural types of 
nationalism. Hutchinson (1994) argues that in practice, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between political and cultural nationalists, (Hutchinson, 1994:41).  
Elie Kedourie in Hutchinson (1994) provides an essential definition of 
nationalism. He argues that it is a doctrine formulated by new secular 
intellectuals, hostile to the traditional dynastic and religious order, (Hutchinson, 
1994: 42). Political nationalism focuses on the state as the main and highest 
aim of the nation.  In contrast, “for cultural nationalists the state is, at best, 
accidental, and is frequently regarded with suspicion as a product of an over-
rationalist ethos that seeks to impose a mechanical uniformity on living cultures, 
(Hutchinson, 1994: 44). Moreover, cultural nationalists are suspicious of such a 
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centralist politics. As Hutchinson (1994) argues, cultural nationalism is aiming at 
“moral regeneration of the ‘way of life’ of a unique historical community”, 
(Hutchinson, 1994:46). 
This conceptualisation of political and cultural nationalism is very essential for 
this thesis as the process of transformation from the PKK to the KCK is exactly 
the process of overcoming political nationalism that was in the case of the PKK 
to the era of cultural nationalism as it is in the case of the KCK. As an outcome 
of the argument about both political and cultural nationalism, it can be 
suggested that the dynamic of social movement is cultural nationalism and the 
dynamic of political movement is political nationalism. In other words, social 
movement is a cultural type of nationalist movement and political movement is 
political type of national movement. The concepts of political movement and 
social movement will be illustrated in this part of the chapter below. 
 
2. Kurdish Nationalism 
In the case of Kurdish nationalism, it is obvious that the process is different from 
what has been illustrated by scholars about nationalism elsewhere. From the 
point of Smith (1996b), collective memories play a decisive role in nation 
formation according to his ethnic-symbolism theory. The process of nation 
building that Smith (1996a) argues is quite different from that of state-making’. 
For, states may be established without recourse to memory and remembering, 
but nations require shared memories to give their often heterogeneous citizenry 
a common habitat, a source of pride and dignity, and a common destiny’ (Smith, 
1996b: 384). In weighting this out against the Kurdish case in question, through 
a close historical investigation of the Kurdish nationalist movement, one might 
be able to argue that the failure to maintain a shared memory among the Kurds 
 24 
is one of the characteristic features of nationalist project among the Kurds. 
Perhaps, the Kurdish history up to the collapse of the Kurdish republic of 
Mahabad (1946), with perceived accomplishments and upheavals, is shared by 
majority of the Kurds. In addition, the elements of the universal shared Kurdish 
history or memory is best articulated in Edmond’s depiction of Kurdish 
nationalist thinking. In early 1970s, Edmonds presented what he then called ‘the 
historical bases of Kurdish nationalist thinking’ as follows: 
“The Kurds constitute a single nation which has occupied its present 
habitat for at least three thousand years. They have outlived the rise 
and fall of many imperial races: Assyrian, Persian, Greeks, Romans, 
Arabs, Mongols, and Turks. They have their own history, language and 
culture. Their country has been unjustly portioned. But they are the 
original owners, not strangers to be tolerated as minorities with limited 
concessions granted at the whim of the usurpers”, (Edmonds, 1971: 88) 
In fact the above statement contains most of the constituting elements of the 
kind of ‘nation’ framed in ethno-symbolism. The elements of ethnic ties (mythic 
or real), symbols, culture, territory, and above all, a political claim to  ‘the right of 
self-rule’ which for Kedourie, and Gellner considered one of the pillars of 
nationalist conviction Gellner, (1969), Kedourie, (2000). The above statement 
might apply to the Kurdish nationalist conviction since its early inception at the 
end of nineteenth century, represented predominantly by young and educated 
Ottoman Kurds and certainly is evident in the language of the first Kurdish 
printed newspaper (Kurdistan) published in 1898 in Cairo, (Strohmeier, 2003: 
21-26). However, it is arguable that the modern history of the Kurds, especially 
after 1946, seems to make a dividing gap in Kurdish historical memory 
especially among the Kurds in Iraq. The factors that make such difference could 
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partly be traced back to efforts of individual central states in which Kurds make 
part of their population, and partly to the nature of the modern Kurdish political 
parties emerged just after the collapse of the republic of Mahabad in1946. This 
argument may find more empirical evidence in the particular case of Iraqi 
Kurdistan and in the enduring internal divisions within the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in Iraq starting among leaders of the KDP back in 1960 and 
continued throughout 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, 1946 is the year which 
coincides with the establishment of the first and the only self-proclaimed 
independent Kurdish state in the twentieth century. The same year also 
witnessed the foundation of the most popular Kurdish nationalist party at the 
time, which was the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq. Apparently, the party 
carried genesis of fragmentation from its foundation back on 16th August 1947. 
The division was not only derived from the divided social background of the 
early leaders as that between tribal Mustafa Barzani and urban left-oriented 
Ibrahim Ahmed and his colleagues, in fact, the divide was also fuelled by the 
uneasy alliance which proved the lack of chemistry in their respective visions to 
the Kurdish question in Iraq. The division which since 1990s has taken up a 
different shape and more deeply touched the Kurdish society, and which 
undoubtedly left its own mark on the identity of the Kurds in Iraq in particular 
(Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, pp. 155-184). 
However, this claim as regards the Kurdish case should be a matter of empirical 
deliberation rather than as something to be taken for granted. The dominant 
conviction within Kurdish nationalist historiography, as Vali (2003) observes, is 
one that is characterised by being both ‘primordialist’ and ‘ethnicist’. For 
average Kurdish nationalist, as Vali (2003) argues, “the Kurdish nation is a 
primordial entity, a natural formation rooted in the nature of every Kurd, defining 
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the identity of people and community through history.’ (Vali, 2003: 59). As for 
the ethnic side of the discourse, Vali (2003) suggests that the “notions of 
Kurdish community and identity are both premised on the common national 
origin, defined in terms of a uniform Kurdish ethnicity”, (Vali, 2003: 60-61). 
However, it can be argued at this point that, as much as concerns the northern 
part of Kurdistan in Turkey, close examination of the discourse of identity since 
the mid-1990s compels one to consider the dramatic transformations which 
have taken place post that date. The Kurdish national movement in Turkey has 
gone through a socio-economic and political transformations so has the identity 
of the political community. While the Kurdish identity previously was 
characterised by largely ethnic traits, in the recent years the ethno nationalist 
discourse of Kurdish identity has been seeing a great develop in Turkey, 
especially since 2005 as the KCK was established. Since 2005 notions such as 
‘civil rights’ democracy, nationalisation and coexistence’ have come to 
discussion parallel to the popular ethnic nationalist terms as ‘Kurdish-ness’, in 
Kurdish (Kurdeti)’ in Turkish, (Kurtculuk). Nevertheless, while the emerging 
identity shares fundamental components with the dominant ethno nationalist 
one, the former promises to depart to a great extent from the latter by 
incorporating newer elements that would inform the transformations which have 
taken place after 2005 when the KCK came on the scene. 
 
3. Social Movement and political Movement 
Smelser (1962) defines a social movement as a collective behaviour. He 
suggests that there is no social movement which is not a collective behaviour. 
Thus, he defines collective behaviour as “mobilization on the basis of belief 
which redefines social action”, (Smelser, 1962: 8). However, some collective 
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behaviour is not institutionalized as in the case of social movements. Therefore, 
all social movements are collective behaviours, but not vice versa. In addition to 
Smelser (1962)’s definition, Touraine (1981) sees social movements from the 
point of class actors and the struggle. He suggests that “social movements are 
the organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class 
adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community”, 
(Tourane, 1981: 77).  
On the other hand, Zald and McCarthy (1987) have suggested that “a social 
movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing 
preference for changing some elements of the social structure or reward 
distribution, or both, of a society”, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987: 20). In other 
words, they suggest that a social movement can be described as a “purposive 
and collective attempt of a number of people to change individual and societal 
institutions and structures”, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987: 122). The main point in 
this definition is the substance of the change. In the words of Zald and 
McCarthy (1987), it is about changing individuals and societal institutions and 
structures. This point is very essential for this thesis as any time the concept of 
social movement used, the reader must think of the change in social values. In 
other words, social movement is essentially about changes in the values of 
society. 
Castells (2012) suggested that “social movements, throughout history, are the 
producers of new values and goals around which the institutions of society are 
transformed to represent these values by creating new norms to organize social 
life”, (Castells, 2012: 9). He argues that there is in theory, an essential 
difference between political movement and social movement. In practice they 
mix every time, but theoretically the difference is very essential as regards as 
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the value of society and the transformation of values and norms. Political 
movements nonetheless, are aiming at the state. They are aiming at changing 
power of the state. Not the destruction of the state as in the case of revolution, 
but the way of running the state and institutions within the state can be the main 
aim of a political movement. On the other hand, Castells (2012) suggested that 
social movements are collective actions that are aiming at transforming the 
values of society affecting the way that people think, behave and speak. Social 
movements are about affecting the way people produce or reproduce several 
new terms and concepts or at least redefining the concepts and giving them 
different values. 
 
4. The Struggle 
This is a Marxist concept. It has been rooted from the notion of class struggle, 
(Touraine 1981). In case of Kurdish struggle: the concept is widely used by the 
Kurdish nationalists as ‘Xebat’ or ‘Berxodan’, in Turkish ‘Mucadele’, in Arabic, 
‘Nidhal’. In this thesis, the term ‘struggle’ is used in the sense of “Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conception of social life as a struggle over representations of reality”, 
(Schmitz and Wiater, 2011: 21). This means that the struggle is confronting 
daily social, cultural and political difficulties by people. Touraine (1981), 
classifies three types of 'positive' struggles and three types of 'critical' ones. 
Positive and critical struggles can occur at the levels of historicity, institution, 
and organisation. Positive struggles happen in a “totality” of reform or 
revolution, and critical ones are against a “totality”. Touraine (1981) argues that 
positive struggle at the level of historicity is called social movement, at the 
institutional level is called “institutional” or “political pressure” and at the 
organisational level is called “claims” and “protests”. 
 29 
For Touraine (1981), critical struggle at the historicity level is “revolutionary 
action”, at the institutional level is “pressure against obstacles”, and at the 
organisational level is “crisis behaviour” (Touraine, 1981: 84-90). In this 
classification, there are two struggles that can be regarded as social 
movements: positive struggle at the historicity level and critical struggle at the 
same level. Touraine (1981) restricts them as “social movements” and 
“revolutionary action” correspondingly. Thus, the term of struggle in this thesis 
was used to refer to the attempts by the Kurdish national movement actors to 
maintain social, cultural and political rights. This means that the struggle is a 
social movement itself. 
 
A Summary of the Kurdish National Struggle in Turkey 
The Kurds, especially Kurds in Southern Turkey, have been struggling to gain 
cultural, social, and political rights, self-governance and sovereignty for almost a 
century. During the course of the twentieth century, the Kurdish national 
struggle has been through several difficulties and Kurds have paid high prices. 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds were promised to 
have their own state alongside the other nations in the region, (McDowall 1992). 
Yet, due to several internal and external reasons and the rapid changes of the 
politics and interests of the main powers in the region, very quickly that dream 
became impossible. Without respect for the identity of people who lived in the 
region, without consent, the land of the Kurds has been divided into four parts 
and been given to the newly established states in the region. As Yildiz and 
Muller, (2008) argue, “following the first world war, state borders in the region 
were artificially imposed by the great powers with little or no respect for Kurdish 
linguistic, cultural or familial continuity”, (Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 126). 
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For that, the Kurds have started their struggle to fight for their social and 
political rights, having riots and revolutions against those powers. However, 
almost all of the Kurdish revolutions and riots in Turkey have been suppressed 
and the activists jailed, hanged, or killed; or they have spent the rest of their 
lives in exile. Interestingly, the Kurdish national movement in Turkey has seen a 
different stage and reasonably successful methods have been examined since 
the PKK started a moderately wider nationalistic revolution in the late 1970s in 
East Turkey.  
On the other hand, despite several obstacles in front of the Kurds by the Turkish 
political system; in the last twenty years in Turkey, Kurdish politics and social 
movements have been managed in accordance with the system of the Turkish 
state. In other words, since the Kurds have never been successful in establishing 
their own sovereign state in Turkey, in the last two decades, the Kurds have had 
to start to learn how to play the game in order for them to gain their cultural, 
political and social rights gradually. As Watts, (2010) argues, Kurdish politics have 
been formed within the Turkish system since 1990, when for the first time a pro-
Kurdish political party, People Labour Party, ‘the HEP’ managed to send some 
deputies to the Turkish national assembly (TBMM) as representatives of a 
somewhat pro-Kurdish ideology. Since then, the main actor of the Kurdish national 
movements has developed gradually and steadily, learning about how to cope with 
a capricious system and play the game. Therefore, establishing ‘the HEP’ was the 
first legal and parliamentary collective action of the Kurds. It must be argued that 
prior to the 1990s; the Kurdish activists in Turkey had several legal and political 
attempts. Wining Diyarbakir municipality by the Kurdish politician ‘Mahdi Zana’ in 
1978 is the best example. Nevertheless, these actions were not collective and 
organised as it was seen from the moment of establishing the ‘HEP’. Moreover, 
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from the 1990s, the majority of the Kurdish legal activisms were inspired and 
blessed by the PKK as it was the main mobilizer of the Kurdish national struggle.  
 
The Emergence of the KCK 
It can be argued that the KCK has been established on the ashes of the 
PKK. As a matter of fact, the PKKIt could mobilize the Kurdish people in the 
northern part of Kurdistan for the last three decades, Ozcan (2006), Yildiz 
and Muller (2008), Olson (2009), (Yildiz and Breau (2010) and McDowall 
(2010)). However, putting the PKK in the list of terror by the EU, US and 
Turkey put the movement into a difficult situation. According to Ocalan, 
(2011), putting the PKK in the list of terrorist organisations served a purpose. 
During an interview with his lawyers in prison, Ocalan argued that, the matter 
of labelling terror on the PKK has been a result of London- Washington 
agreement to put any organisation that has negatively affected their interests 
across the world into that list. However, this attempt did not prevent the PKK 
developing peace and extended cease-fire, though most of the European 
countries followed this path and put the PKK into that terror list, Ocalan 
(2011). 
Nevertheless, this can be regarded as an important reason for changing the 
strategy of the PKK’s struggle and thinking of new ways for their path. For 
that, the PKK started to change its name to KADEK and the name of its army 
ERGK to HPG and then created a wider entity that was called the KKK which 
finally became the KCK. To some extent, that was in order to clear itself from 
terror labels. Moreover, they announced unilateral cease-fire several times 
and stopped all attacks on the Turkish economy in the tourist areas in the 
west of Turkey, (Yildiz and Breau 2010). However, the label has continually 
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been attached to them and the name “PKK” has still continued as the main 
name for them to be recognized under. Ever since, they have focused on the 
civil and legal activities within the cities and started to concentrate on the 
legal way to participate in organising Kurdish people in the predominantly 
Kurdish cities and towns in the south east of Turkey and Kurdish inhabitants 
in the Turkish metropolis cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara to go to 
the voting stations during the local and general elections in Turkey and 
asking people to vote for pro-Kurdish parties such as the Democratic Society 
Party, the DTP and Peace and Democracy Party, the BDP. Despite all these 
changes, the label has still remained on them; even legal activists from pro-
Kurdish parties were faced with several charges as they were accused of 
making propaganda for the terrorist organisation. 
In the March 2009 local elections, the DTP, as a main Kurdish representative 
party in Turkey, doubled the number of municipalities under its control in the 
predominantly Kurdish areas. As a reaction to this, the government started 
an operation under the name of the “KCK operation” to arrest and jail 
Kurdish activists. Another very important point in this respect can be the shift 
of the PKK in terms of their goals and the range of their struggle. “The 
Ideology of PKK” has started to compromise its demands for liberation of all 
Kurdistan and establishment of a Kurdish state. Instead of that, it has started 
to criticize nation states and think of brotherhood between the Kurds and all 
other nations and ethnicities around the Kurds in the Middle East. It was 
calling for autonomy for the Kurds inside the borders of the republic of 
Turkey as long as that republic is democratic and respects the notion of 
freedom and celebrating diversity and recognising minorities’ cultural, 
political and social needs.  
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By the 2011 General Election in Turkey, the Kurds in Turkey sent thirty six 
“clear” Kurdish or pro-Kurdish active MPs to the Turkish national assembly. 
This means that the political expression of Kurdishness and the notion of a 
collective action were evident during this election. Moreover, in the same 
year the project of “Democratic Autonomy” in Kurdistan was suggested by 
the KCK. This step made the main actors of the Kurdish national movements 
very active in the process of mobilizing Kurdish people through the policy of 
the KCK. Since the KCK with its diverse range of activism came on the 
scene, the notion of Kurdish awareness in Turkey has been raised to a large 
extent. Obstacles are challenged and a significant amount of the Kurdish 
people has been mobilized to hold the responsibility of struggle for the 
Kurdish cultural and social rights in Turkey. 
However, there were several dilemmas for the movement. The dilemmas 
were internal, such as the ideological problems amongst activists within the 
movement. They were also external, such as the issue of terror and the 
international community’s sensitivity about the legitimacy of this movement 
and gaining support from the western communities such as European Union 
powers and other notable powers in the world. Thus, whole parts of this 
study will try to explore the nature and the reasons of the birth of this new 
wave of social movement of the Kurds in Turkey and its struggle during the 
last twenty years, focusing on the way of transformation and the stages of its 
struggle according to the ideology of the KCK movement and the demands 
of the new era of struggle in the new context of Turkish and international 
politics and the social arena. 
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Methodology 
In instruction to accomplish the research necessary for this thesis, it is 
crucial to follow an appropriate methodological order. Therefore, it is 
necessary for this thesis to utilise a qualitative approach to collect and 
analyse relevant data.   
It is argued that qualitative approach to social science research is an 
important way of gathering and analysing data. Denzin and Linkoln (1994) in 
Creswell (1998) have defined qualitative research; he argues that “qualitative 
research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena 
in terms of the meanings people bring to them”, (Creswell, 1998:15). Thus, 
qualitative research is more practical and is involved with the deep concerns 
of the researched society. “Qualitative research involves the studied use and 
collection of a variety of imperial materials – case studies, personal 
experience, introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, 
interactional, and visual texts- that describe routine and problematic 
moments and meanings in individuals’ lives”, (Creswell, 1998: 15). 
The definition mainly emphasises on the two points that both are important 
for this study. The first one is the way and method of collecting data, through 
various methods within the qualitative approach. The second is the way of 
analysing the data through an interpretive process within the qualitative 
approach. The reason for adapting qualitative approaches is because of an 
important point that needs to be highlighted, which is the issue of validity or 
credibility. As Brady and Collier (2010) suggest, the research should 
“maximize the validity of measurements”, (Brady and Collier, 2010: 133), 
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meaning that, “it should use reliable data-collection procedures that, if 
applied again, would yield the same data”, (Brady and Collier, 2010: 133).By 
using a qualitative approach, valid data and the gathering of adequate 
essential information which is necessary for the research subject, can be 
gained.  
 
For the data collection, there are mainly four types of information to be 
collected. The four are observations, interviewing, documents and audio 
visual materials, (Creswell, 1998: 16). First of all, observations can be 
participant or non-participant. For this study, both participant and non-
participant observations are used. I have been within the Kurdish activists 
during their activities in order for me to understand their motives and 
feelings. For instance, in 2011-2012, I was in Turkey and Iraq to observe 
activisms of the KCK as the main movement that this thesis is about to 
investigate. Particularly, in 2011, I was in Diyarbakir observing ‘Newroz’ 
celebration and announcing the project of the KCK “Democratic Autonomy”.   
The second type is interviews in qualitative data collection, which must be 
semi- structured and open-ended. For this study also, there are semi-
structured interviews with more than thirty different people from Turkish 
members of parliament, politicians in Turkey, Iraq and other politicians from 
Iran and Syria in Europe, and to several academics and first hand activists 
that are dealing with the matter that this study concerns. There are almost 
eighty hours of interviews conducted during one year of fieldwork for this 
study. Interviews were conducted only in Turkey, Iraq and Europe. 
Interviewees all showed their consent for participation in this research and 
some were more than happy to mention their names within this research. 
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However, due to the sensitivity of the research, I have decided not to 
mention the names of my interviewees and contributors of this thesis. 
Therefore, I have made some codes for the interviewees. All interviews that 
have been conducted within Turkey or with any politician from Turkey 
originally; were coded as (A). Interviews with politicians who are from Iran 
originally were coded as (B). Interviews within Iraq or with Iraqi politicians 
were coded as (C). Finally, interviews with individuals from Syria were coded 
as (D). 
The third type of data collection is gathering and analysing documents. 
Documents can be private and public. For this study, there are several 
important published and unpublished texts and documents analysed. The 
fourth method which is audio visual material can be photos, video tapes and 
record, compact disks and maps, (Creswell, 1998:120). For this one also 
there are several maps, photos and some voice records used. Moreover, all 
interviews are voice recorded, transcribed and translated when needed. All 
interviews were saved securely and confidentially. All the uses of documents 
were referenced properly. 
Discourse analysis was one of the key techniques used in this thesis to 
analyse the data that had been collected. Defining the meaning and use of 
discourse analysis is important to make sense of this technique. Sewell 
(1980) in Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002) argues that discourse 
analysis refers to analysing  the sum total of the “manifestos, records of 
debates at meetings, action of political demonstrations, newspaper articles, 
slogans, speeches, posters, satirical prints, statutes of associations, 
pamphlets, and so on of a time, a place and a people”, (Klandermans and 
Staggenborg,2002: 67). This can give this study a view that collecting such 
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kinds of data is necessary in order to have a clear and appropriate frame for 
the research and to analyse these discourses.  
Bryman and Burgess (1994) argue that, “There are at least four types of works 
that have commonly been described in this way”, (Bryman and Burgess, 1994: 
47). The first one is mainly influenced by speech act theory; this has been 
directed in a systematic account of the organisation that has conversational 
exchange as a main discourse, (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). The second one 
has a psychological aspect, mainly concentrating on what is termed as 
discourse process, (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). The third type has been 
mainly developed by sociologists, especially sociology of scientific knowledge 
theorists; as (Bryman and Burgess, 1994) argue, “Partly as a response to 
methodological difficulties with other ways of studying science”, (Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994: 47).  The last type is the most important part for this study. It is 
an approach that has been advanced by a very different tradition of continental 
social philosophy and cultural analysis, (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). 
The use of analysis in this thesis is important as this study is applying an 
analysis to a social movement, through documents and interviews of some 
key previous and current personnel within the movements. Klandermans and 
Staggenborg (2002) argue that “for the social movement researcher, 
common data sources are organisational documents and newspaper 
articles”, (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 67). Moreover, analysing 
the public speech, the events and even slogans of the social movement 
activist are essential. 
The challenges of this study as a social movement research can be posed in 
the two sets of challenges, as Klandermans and (2002) suggested. The first 
challenge “relates to definitions conceptualizations. Ideational concepts are 
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inherently imprecise, and distinctions between frames, ideologies, and 
discourses are frequently blurred”, (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 
63). The second challenge regards the issue of verification and proof of 
discourse analysis. Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002) argue that 
“discourse analyses confront the difficult tasks of describing and presenting 
evidence for concepts that reside in the black box of mental life”, 
(Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 63). 
On the other hand, with regards to social movement research, there are 
three levels of discourse. The first level is related to the Trans-National 
movements. Klandermans and Staggenborg, (2002) describe that as “world 
historical discourse ‘or mentalities’ of reformation, enlightenment, Islamism, 
and so on, and then the more circumscribed discursive fields of specific 
movements such as gay rights, liberation theology and ecology”, 
(Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 68). Moreover, political science 
researchers have recently drawn attention to social movements on this 
trans-national level through the theories of international relations. 
The second level of discourse analysis is on the level of organisational. This 
is when the social movement has been structured based on several different 
social movement organisations. In this case, as Klandermans and 
Staggenborg, (2002) argue “their textual production forms part of the 
polyphonic voice of a movement’s discourse”, (Klandermans and 
Staggenborg, 2002: 68). Rochon (1998), in Klandermans and Staggenborg 
(2002), has suggested that “this level is often reflective of discursive 
elements that resonate among the larger populace, akin to processes of 
frame alignment and frame bridging”, (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 
68). This level of discourse is so important especially during the controversial 
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moments of social movements’ transformation of strategies and goals. 
The third level of discourse according to (Klandermans and Staggenborg 
(2002), is “individual production of text and speech by participants and 
activists”, (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 69). This is also a very 
important level of discourse analysis especially for the concern of this study, as 
there are several documents, interviews and speeches by key individuals within 
the social movements’ organisations that this study must explore. However, 
there is a difficulty in terms of analysing speech from spoken language and 
there is a difference between analysing speech and texts from written 
documents. Moreover, there is an overlap or relationship between the individual 
level of discourse analysis and the “more general levels because texts are 
usually produced by individuals”, (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002: 69). 
The first method of collecting data in this thesis is the interview. There are 
several semi-structured, open ended interviews with several important 
personnel within the social movements’ organisations. It is beneficial to ask a 
simple question about the nature of the interview. Someone may say what is 
the interview? Very simply, Silverman (2004) suggested that “interviewing 
provides a way of generating empirical data about the social world by asking 
people to talk about their lives. In this respect, interviews are special forms of 
conversation”, (Silverman, 2004: 140).  
On the other hand, Flick, et al. (2004), believe that there are a huge number of 
“different types and procedures of qualitative interviews”, (Flick, et al. 2004: 
204). This thesis is focusing on the interview, especially semi-structured 
interview as a very important method of collecting data. Very specifically face- 
to-face interview is taken into account in this thesis. This is due to the nature of 
the study as it is very crucial to the interviewees to be observed while they are 
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answering the questions. Thus, there is a combination of the process of 
interview and observation at the same time. Briggs (1986) in Silverman (2004) 
has argued that “the social circumstances of interview are more than obstacles 
to respondents’ articulation of their particular truths”, (Silverman, 2004:141). 
This means that, the researcher must carefully take the social and political 
circumstances into account while undertaking interviews and analysing their 
speeches. In other words, face-to-face interviews give the researcher good 
opportunity to gain some information and notice important points during the 
reaction of interviewees while they are responding to the questions. Moreover, 
during face-to-face interview, it is more likely that both interviewer and 
interviewee are mutually active, much more involved in the subject and react 
with discussing points that concern the research. Borrowing the words from 
Silverman (2004), face-to-face interviews predominantly are “collaborative 
accomplishments, involving participants in meaning-making work in the 
process”, (Silverman, 2004:142). However, the process of interview sometimes 
is facing with the issue of honesty and frankness. Often interviewees obliged to 
avoid some crucial points in order not to be in social and political difficulties. 
During my fieldwork for this thesis, often I saw some people who want to talk to 
me; but as soon as I demand them to let me record their speech, they would 
show their disagreement.  
 From this point of view, face-to-face interviews can be the producer of 
knowledge and meaning on the one hand, and can be an active tool of data 
collection on the other hand. In other words, this kind of interview contributes to 
“understanding how the meaning –making process unfolds in the interview is as 
critical as apprehending what is substantively asked and convoyed”, (Silverman, 
2004:142). Thus, it can be achieved during undertaking semi-structured 
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interviews. On the other hand, as Silverman (2004) argues, regardless of the 
types of interview, “there is always a model of the research subject lurking 
behind persons placed in interview roles”, (Silverman, 2004:144). 
The second method of the collecting data for this thesis is observational 
techniques. There are two different ways of observation, participatory and 
non-participatory. For this study in particular, I have used both types of 
observation during my fieldwork. I have participated in cultural, social and 
political gathering and observing experts and key individuals of the 
movement during my stay in Turkey and Iraq. I have seen several key 
community leaders and politicians who are able to explain the complexity of 
Kurdish national movements in Turkey.  The task of this observation was to 
make those experts to analyse the situation and produce a discussion about 
the discourse of political parties that are playing the main game with regards 
to the Kurdish question in Turkey. In more specific words, I have observed 
groups of members of Turkish parliament when they were gathering and 
addressing to people to express their views about the subject. I have 
participated in the gathering of several academicians, politicians and several 
political commentators outside the arena of the Turkish system who have 
discussion about the same subject. In addition to all this, it is necessary to 
say that observation and participation with observation gave this study an 
enormous magnitude of knowledge and very useful insights in terms of the 
familiarity with the actual society that the study concerns. 
The essential contribution  of the methodology in this thesis will be very clear 
in the forthcoming chapters, especially during the presentation of the 
discourse of the current Kurdish national movement and showing the hand of 
the participants and interviewees in the fieldwork across the whole study. 
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The main contribution of methodology to go through the better way to get 
answer of the main question of the thesis is that the essential data has come 
from my fieldwork that is directly constructed based on methodology. 
Moreover, analysing all data has been perused based on research method 
alike. In the next stage of this work, the combination of the view of 
participants and researcher will be presented, especially in each of the 
fourth, fifth and the seventh chapters. 
 In the next chapter, another two important points will be investigated.  The 
first one will be the literature review for the academic works by previous 
scholars. It will critically look at the scholarship literature around the Kurdish 
movements and the struggle of the Kurds, especially on the Kurds in the 
northern part of Kurdistan. The second point will be presenting theoretical 
approach to the subject through examining social theories; especially 
theories of social movements. The importance of the next chapter is that the 
the whole framework of the thesis will be clarified during the demonstration 
of the literature reviews and theoretical examination for the Kurdish national 
struggle in Turkey.  
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 Introduction 
Having previously set out the concepts of a social movement and defined the 
Kurdish national struggle, particularly for the Kurds who live in Turkey, this 
chapter will consider how other scholars have analysed the Kurdish national 
struggle in Turkey and Kurdistan in general. This is in order to better understand 
the notion of the transformation of the KCK in this context. These 
considerations will help to situate the changing strategy and goals of the KCK, 
as the main actor of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey and in the 
northern part of Kurdistan (South East of Turkey). The second part of this 
chapter will be engaged with social movement theories and looking for the way 
of analysing the Kurdish national struggle and set out a theoretical framework 
for the main actor of the Kurdish national movement which is the KCK. 
 
Literature review 
In reviewing some relevant previous academic works in relation to this study, 
there will be two different types of literature. After discussing the part of the 
literature review, it will be looking at the work of several social and political 
theorists with regards to their assessment and explanation of social movements 
and showing examples of some other social movements and the way of 
transferring and changing their agendas in terms of their ideologies and political 
frameworks. This theoretical framework will also investigate the matter of 
practical transformation and changing movement’s activities such as, 
transformation from violence and armed struggle to the civil and legal one. 
Moreover, this work will show the reasons for those changes and 
transformations during the struggles. The study will also focus on the negative 
and positive outcomes of the movement’s changes for its organisations and for 
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the current position and future of the Kurdish nation that they have struggled for. 
There are two different types of literature to consider here. Firstly, those works 
which focus on the recent history of Kurdish nationalism. Secondly, those works 
which especially focus on the PKK written by scholars based in Western 
universities and to some extent in Turkey. The reason of focusing mainly on the 
Western academic literature is due to the lack or limitation of free and unbiased 
studies in Turkish, Iranian and even at universities in Arabic countries with regards 
to the Kurdish question. Moreover, it is not possible to find a wide range of 
academic studies and study centres about the Kurds and the Kurdish question in 
comparison to any other important issue in the Middle East. For instance, there are 
huge literatures about Arab- Israel conflicts and several institutes, and academic 
centres have drawn a great attention to the Middle East issues at various 
universities across the whole world. In contrast to this, until very recently, there 
were very few attempts to focus on the issue of the Kurds and the conflicts 
between Kurds and those nations that are surrounding them and the states that 
Kurds are situated in. 
Until very recent years the academic study of the Kurds and Kurdishness in Turkey 
was missing. That was due to the Turkish denial of existence of the Kurds and a 
regarding of them as Turks, (McDowall, 1992), (Ozcan, 2006). This means the 
literature review for this study faces real difficulties in terms of stating it within 
existing theorisation and theoretical approaches. It also faces difficulties with 
regards to impartiality in the academic literature about the Kurdish national struggle 
question. Academic works written about the Kurdish national struggle usually focus 
on the historical narratives of Kurdish revolutions and nationalism. Here, there are 
several academic books and articles that concern the Kurdish national movement 
in all parts of Kurdistan and predominantly about the part that is situated in Turkey. 
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Jwaideh (1961) is the one of the first authors that has observed the history of 
the Kurdish struggle or national movement. Jwaideh highlights the Sheikh Said 
rebellion in (1925) for northern Kurdistan.  Jwaideh (1961) touches on the 
Kurdish culture and roots with prominence on the Kurdish national movement in 
this region. Despite the time of this work that was conducted in the middle of 
last century, there is some direct relevance to the question of transformation of 
the struggle of social movement in Kurdish areas of Turkey. It is a wide-ranging 
research on several aspects of Kurdish society such as: language, culture, 
social life, economic, politics and geography of Kurdistan. There is a focus on 
the causes and the results of the rebellions of ‘Muhammad Pasha of Rawnduz’ 
and ‘Sheikh Ubaydullah of Nehri’ in the nineteenth century. Also there is an 
emphasis on explaining the revolt of ‘Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji’ and the rise and 
the fall of that revolution in the southern part of Kurdistan in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Moreover, reference is made to ‘Sheikh Abdul Salam 
Barzani’s’ rebellion in the south in the nineteen thirties and  the struggle of 
Kurds in Iran and establishing the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad by ‘Qazi 
Mohammed’ in 1946.  Jwaideh (1961) is very interesting and has an historical 
importance in terms of the political history of the Kurdish national movements in 
all parts of Kurdistan in the last century. Nonetheless, the work has a lack of 
addressing the question that this thesis is trying to deal with which is the issue 
of transformation of Kurdish struggle from one dimensional to multi-dimensional 
activism and through social and civil means as well as political aspect at the 
present time. 
Another important work is conducted by Robert Olson (1989). This work is of 
relevance to the current study as there is a real concern about social movement 
in the northern part of Kurdistan focusing on two points. Firstly, the work looks 
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at the policy of Great Britain with regards to the Ottoman Empire and the 
Kurdish issue in the wake of the collapse of the empire, since the power of 
Great Britain had a direct but negative effect on the future of the Kurds at that 
time. Olson (1989) also focuses on the international implications of the revolt of 
‘Sheikh Said’ in (1925). The second point is that; Olson (1989) raised a 
question about the revolt of ‘Sheikh Said’ as he asked whether it was religious 
or nationalist. In other words; the revolt of Sheikh Said was somehow a Kurdish 
struggle and aimed at making a home or autonomy for the Kurdish people in the 
northern part of Kurdistan. However, the apparatus of that revolt “such as 
propaganda, mobilization and symbols of the revolt” were religious. Olson 
(1989), states that the violence, tribal feuds, and individual disputes were 
noticeable causal factors in the rebellion. Therefore, the revolt from the 
beginning gave the impression that it would be a failure. Mainly rural Kurds 
were supporting ‘Sheikh Said’ and the Kurds of the cities did not support the 
rebels. 
In addition to that, Olson (1989) suggested that the religious character of the 
rebellion was of use to ‘Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’ in his ambition to secularism. 
Whether or not the revolt was a nationalist one, it is clear that the newly 
established Turkish state treated it as a religious revolt in order to justify actions 
against the traditional place of Islam in government and society. Olson (1989) 
also points out the continuity of the Kurdish national movement over the last 
century besides the limitations within the movement that continue to decay the 
struggle. Furthermore, he shows the histories of the growth of international 
backing for the idea of the independence of Kurdistan. That was the matter that 
had been mentioned in the Treaty of Sevres (1920) and by the ‘League of 
Nations’. Yet, the Treaty of Lausanne in (1923) depressed that dream. The work 
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of Olson (1989) has a great importance with regards to issues of Kurdish 
national movements and its struggle. Yet, as mentioned earlier, still there is a 
gap that the current study attempts to fill which is investigating the discourse of 
the movement in relation to the process of transformation of Kurdish national 
movement from armed struggle to a civil and legal one in the recent and current 
time in the northern part of Kurdistan.  
 Van Bruinessen (1992) is another important work in this field. This work 
underlines the issues of the form and nature of the Kurdish national struggle 
and the class awareness in the Kurdish society. Van Bruinessen (1992) 
highlighted an important point in terms of Kurdish perspectives and struggle. He 
argued that in the southern part of Kurdistan, during the sixties and seventies of 
the last century; the revolution by ‘Mustafa Barzani’ was a different movement 
compared to the revolutions elsewhere. In the case of Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Mexican, Cuban and even Algerian revolutions, all the way through the 
twentieth century; Barzani’s revolution was different. Van Bruinessen (1992) 
argued that those revolutions were progressive (justice-seeking, anti-
exploitation and anti-imperialist). Nevertheless, the Kurdish movement in Iraqi 
Kurdistan was conservative and even backward-looking in appearance, in spite 
of the justness of its demands. It is astonishingly shocking for some 
commentators that despite the fact that Barzani remained for at least twelve 
years in Moscow after his fleeing from Kurdistan due to the collapse of 
Mahabad republic in 1947 when he came back and started leading the 
revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan; he was much more conservative and with tribal 
tendencies than before his escape. 
Bruinessen (1992) is looking for the reasons for this condition in the Kurdish 
national struggle. He suggested that, conservatism is due to the persistence of 
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"primordial loyalties" which are those to family, tribe, tribal chief and landlord, 
and religious figures such as the Sheikhs or the leaders of Mystics. 
Questionably, Bruinessen (1992) tried to touch an important subject of the 
history of the Kurdish revolts that has lately been highlighted in the twentieth 
century. Throughout the whole history of the Kurds in the twentieth century, 
Kurdish movements have always tried to solve their problems with the same 
mentality as the mentality of their enemies who created the problems for them. 
Kurds always fought to solve the problem with less or the same level of thinking 
that has created the problem. Moreover, Kurds always asked for the same type 
of rights as others had and others deprived the Kurds from. As a matter of fact, 
Kurdish people have struggled for gaining a nation state in the same way as 
Turks, Arabs and Persians have. Yet, so far it can't be achieved. 
Another important point in Bruinessen’s (1992) work that to a certain degree 
has a relevance to this study is raising a question about the revolt of ‘Sheikh 
Said’ in 1925 in the northern part of Kurdistan. Bruinessen (1992) highlighted a 
question whether the revolt of ‘Sheikh Said’ was religious or nationalist. He 
argues that the revolt was a mixed action between both. The limitation of this 
work can be addressed through his overview to the class struggle within the 
context of the Kurdish national movement. The work can be seen as a great 
academic work about Kurdish social and political structure. Yet, he undervalued 
the importance of the social and political outcome of the revolt of ‘Sheikh Said’. 
The revolt of ‘Sheikh Said’ has internally had a significant influence on the 
Kurdish-Turkish relations throughout the twentieth century in Turkey and 
externally the revolt had an impact on the policy of great powers such as Great 
Britain’s foreign policy with regards to the Middle Eastern powers and newly 
established states. Another point that is worth mentioning is that the author has 
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visited most of places of Kurdistan for his fieldwork and he had a close 
observation. 
Another prominent work in relation to the social and political movement in 
Kurdistan is the work of Denise Natalie (2005). In her study, she focuses on the 
Kurdish national movement through emphasising Kurdish ethnicity as a central 
point of the movement. Natalie (2005) argues that due to the political status of 
the Kurds within the states of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, and complex 
relationships between the Kurds and these states made the notion of ethnicity a 
noticeable theme in the Kurdish movements. The notion of nationality and 
ethnicity among the Kurds are almost the same since the governments of the 
four countries are calling for nationality and citizenship on the one hand. Yet, 
Kurdish movements always wanted to call for Kurdishness as a notion of 
ethnicity and then as a notion of nationality on the other hand. This means that 
the issue of highlighting Kurdishness has become a priority as distinctiveness to 
confront others around them. Thus, the work of Natalie (2005) tries to deal with 
the question of how this complex relationship in the four different contexts has 
affected Kurdishness and Kurdish national movements. Natalie (2005) links this 
issue with the political space as she argues that the Kurdish national struggle 
has become a struggle for highlighting the Kurdishness as an ethnically 
distinctive. This is dependent upon the incentives that have been offered by the 
governments of these four states and the reaction of Kurdish national 
movements to those incentives structures. In other words, what it means to be a 
Kurd consequently must be considered in relation to what it means to be a 
citizen of one of these four countries. 
Natalie (2005) argues that political space regardless of the actual situation of 
the Kurds was relatively larger. Nevertheless, in the case of Turkey, the status 
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of the Kurds and political space for the Kurds is almost absent. Moreover, on 
the status of the Kurds of Iran, Natalie (2005) argues that political space was 
more accommodating to the Kurds, as compared with Turkey and Iraq. 
According to Natalie (2005), political space is not subjected to continuity across 
the places and times. Yet, variations have created differences in terms of 
expression of the Kurdish struggle in different settings over the period of the last 
century. Particularly after the 1990s the notion of Kurdishness and ethnicity has 
become significant across the whole of Kurdistan, regardless of the notion of 
political space inside any state that the Kurds live in.  
Another relevant work to the study of the Kurdish national struggle is that of 
David Romano (2006). Romano examines Kurdish nationalist movements via 
analysing their discourse as social movements. Romano does this by looking at 
the different Kurdish nationalist movements and comparing three Kurdish 
political parties, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Romano (2006) 
compares the structures, policy and leadership of those three Kurdish parties. 
Romano’s work focuses especially on the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, 
especially the revolt of the PKK. Yet, it does not fully unpack the issue of recent 
transformations in the Kurdish national struggle in the northern part of Kurdistan. 
Moreover, there is not any explanation of the new Kurdish national movements 
that have developed in recent years through the focus on the civil, cultural, social 
and political struggle rather than armed struggle and using violence. In addition 
to that, there is no mention of some social and political phenomenon and 
concepts that are new aspects of the cultural, social and political agendas such 
as the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ and establishing a system that is called 
the  ‘KCK’ as an umbrella for the Kurdish national movement in Turkey.   
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The work of Houston (2008) investigates the process of nation building and the 
Kurdish struggle in the Middle East. Houston (2008) examines the foundational 
practices of the process of nation building and the process of establishing 
nation states in the Middle East in the wake of the First World War. Houston 
(2008) illustrates the status of the Kurds as a nation with regards to the process 
of building states and marginalizing or disregarding Kurds during the process by 
the newly established states of Iraq and Turkey. Another important point in the 
work of Houston (2008) is looking at the impact and the role of Kemalism in 
Turkey and Khomeinism in Iran and showing similarities and differences 
between both. Houston (2008) mainly looks at the status of the Kurds in Turkey 
and the impact of Kemalism on the Kurdish question. He tries to examine the 
nature of Kurdish ethnicity as an interpersonal and creative act. Houston (2008) 
tries to show the importance of similarities and differences between Kemalism 
and Khomeinism and their effects on the process of building national identity 
and with regards to the Kurds. Thus the focus of the work is on the imagining 
and producing of Turkish, Arab and Persian national identities rather than a 
Kurdish one. Thus, according to Houston (2008), the Kurdish nationalism is the 
reaction of the other nationalism projects in the region. Houston (2008) believes 
that Kemalism is a negative phenomenon of the Middle East and has had a 
negative impact on the process of building the state. Thus, Houston (2008) 
suggested that it must be thought of a process of de-kemalisation of the state 
and society in Turkey. This is an important point and can be elaborated in detail 
in deferent academic works in future. This point is important for this thesis as 
the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey is reaction to the Turkish nationalism 
and under the hegemony of Kemalism. The PKK especially was a reaction of 
Kemalism and the process of Turkification.  Although Houston (2008) does not 
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concern the issue of legal and civil struggle of the Kurds in Turkey; yet the work 
of Houston is important in two aspects for this study. First, there is a lot of 
analysis of the status of the Kurds in Turkey in terms of nation building. Second, 
there is a great explanation for the birth, rise and impact of Kemalism on the 
whole processes of the Kurdish struggle in the twentieth century. In other 
words, Houston (2008) suggests that there is a notable impact of Kemalism on 
the discourse of the current social movements in the Kurdish part of Turkey. 
 
More Recent Assessments of the Kurdish National Struggle 
It is undoubtedly useful to draw attention to the past and have an historical view 
for the Kurdish revolutions and movements in order to make the recent and 
current Kurdish struggle to be understood better. However, the focus this study 
is on the current situation of the Kurdish national struggle and transformation of 
the strategies of that struggle. This includes the recent changes from using the 
violence and guerrilla warfare that have narrow sights and limited achievements 
through the civil and modern ways of social movement activities that have 
strategic and long term goals and wider achievements. There is an interesting 
point which is whether the Kurds in Turkey are about to get on with the change 
and have started to transform their struggle from using violence to playing civil, 
cultural, social and political games in the arena. For that, two of the academic 
works that are worthy to be mentioned in this study are the works by Robert 
Olson (2009) and Nicole Watts (2010). 
Olson (2009) shows the parliamentary activities by the closed DTP party and 
the current BDP party as a political wing and legal representative of the PKK. 
Watts (2010) likewise, examines the main focus of this party as the main and 
only active Kurdish party which can mobilize and politicise the Kurdish people 
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and raise their awareness with regards to their cultural, social and political 
rights. It is, however, important to recognise that there are several small and 
marginalized Kurdish or pro-Kurdish, legal and illegal parties in Turkey such as 
the Kurdistan Socialist Party, in Kurdish Partiya Sosialista Kurdistan (PSK) and 
legal parties such as the Rights and Freedom Party, in Kurdish Paritya Maf u 
Azadi (Hak-Par) and the Participatory Democratic Party, in Kurdish Partiya 
Demokrata Besdar (KADEP). However, comparing to the peace and 
Democratic Party (BDP) and organisations that are under the range of the 
“Ideology of PKK”, these parties are very small and ineffective parties on the 
Kurdish social and political arena in Turkey. 
Watts (2010) also focuses on the Kurdish activists in the municipalities and 
governmental offices as a new and to some extent legal way of struggle within 
the Kurdish national movements in the last decade of the twentieth century and 
the first decade of the twenty first century. Watts (2010) shows a big difference 
of struggle by legal pro-Kurdish social and cultural activists ‘Ciger Xwin’, Dicle-
Firat, and ‘Aram Tigran’ houses as well as political activists in Turkey such as 
previous People Labour Party (HEP), Democratic Party (DP), People 
Democratic Party (HADEP), Democratic People Party (DEHAP), Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) and currently the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and 
Democratic Society Congress DTK. Beside these parties, there are several civil 
and academic activities which can be regarded as a new wave of Kurdish 
national movements, (Watts, 2010). 
Nonetheless, Olson, (2009) and Watts, (2010), did not focus on the way and the 
nature of the transformation of the strategies and actual reasons for and 
elements of that change. They both have no focus on the issue of labelling the 
PKK as a terrorist organisation and the capture of its leader Abdulla Ocalan as 
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a turning point of thinking of that change and searching for other methods of 
struggle. The ranges of the both works were not about investigation of the 
reasons behind the ideological shifting that made the PKK reshape itself and 
create the KCK system. In other words, they both ignored focusing on the newly 
and uniquely established body that is called the KCK system as a main 
character for the Kurdish national movement in the current time. 
Gunes (2012) is another new and important work in this field. This book 
engages with discourse of the Kurdish national movements from the 1960s of 
the twentieth century. Gunes (2012) mainly focuses on how the Kurdish identity 
has been discursively produced? He is highlighting the major shift of the 
discourse until the emergence of the PKK in the 1970s. Gunes (2012) is mainly 
referring to Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical engagement with regards to the 
discourse of the Kurdish identity. The relevant point in the work of Gunes (2012) 
is the analysis of the shift of the PKK’s discourse from separatism to democratic 
solution within Turkey. The work of Gunes is relevant to this thesis in the way 
that the issue of transformation is somewhat about that shift. However, the point 
that Gunes (2012) does not touch upon is the whole frame of the newly 
established social and cultural system of the KCK as a wider and multi-
dimensional movement rather than only the PKK and political engagement with 
the shift of Kurdish nation statehood to democratic solution within Turkey. The 
work of Gunes (2012) has its importance also in terms of investigating the 
narration of establishing the PKK since the early 1970s until very recent pro-
Kurdish parties in Turkey. Yet, most of the recent academic works including 
Gunes (2012) have ignored the wider analysis for the cultural, social and 
societal activism of the KCK. Therefore, analysing the KCK activism and 
referring directly to the KCK make this current thesis authentic in this field. 
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There are also journal articles that have been written on this subject; such as 
Gambetti (2005), Tezcur (2010), Grojean (2012), Jongerden and Akkaya 
(2012), and Casier and Jongerden (2012). Certainly, all of these articles are 
important and relevant to this work. These articles highlight issues such as 
the issue of terror and the placing of the PKK into the list of terrorist groups 
by Turkey, the EU and the USA. These are the fundamental issues that 
have, in fact pushed the PKK to review its own ideologies and policies. The 
point was one of the reasons that have become a turning point for 
establishing an alternative entity that can cover almost all Kurdish activism in 
the wider sense. Meaning that, the process of transformation from the PKK 
to the KCK was partially a product of this point. 
The importance of this thesis comparing to the previous works that have 
been mentioned above could be seen in the forthcoming chapters.  It can be 
briefly argued that this thesis will show a different face of the Kurdish 
national movement by focusing on political, cultural, social and societal 
aspects of the struggle through the newly establish system that is called the 
KCK. For that, the task of this thesis is to focus on the main point of this 
study which is investigating the reasons behind the shift of the PKK to the 
KCK. In order to accomplish that, theories of social movement and 
nationalism can contribute this thesis to analyse its main question. This first 
part of this chapter has set out a brief survey on relevant works on Kurdish 
nationalism, and what the thesis will later describe as the Kurdish national 
struggle. The point here has been while there is much relevant and 
worthwhile work, much of its lacks the focus on issues not only of this 
struggle for Kurds who live in Southern Turkey, but more fundamentally, 
those movements which represent and/or reflect their interests. In the next 
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part of this chapter, there will be an engagement with social movement 
theories and looking for the approach of examining the Kurdish national 
struggle and set out a theoretical framework for the main actor of the Kurdish 
national movement which is the KCK.  
 
 Social Movements and the Kurdish National Struggle: Social 
Movements and the Analytical Lens 
What is a social movement? What is the benefit of a social movement theory 
approach for my thesis? Despite the fact that defining a social movement is a 
complicated, yet worthwhile; the benefit of this theoretical lens for this thesis is 
to help structure the engagement with the research material, and indeed to help 
provide a further anchor for the research structure deployed here. In this thesis, 
the constant which is compared before and after transformation is the 
institutions of that demand political rights, recognition, and autonomy for the 
Kurds living in Southern Turkey. The rationale behind utilising social movement 
theories is that the KCK as the main character of the Kurdish national struggle 
is regarded as a social movement in this thesis. It is suggested that the main 
task of social movements is about changing values of society, Castells (2012). 
The thesis argues that the KCK has worked on transformation on the values of 
the Kurdish national struggle from political one-dimensional struggle to societal, 
social, cultural, and political struggle that can be seen as multi-dimensional 
struggle. Therefore, despite utilisation of theoretical understanding of 
nationalism; this thesis suggests that it is crucial to utilise theories of social 
movement in order to better examine the notion of transformation of the Kurdish 
national struggle in Turkey. Some scholars may call the Kurdish movement 
nationalist movement, but in this thesis, it will be referred to as a social 
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movement that comprises the Kurdish national struggle. This is a specific term, 
inspired by the work of French sociologist Alain Touraine (1981). Touraine 
argues that social movements are inherently about struggle. Therefore, the KCK 
as a main actor of the Kurdish national struggle is considered as a social 
movement in this thesis and theories of social movements are so crucial for 
understanding the Kurdish national struggle.   
Touraine (1981) categorizes three types of 'positive' struggles and three types 
of 'critical' ones. Positive and critical struggles can occur at the levels of 
historicity, institution, and organisation. Positive struggles happen in a “totality” 
of reform or revolution, and critical ones are against a “totality”. Touraine argues 
that positive struggle at the level of historicity is called social movement, at the 
institutional level is called “institutional” or “political pressure” and at the 
organisational level is called “claims” and “protests”. For Touraine critical 
struggle at the historicity level is “revolutionary action”, at the institutional level is 
“pressure against obstacles”, and at the organisational level is “crisis behaviour” 
(Touraine, 1981: 84-90). In this classification, there are two struggles that can 
be regarded as social movements: positive struggle at the historicity level and 
critical struggle at the same level. Touraine (1981) restricts them as “social 
movements” and “revolutionary action” correspondingly. 
Such arguments stand in direct contrast to the work of scholars like Smelser, 
who only define the idea of social movement in light of collective behaviour. 
Smelser (1962) defines collective behaviour as “mobilization on the basis of 
belief which redefines social action”, (Smelser, 1962: 8). According to Smelser 
(1962), there are two types of social movements; norm-oriented movements 
and value-oriented movements. He argues that, “norm-oriented movements are 
struggles to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a 
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generalised belief”, (Smelser, 1962: 270). However, value-oriented movements 
are collective struggle to “restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name 
of a generalised belief”, (Smelser, 1962: 313). By referring to Robertson (1988) 
and Giddens (1984), it can be said that norm-oriented movements cover social 
reform movements, and value-oriented movements cover revolutionary 
movements. For Smelser (1962), political and religious revolutions, the 
formation of sects, nationalist, nativists, messianic, millenarian, utopian, 
charismatic, and many other movements all can be regarded as value- oriented 
movements, (Smelser, 1962: 313). 
 According to a structural-functionalist view in sociology, the division of social 
movements by Smelser (1962) is a general and complete one. The point is; 
to what extent can one divide values from norms? It is a practical question 
that this stream of thought may struggle to answer, but the result, which is 
division between reformist and revolutionary movements, is generally 
accepted in the field. Smelser (1962) detailed explanations about value-
oriented movements; however, it may bring hesitation to mind that some of 
these could be reforms as well. Interestingly, classification of social 
movements by Touraine (1981) is broadly the same as Smelser (1962), but 
derives from a critical sociology point of view. The main distinction is that 
Touraine (1981) regards cultural struggles as social movements, whilst 
Smelser (1962) considers some of the institutional and organisational 
struggles, by borrowing the terminology of Touraine (1981), to be norm-
oriented social movements as well. The typology of Touraine (1981) is more 
practical, as it shows the location of social movements in the social structure, 
in contrast to the more abstract classification of Smelser (1962). It can be 
argued that the classification of Touraine (1981) as a matter of definition 
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identifies as social movements only those that are at the cultural level. 
It is important to indicate here that the social movements during the frame 
process face at least six strategic hurdles if they are to become a force for 
social change, McAdam, et al (1996). Social movements must: (A), be able 
to recruit new members, meaning that, they can have attractive ideological, 
social, political and economic agendas to persuade new recruits to join the 
movement. (B), they have to show their will to continue the morale and 
commitment of current adherents. (C), they have to be able to generate 
media coverage of a favourable sort. (D), social movements must be able to 
mobilize support from various people out of their range of members, 
“bystander public”. (E), another important point is constraining the social 
control option of their opponents. (F), the last and a very important point is 
shaping public policy and state action, (McAdam, et al 1996: 340-341).  
The first and second points can be seen as internal actions to maintain the 
movements’ internal strengths through recruitments and sustainability. Yet the 
other four points are external actions that lead the movements to grow up and 
move towards power and maintaining social change. Moreover, the existing 
conception of collective action frames and framing process can be disloyal to an 
almost exclusive concern with ideas and their formal expression by the social 
movements’ performers. Thus, empirical research on the topic tends to focus on 
the speeches, writings, statements, or other formal ideological pronouncements 
by social movements performers. 
Nevertheless, some collective behaviour is not predictable as in the case of social 
movements. Therefore, it can be argued that all social movements are collective 
behaviours, but not all collective behaviours are social movements. Touraine 
(1981) sees social movements as a function of class and class struggle. He 
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suggests that “social movements are the organized collective behaviour of a 
class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of 
historicity in a concrete community”, (Tourane, 1981: 77). Tilly (1978) argues that 
“collective action consists of people’s acting together in pursuit of common 
interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of interests, 
organization, mobilization and opportunity”, (Tilly, 1978:7). Zald and McCarthy 
(1987) have suggested that “a social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in 
a population representing preference for changing some elements of the social 
structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society”, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987: 
20). In other words, they suggest that a social movement can be described as a 
“purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individual and 
societal institutions and structures”, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987: 122). Therefore, 
the main task of a social movement is to change the perspective of individuals 
and values of society, Zald and McCarthy (1987), 
The specific focus in this thesis is to analyse the Kurdish national struggle, or 
more specifically, institutional evolution and transformation (as a social 
movement) in the specific context of Northern Kurdistan/Southern Turkey over 
the past 10 years and examine it through organisations. More importantly, 
Castells (2012) suggested that “social movements, throughout history, are the 
producers of new values and goals around which the institutions of society are 
transformed to represent these values by creating new norms to organize social 
life”, (Castells, 2012: 9). He argues that there is in theory, an essential difference 
between political movements and social movements. Political movements are 
aiming at the state. They are aiming at changing power of the state. Not the 
destruction of the state as in the case of revolution, but the way of running the 
state and institutions within the state can be the main aim of a political movement. 
 62 
Castells (2012) argues that the best and most recent example in this respect 
can be the Obama Campaign in 2008. In the case of Obama, the values and 
norms, the basic elements of society, social and political products are still there, 
but the political power and some parts of political structure will be changed. 
More specifically, it is only partially that the political power can be changed by 
changing Republicans for Democrats or vice versa. Otherwise, the ‘Wall Street’ 
and capitalist economic system stay. On the other hand, Castells (2012) 
suggested that social movements are collective actions that are aiming at 
transforming the values of society affecting the way that people think, behave 
and speak. Social movements are about affecting the way people produce or 
reproduce several new terms and concepts or at least redefining the concepts 
and giving them different values. Therefore, the main point and the salient 
element of social movements are transformation of the social values and 
perceptions of society. Based on explanation of Castells (2012), it can be 
argued that there is a dialectical relationship between social movement and 
transformation. There is no social movement if the process of transformation of 
the stage and changing, then reshaping values has not taken place. Also 
societal transformation cannot happen without broad and collective activities 
that are shaped in the colourful cloths of a social movement.  
There are several social movements which have utopian or radical ideologies in 
the beginning of their struggle. However, they are compelled to change their 
policy to a reform or even reverse from their ideologies because of some new 
circumstances in their ways. The best example in this respect can be the 
movement which is the main subject of this study. The PKK which was the main 
actor of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey can be an example of this 
type of ideological and strategic shifts. In the beginning of the struggle of new 
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Kurdish movement in the northern part of Kurdistan, the PKK was calling for 
independence of the greater socialist Kurdistan state. However, over time and 
in accordance with the new wave of social and political atmosphere in the 
region, the PKK has changed its aims and policies to autonomy for the Kurdish 
people within the democratic Turkish republic. 
The useful point to be mentioned here is that there are several different 
classifications for the types of social movements.  However, the main task for 
this study in this respect would be the focus on the Kurdish national movement 
in Turkey and to discover whether any of these types of social movements and 
theoretical explorations can be useful to understand the nature of this social 
movement and its organisations, and elaborating elements of differences and 
similarities according to the theories of socials movements. In order to get close 
to our theoretical explanation with regards to the social movement in the 
Kurdish part of Turkey, it is necessary to draw attention to and narrow down the 
focus on the main concept of this study which is the concept of transformation 
within social movement organisations. 
 
Structural Factors and Organisational Change in Movements of the 
Kurdish National Struggle 
Social movements might go through several stages during their periods and 
activities. It can be described as growth or decay or, in the most cases, changes 
and renovating themselves. In other words, social movements rise and fall; 
retreat and revive “according to the political conditions of the movement”, 
(McAdam, et al 1996: 53). Zald and Ash (1966) argue that social movements 
manifest themselves through their organisations. These organisations are often 
subjected to a wide range of internal or external, perhaps both internal and 
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external pressures that affect their power, viability, effectiveness, structure and 
policy, goal attainment and eventually, sustainability, (Zald and McCarthy 1987). 
As a result of these kinds of pressures, often organisations have to think of 
changes in their policies and practices, their strategies and agendas. 
This can be described as organisational transformation. As Zald and McCarthy 
(1987) discuss, the model of organisational transformation stems from Max 
Weber. There are three types of changes that are involved in the process of 
social movement organisations. They are: goal transformation, organisational 
maintenance, and oligarchisation, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987).  
Goal transformation might take several forms of changes in strategy and 
agenda. It also takes changes in tactics and programmes. The example of goal 
transformation could be the diffusion of goals from difficult and unattainable 
goals to easier and attainable ones. Zald and McCarthy (1987) suggested that 
this can happen often by pragmatic leaders and for the sake of sustainability, 
“so the organisation can pursue a broader range of targets”, (Zald and 
McCarthy, 1987:121). The example of this type of organisation is the main 
concern of this study and the way of changing and transformation of the goals 
of the PKK and the Kurdish struggle by the leadership of the PKK, especially 
after the capture of its charismatic leader Abdulla Ocalan in 1999. 
Organisational maintenance is the second type of organisational change; it is 
basically a special form or practice of goal transformation, meaning that, “the 
primary activity of the organisation becomes the maintenance of membership, 
funds, and other requirement of the organisational existence”, (Zald and 
McCarthy, 1987:121). This kind of maintenance represents the practical ways in 
which movements maintain resonance and salience in the face of structural 
alteration – the way that such movements stay relevant in a constantly changing 
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world. Take example for organisational maintenance can be seen in the way that 
the main actor of the Kurdish national movements has started to reorganize its 
structure through the change of the senior members of the management of the 
PKK and replace its old policy by focusing on civil and legal activities through pro- 
Kurdish Turkish parties such as, the DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and very 
currently the BDP inside Turkey. Organizational maintenance also implemented 
through developing several Kurdish and pro -Kurdish civil and media institutions 
in Europe such as, the Kurdish National Congress (KNK) in Europe, the Kurdish 
Human Rights Project in London and several TV stations during the last fifteen 
years such as, MED_TV, Media-TV, Newroz-TV, Roj-TV and currently, Med Nuce 
TV and Sterk TV in Belgium. All these activism have been developed within the 
process of reorganizing the movement in the 2000s.  
The third type of organisational change in a Weberian sense can be seen as 
the process of bureaucratisation, Weber (1977). Zald and McCarthy (1987) 
have called it as oligarchization. It has been described as the concentration of 
power in the hand of few members of the organisation who are on the top of the 
organisational hierarchy, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987:122). Apart from the issue 
of transformation, there are other concepts that have a great impact on this 
study and in order to be able to explain the nature of Kurdish national 
movement. One of the concepts can be resource mobilization.  
 
Resource Mobilisation and Kurdish National Struggle Movements 
So far, this chapter has established that both a given context (i.e. the structural 
operating constraints of what a movement is trying to achieve) as well as the 
nature and aims of the social movement will influence organisational forms and 
management structures. There is, however, another key factor: the tools that a 
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social movement has at its disposal to try to achieve these aims in a given 
context are important in shaping the movement and the consequences of the 
movement’s outcome. On the other hand, it is argued that different tasks demand 
different sorts of organizational structures. For instance, “centralized structures 
can be more effective for institutional change, but have more difficulty in 
promoting grass-roots participation. Decentralized structures can obtain more 
membership involvement, greater satisfaction and group maintenance, but will 
tend to score low in strategic-goal attainment”, (Zald and Ash, 1966: 329). 
There is also a fundamental question as to how enduring a movement, and more 
specifically its aims and ambitions, are in terms of its strategies and activities to 
achieve success. Instrumental movements that are seeking to achieve short-term 
goals will tend to develop centralized, hierarchical organizations possessing a 
clear division of labour and roles. In this case, as Zald and McCarthy (1987) 
argued, organizational survival will not be a concern, beyond obtaining the 
movement’s goals, and all resources will be invested in goal-attainment. 
However, expressive movements that are seeking attitudinal and value 
transformations and the re-creation of collective identities will generally tend to 
have long-term goals and emphasize organizational survival. In this case, the 
social movement will be developed decentralized, segmented and reticulate 
organizational structures with a vaguely defined division of labour and roles (Zald 
and McCarthy: 1987). 
Resource mobilization theorists tell that the aims, strategies and activities of 
social movement organisations are not always those of the social movement as a 
whole, McAdam, et al (1996), Zald and McCarthy, (1987). When considering 
these issues at the granular level, it is important to realise that movements are 
not inherently monolithic, but rather complicated and dynamic sums of their 
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multiple parts. Studies regularly find differences between the beliefs and 
motivations of leaders and rank and file members of these organisations. 
Commentators warn that because social movement organisations enjoy relative 
autonomy from the movement’s membership, therefore, “the merging between 
the organisation’s program and membership interests in most cases can be 
assumed to be problematic”, (Jenkins, 1983: 528). Moreover, social movements 
are hardly unified affairs because they are combined by various organisations 
pursuing different goals and engaging different tactics. Possibly these 
organisations can “occasionally engage in all-out war against each other” since 
they are in competition for limited resources and support”, (Zald and McCarthy, 
1987: 161). 
It is argued that internal factors cannot be justified for the growth of social 
movements. Resource mobilization theorists also measure the role of outside 
factors, or third parties, in the development of social movements. McCarthy and 
Zald (1977) argue that ‘conscience constituents’ (individuals and groups who 
share the movement’s goals and donate resources, but who do not stand to 
benefit directly from goal-attainment) play a central role (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977b: 1221). The flows of resources from these sectors to social movements’ 
organisations are of central position in the process of mobilization, especially in 
cases where the distressed group comes from the subordinate end of the social 
ladder, (Oberschall, 1973: 159). Often social movement commentators are 
focusing on the other concept which is political opportunity structure with the 
issue of resource mobilization; that concept is also important for explaining the 
whole picture of social movements' growth and decay or even rebirth. 
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Political Opportunity Structures and the Kurdish National Struggle 
The idea of political opportunity structure as being important to social 
movements was first introduced by Eisnger (1973), but afterwards, the concept 
was elaborated and defined by Tarrow (1983). According to Jenkins and 
Klandermans (1995), political opportunity structure for any social movement has 
three elements in terms of the political system. Those elements are “its formal 
institutional structure, its informal procedures and prevailing strategies with 
regards to the challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the 
confrontation with the challengers”, (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 168). 
Political opportunity, with reference to social movements, here means, “the 
degree of openness or closeness of formal political access, the degree of 
stability or instability of political alignments, and the availability and strategic 
posture of potential alliance partners”, (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 167) 
Tarrow (1989b) has suggested another fourth dimension: political conflicts 
within and among elites. 
This concept and its dimensions need to be explained more in order to see the 
function of social movements with regards to structures and political processes. 
Political structures are interdependent on the dynamic of authority between 
challengers and the states in terms of the actions of the state and the action of 
social movements. This means that both formal and informal procedures are 
actively affecting the structure and the strategy of authority and challengers of 
the state and social movements. In other words, the process of interaction 
between authority and challengers within the political context has been running 
according to a specific logic that any social movement has, Jenkins and 
Klandermans (1995). On the other hand, the configuration of power within the 
political opportunity structure; it depends on the political and social system of 
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the movements. For instance, in the party system, the configuration of power 
“refers to the distribution of power among the various parties as well as to the 
relations that exist between them”, (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 180). 
Another important point is the characterisation of the structure and functioning 
of the system. Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) argue that the nature of 
political systems will affect the structure and function of social movements. For 
example, in “a corporatist system” union structures and functions are highly 
comprehensive. In a “pluralistic system” by contrast, union structures and 
functions are highly fragmented, (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 190). On the 
other hand, McCarthy, et al (1996) classified the typology of opportunity 
structure into two different types: proximate opportunity structure and state-
cantered opportunity structure, McCarthy, et al (1996). The notion of the first 
type which is proximate opportunity focuses on the signals that groups of social 
movements receive from their immediate policy environment or from changes in 
their resources or capacities. 
Qasimlu, (2006) argues that those movements that are small and not very 
effective and not famous mainly have bigger demands and claims. Nonetheless, 
those movements or political parties that are famous and have large public 
support mainly have demands and aims that are smaller. Qasimlu, (2006) tries to 
explain this puzzle through the theory of changing the strategy and the aim of 
social movements. He argues that due to the lack of support and little 
responsibility of the movements, such small movements are living in a utopia 
and looking at the big and not real aims.  However, by getting some experience 
and gaining a good amount of support from their people, they will realize that 
these kinds of utopian aims are hard to achieve. Qasimlu, (2006) gives a vital 
example in his life during his struggle as a Kurdish leader in the eastern part of 
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Kurdistan and in his role as secretary general of the KDPI. He suggested that his 
party as the biggest Kurdish party in the eastern part of Kurdistan is demanding 
autonomy for Kurdistan within the democratic republic of Iran. Yet, the smallest 
Kurdish party in Kurdistan is demanding a greater independent Kurdistan and 
never compromise on any centimetre of the Kurdish land in all four parts of 
Kurdistan. Thus, changing the aims and goals of social and political movements 
can often be under the influence of social and political situations. 
In this sense, there are two subtypes of proximate opportunity structure; one of 
them is policy-specific opportunities. It means that the focus of social movements 
would be on policy and the way of addressing policy to mobilize collective 
actions around particular issues and looking at the consequences, (McCarthy, et 
al, 1996: 42).  In contrast to this subtype of proximate opportunity; the second 
one which is group–specific opportunities focuses on the opportunity structure of 
specific groups and their changes over time, (McCarthy, et al, 1996: 43). 
The second type of opportunity structure according to McCarthy et al (1996) is 
the state-centered opportunity structure. This type focuses on the state and its 
function with regards to social movements. This one also can be classified in to 
two subtypes; cross-sectional statist and dynamic statist. The notion of cross-
sectional statist is some sort of reaction against the first type which was 
proximate approach. In this type, the state can be regarded as the crossroads of 
the parallelogram of group forces, which means that the state can be seen as a 
whole entity which is an autonomous and irreducible set of institutions, McCarthy 
et al (1996). The function of the state here is shaping political conflicts in the 
interest of “its survival and aggrandizement”, (McCarthy et al, 1996:44). 
On the other hand, the second subtype of state-centred opportunity structure is 
the dynamic statist. This is about the way of states’ changes and how these 
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changes can be a reason to produce or reduce political opportunities.  Charles 
Tilly can be seen as a main scholar in this respect, Tilly (1992) in McCarthy et al 
(1996) argues that the process of making state does not end just by emerging 
the stately institutions. He argues that the process of state building is a dynamic 
one and addresses both state vis-à-vis the social movements institutions and to 
“continually remake the state itself”, (McCarthy et al, 1996:44).  The notion of 
this dynamic process is very important for this study. It is important for reading 
the process of transformation of social movements and changing the strategy of 
the movements. The dynamic process theory is most beneficial for this study in 
terms of political opportunity structure theories that have been mentioned 
above. 
Commentators argue that the “entire political systems undergo changes which 
modify the environment of social actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, 
forms and outcomes of collective actions”, (McCarthy et al, 1996:44). While the 
cross-sectional statist type helps us to understand the link between social 
movements and political opportunity structure to a national grid of institutional 
regulations, the dynamic statist helps us to specify political opportunity for 
different actors and sectors. However, in order for us to understand the 
process of political opportunity structure, we need to be familiar with the 
cultural framings of the social movements that we are about to highlight in the 
next section of this thesis.  
 
Cultural Framing and the Kurdish National Struggles  
For any social movement or collective action, culture is important that needs to 
be taken into account. Cultural Framing here refers to all “shared beliefs and 
understandings, mediated by and constituted by symbols and language, of a 
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group or society”, (McAdam, et al, 1996: 262). On the other hand, we have 
another important concept in this respect which is ideology. For this concept, it 
is useful at this point to examine the meaning of ideology and its position. The 
term ideology was first used by De Tracy as “the objective and impartial 
gathering of ideas gained through experience” (George and Wilding 1994, 2). 
Karl Marx’s explanation of ideology is more social and practical. He argues that 
“ideology has a social and material function not only logical and intellectual” 
(Harrington 2005, 43). De Tracy defined ideology “as a study of ideas about the 
world. Now, ideology is once again a representation of the world”, (Leonardo, 
2003: 211). Karl Mannheim is one of the major figures in this respect. He 
argues that “dominant ideologies are always distortions of reality for the benefit 
of the ruling groups and to the disadvantage of other groups in society”, 
(George and Wilding, 1994:  4). 
The best definition of ideology might be the one that has been provided by 
Talcott Parsons, who defines it as a “system of beliefs held in common by 
members of a collectivity…a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative 
interaction of the collectivity”, (George and Wilding 1994, 5). Focusing on both 
culture and ideology in this work can have a very crucial impact, as the current 
Kurdish national movement in Turkey is going through a set of ideological 
frames which is affecting the frame of culture to a large extent. By and large, 
these conscious ideational expressions are, of course, important components of 
the whole efforts of given social movements, (McAdam, et al 1996). Movement 
framing and the issue of opportunity can be seen as two interdependent 
variables, meaning that, a social movement framing process concentrates on 
the volatile end of political opportunity. On the other hand, as McAdam, et al 
(1996) argue, social movements can be seen as a field of actors not a unified 
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entity. Social movements “often have a range of actors pursuing numerous 
strategies in both institutional and extra institutional venues”, (McAdam, et al 
1996: 283). For example, sometimes an organisation within a social movement 
combines institutional ways of pressure such as lobbying or electoral politics, 
while using extra institutional strategies to affect the situation such as boycotts 
and demonstrations. 
Frame propagation is another issue that can be regarded as crucial for social 
movement tactics and strategies.  Tilly (1978) in McAdam, et al (1996) argues 
that “broad political and social structures influence the range of tactics available 
to movement actors”, (McAdam, et al., 1996: 301). Social movement tactics can 
be seen as those actions that directly raise the costs to the powers and public; 
for instance; strikes or boycotts and the use of physical coercion. On the other 
hand, it can be in the form of dissemination of diagnostic and prognostic 
frames. It is obvious that every social movement is using several tactics and 
strategies to influence and change the agendas of their opponent powers. 
 
The Kurdish National Struggle: A New Social Movement? 
 Based on the new social movement theories, the main noticeable feature of 
social movements is that they are focusing on cultural and social aspects. In 
other words, social movements are multi-dimensional in terms of the social and 
cultural framing process. However, the political aspect still remains as an 
important feature of social movements. In the Weberean expression, Buechler, 
(1995) argues that new social movement theories are rooted in continental 
European traditions of political philosophy and social theory. 
In previous academic iterations, social movements have been predominantly 
seen from the classical Marxism approach which presumed that all political and 
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social actions are driven from economic logic of the conflict between the 
capitalists and working class people. Moreover, as Canel (1992) in Buechler 
(1995) argue, “Marxism’s class reductionism presumed that the most significant 
social actors will be defined by class relationships rooted in the process of 
production and that all other social identities are secondary at best in 
constituting collective actors”, (Buechler, 1995:442). 
These ideas made Marxist theorists ignore any other forms of social actions and 
concentrate only on the proletarian revolutions. In contrast to that, the notion of 
new social movements theories have focused on the various arrays of collective 
actions that can be regarded as an alternative for the previous academic 
iterations of social movements according to classical Marxism. In Buechler's 
(1995)’s words, new social movements theorists “have looked to other logics of 
action based in politics, ideology, and culture as the root of much collective 
action, and they have looked to other sources of identity such as ethnicity, 
gender and sexuality as the definers of collective identity”, (Buechler, 1995: 
442).  
From the view point of Laclau and Mouffe, the social movements are “products 
of co-modification of social life which destroyed previous social relations, 
replacing them with commodity relations”, (Bertram, 1995:89). Laclau and 
Mouffe’s attempts are to give explanation to social movements out of the circle 
of classical Marxism. In other words, “their entire philosophy is predicated on an 
optimistic view and emerging democratic consumer culture”, (Bertram, 1995: 
89). 
Touraine (1988) has anticipated several faces of the major debates in relation 
to the social movement and he can be seen as a leading theorist in this respect. 
He argues that social movements have two dimensions. As Buechler (1995) 
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elaborated, the first coming from Marx’s approach which reiterates Marx’s idea 
that “there is one central conflict in every type of society”, (Buechler, 1995:444). 
For Marx, obviously this is the struggle between labour and capital in industrial 
society. Nevertheless, Tourane (1988) suggested that in post-industrial society, 
the conflict between labour and capital subsides. Instead of that, “other social 
cleavages become more salient and generate new identities, and the exercise 
of power is less in the realm of work and more in the setting of a way of life, 
forms of behaviour, and needs”, (Edelman, 2001: 288). 
Another dimension is from a Weberian approach which is the concept of ‘the 
actor’. According to Touraine (1988), in post-industrial society, “diverse 
collectives have a growing capacity to act on themselves and to struggle for 
historicity … the set of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models”, 
(Edelman, 2001: 288).  This is very interesting point that makes this study to 
consider that despite the difficulties of seeing any gap between old and new 
social movements theories. Yet, the social movements have their own 
distinctiveness and dimensions. On the other hand, it can be argued that there 
is a bridge and a strong link in between both types of social movements. In 
other words, new social movements are extensions of the old social movements 
theories.  
The main argument about new social movement theory related to this thesis is 
that since the PKK was mainly political collective action; it can be understood 
through the previous academic iterations of social movement. However, the 
KCK as a multi-dimensional movement that is mainly focusing on cultural and 
social aspects; it is better understood through the new social movement 
approach. This is a clear indication that the theories of social movements are 
useful and necessary for understanding the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey.  
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In all cases, there are various theories about social movements that are very 
important for this study and some of them are less important. In the next 
chapters, the importance of most of these theories will be seen during analysing 
the main subject of this thesis which is social movement in the Kurdish part of 
Turkey. 
  
Conclusion 
The main concern of this chapter was on the two important points that can be the 
main base for the vision and the sight of investigating the main subject of this 
thesis. The chapter has reviewed literature and academic works of previous 
scholars that have been written about Kurdish national struggle and Kurdish 
national movement in Turkey. This chapter has set out some of the key elements 
of social movement theories in a way that will help to analyse and explain how 
the PKK came into being, and more recently has evolved into the KCK. The point 
here has not been to argue that there is a single deciding factor in this transition – 
that it was not solely resource mobilisation, cultural framing, or indeed structural 
factors in state behaviour towards the demands of social movements, but rather 
all of these factors in combination which will help to explain and illustrate this 
phenomenon. Through the prism of this chapter, theoretical contexts of Kurdish 
national movement will be better framed and understood. 
In the next chapter, there will be a discussion about Kurdish national struggle in 
all parts of Kurdistan in the twentieth century. The main focus will be on Turkey 
and the northern part of Kurdistan as it is the main area of this thesis. The 
chapter will also explain the notion of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey as a reaction 
for the notion of Turkish nationalism and the impact of the Turkish nation state on 
the Kurds and performance of the Kurdish national struggle.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE HISTORY OF KURDISH NATIONALISM 
  
  
Honestly it is difficult to believe that there is a nation that is not 
free across the centuries. The nation that is ready to give 
everything to gain freedom. 
Jawahir Laal Nahro- 1935, about the Kurds (Deschner, 2011: 8) 
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Introduction 
In the two previous chapters, the thesis has set out some of the current 
emphases in the literature on Kurdish nationalism, and a theoretical framework 
through the prism of social movement theories that will help to explain the 
activities of the PKK and subsequently the KCK. This chapter will critically 
present the historical background of the Kurdish national struggle in Kurdistan. 
It will show especially, the reasons for and aspects of the failure of the Kurdish 
struggle throughout the twentieth century in all parts of Kurdistan. The 
emphasis will mainly be on the northern part of Kurdistan and particularly the 
notion of Kurdish nationalism under the hegemony of and as a reaction against 
Turkish nationalism in Turkey. 
This chapter focuses on the historical pattern and behaviours evident in Kurdish 
activism for freedom and independence since the beginning of the twentieth 
century until recent years. One can ask whether the Kurds have ever been 
constructing any national movement on their land. In other words, has the 
Kurdish national struggle finally reached a level where they could be regarded 
as a national movement according to the theories of social movements, Tilly, 
(1987), or do their actions mainly have tribal, local or regional features? It is 
worth focusing on this point through the design of the elements, types and 
levels of social movements, Touraine (1981), Castells (2012). This chapter can 
help the thesis to get closer from answering the main question which is 
investigating the reasons behind changing the struggle of the main actor of the 
Kurdish national movement in Turkey to investigate transformation from the 
PKK to the KCK.  
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Who are the Kurds? The history of the Kurds: 
Kurds are believed to number around 30 to 40 million people. They are the 
largest ethnic group of stateless people in the world, (Yildiz and Muller, 2008). 
Geographically, Kurds live in the area called Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds). 
Going back to the early history, according to the great French encyclopedia; 
“Kurds are an asian nation, situated in the west of Iran and the highlands 
around the Tigris and the Euphrates. Kurdistan continues from the Loristan 
region in Iran until Kharpoot (a current city in Turkey called Elazig), which is a 
point where both branches of the Euphrates connect. This is about 900Km long 
from north-west to south-west and 100km to 200km wide on the parallel lines 34 
to 39 longitude and the parallel lines 37 to 46 latitude in the east. The main 
valleys of Kurdistan are the valley of the Bitlis river, both valleys of Adham and 
Sherwan, and the highlands of Zagra. The lake of Wan and its citadel is the 
capital of this Asian and brave fighting nation”, (Abdullah, 2010: 22). The cities 
of (Diyarbakir) in Turkey, (Erbil) in Iraq, (Qamishlo) in Syria and (Sanandaj) in 
Iran are the four major cities that the Kurds see them as regional capitals of 
each part within the four countries. Today, according to the new map of the 
world, agreed by the international community, there is no Kurdistan. Thus, the 
map of Kurdistan (below) is only a wish or a claim by the Kurds themselves. 
The land of the Kurds is situated in the north of Iraq, the south east of Turkey, 
the north of Syria and the west of Iran. Moreover, there are several millions of 
the Kurds living in metropolises, such as Istanbul, Tehran, Damascus and 
Baghdad. 
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The map of Kurdistan (http://www.ardalan.org/about.html) 
No-one has ever claimed that those metropolises are Kurdish areas, however, 
the vast number of the Kurds living in those cities; make them very important for 
the Kurdish struggle and the social and political movements of the Kurds. For 
instance, Istanbul is sometimes considered as the biggest Kurdish city rather 
than Diyarbakir or Erbil, since there are around three to five million Kurds living 
in Istanbul, according to some informal information from Kurdish political 
parties. Moreover, there are large Kurdish communities living in countries of the 
former Soviet Union, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and several other countries. Also there are more than two million Kurds 
in Europe and the USA, and more than a million in Germany alone, (interview 
with A7 on 05/08/2011). 
 According to several historians and archaeologists, “Kurds are the products of 
years of evolution stemming from tribes such as Guti, Kurti, Mede, Mard, 
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Carduchi, Gordyene, Adianbene, Zila and Khaldi, and the migration of Indo-
European tribes to the Zagros mountain some 4,000 years ago”, (Yildiz and 
Muller, 2008: 4). The Kurdish way of life was mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic 
and traditionally organised along tribal lines. Furthermore, “the Kurds have a 
clan history, and have traditionally been organized into tribes and inhabited 
rural districts herding sheep or goats, with some adherence to a nomadic or 
semi-nomadic lifestyle. It is estimated that there are over 800 tribes in the 
Kurdish regions”, (Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 4). Greeks used the word “Kurds” for 
ethnic groups. Herodotus considered the Kurds to be brave and good fighters. 
He thought that the Kurds were ancestors of “Carduques” who fought with 
Xenophon and his ten thousand solders in 400 BC, (Badirxan, 2010). On the 
other hand, the Kurds used to call themselves “Gutus”, which can be translated 
as “fighters”, (Badirxan, 2010:  39).  
Interestingly, the majority of the Kurds and the biggest part of Kurdistan are 
situated in present day Turkey. Estimates indicate that the Kurds constitute 
thirteen to sixteen per cent of all the Turkish population which is about seventy 
three million, Dixson and Ergin (2010). This means that Kurdish people in 
Turkey number about ten to twelve million. Debatably, this is far less than the 
actual number of the Kurds in Turkey. Due to economic, social and political 
reasons, significant amounts of the Kurds in Turkey’s western metropolises do 
not want to or cannot express their Kurdishness. Many have also been 
assimilated for decades so that they no longer think of themselves as Kurds.  
Heper (2007) stated that, public opinion surveys conducted in May 2006 
indicated that ‘those who spoke with their parents in Kurdish [both Kurmanji and 
Zazaki dialects] constituted 13.2 per cent of the whole population of Turkey, 
(Heper, 2007:1).  Moreover, “another public opinion survey carried out in March 
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2007 by one of the leading national newspapers ‘Milliyet’ found that the ‘Kurds; 
comprise 15.6 per cent of the population, or 11.5 million people”, (Heper, 2007: 
1). Kurdish political parties and Kurdish intellectuals argue that the Kurds 
currently number around forty million and about 55 per cent of them are living in 
Turkey. On the other hand, Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey out of 
several different minority ethnic groups such as Albanian, Arabs, Armenian, 
Greek, Cerkes, Laz and others. In addition to that, unlike other Turkic ethnic 
groups; “the Kurds have not been an immigrant group; they have lived in what 
today is Turkey and adjacent territories for long centuries”, (Heper, 2007:1). 
Toprak (2009) argues that “there are 49 identifiable ethnic groups in Turkey, the 
Kurds are the most abundant and are located mostly in the south eastern and 
metropolitan areas in Turkey”, (Toprak, 2009: 1388). Yet, on the land that is 
present-day Turkey there are three old and indigenous ethnics groups; Kurds, 
Armenians and Greeks, (Abdullah, 2009).  Despite the difference in religion and 
culture between Kurds and Armenians, according to a Kurdish Prince “Suraiyya 
Badrkhan” and the head of first Kurdish nationalist organisation in the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Kurds and Armenians have been living together, next 
to each other and in peace and harmony and with good relations on the land 
that they both claim it as their mother land for about three thousand years. 
In spite of having had the same religion for at least the last fifteen hundred 
years, Badrkhan (2010) argues that “it can be noticed within the myths, folk lore, 
songs and stories of Kurdish people, that there are several points or 
expressions of conflicts with Arabs, Persians and especially with Turks. Yet, the 
same cannot be noticed against the Armenians”, (Badirxan, 2010: 70). 
However, there were some periods where relations were negative between the 
Armenians and the Kurds under the Ottoman Empire and during the rule of the 
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young Turks some of the Kurdish fighters were used to fight and kill the 
Armenians as part of the Turkish attempts to genocide to the Armenian people 
as they were an obstacle to the Turkish dream of establishing a pure Muslim-
Turkish state in the region. 
Yet despite these nationalistic arguments for the antiquity and authenticity of 
Kurdish identity, it is important to recognise that it is neither a unified or 
monolithic phenomenon. During the course of last century of Kurdistan, there is 
a set of partition and fragmentation impact on culture, education, society and 
politics for the Kurdish people. Moreover, in contrary to the languages of the 
three main nations in the region “Arab, Fars and Turk”; Kurdish language has 
never become a united and standardised language. Furthermore, the Kurdish 
language has several different dialects and sub-dialects which make it difficult 
for the Kurdish people from different parts of Kurdistan to understand each 
other. After a hundred years of this fragmentation, only well-educated Kurds 
with an interest in learning other dialects are able to understand those from 
different parts of Kurdistan. For instance, if you are from the Turkish part of 
Kurdistan, you need to speak Turkish or Persian with another Kurdish person 
from the Iranian part of Kurdistan or you need to have an interpreter. 
In terms of Kurdish writing scripts, there are also differences. The main two 
different alphabets for the Kurdish language are the Arabic or Aramaic script 
and the Latin one. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, there is also a 
third script for writing Kurdish; some Kurds use the Cyrillic alphabet there, 
McDowall (2010). Furthermore, despite having a positive impact as well, having 
several religions and religious sects among the Kurds has also led to several 
conflicts and disunity. More than all of these factors however, the nature of tribal 
structure of the Kurds has created smaller entities and clans which have 
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become an obstacle to undertake wider activities and think of a united national 
entity, Van Bruinessen (1992). These points about Kurdish culture and history 
motivate this study to draw attention in this chapter to the history of the Kurds; 
to make better understanding of the nature of Kurdish national movement. 
In order to understand the Kurdish mosaic and the effects that different states, 
through policies of political control and repression, have that inflicted on the 
Kurds; this chapter will now examine the experiences of Kurds in four different 
states countries in more detail over the course of the twentieth century.  
 
The Kurds in Iraq (Southern Part of Kurdistan): 
In the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the province of Mosel was 
included into the newly established country of Iraq. Since that time, one part of 
Kurdistan, without consent of the people, without any respect to the identity and 
culture of its people, has been placed within the borders of this new country 
which was created under the British mandate, McDowall (2010). According to 
the international commission of enquiry set up by the ‘League of Nations’, in this 
new state that became independent in 1932, the Kurds had to have the rights to 
establish their own autonomous local administrations, judiciary and education 
systems as well as the rights to having Kurdish as their own official language. 
However, due to the promotion of Arab nationalism in the region and the 
thinking of creating a united Arab entity rather than a diverse society including 
other ethnic and religious minorities, the newly established Arab majority 
kingdom of Iraq never fulfilled those promises, McDowall (2010). 
Despite forming a noticeable minority and strong struggle of the Kurds as well 
as having crucial roles within this new state, the Kurds have been treated as 
second citizens during the course of different Iraqi governments. Throughout 
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the 1930s and 1940s, there were few groups and intellectuals that promoted 
Kurdish nationalism and national struggle towards the Kurdish independent 
political entity or at least some cultural, social and political rights for the Kurds. 
Some leftist figures gathered under the name of the “Hiwa” group. ‘Refiq Hilmi’, 
the leader of the group who was a prominent figure during the revolt and the 
control of ‘Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji’ had some good experience with British 
policy and the nature of the Kurdish and Iraqi society. Hilmi tried to exploit 
‘Mustafa Barzani’s’ rebellions and turn it into a nationalist movement. 
Nonetheless, due to some tensions between two waves within the ‘Hiwa’ group, 
the attempt was not successful. As McDowall (2010) argues, the rebellion 
“remained intrinsically tribal, its outcome settled more by tribesmen than by 
regular groups, let alone by nationalist volunteers”, (McDowall, 2010: 294). 
  Another attempt that is worth mentioning was a Kurdish group that was first 
created within the Iraqi communist Party ‘ICP’ and came out actively. It soon 
had its own journal called ‘Shurish’ “Revolution” and established a party that 
was called ‘Rizgari Kurd’ “Kurdish Liberation” in 1945.  This party was calling for 
the freedom and unification of Kurdistan. Its interim objectives “included 
administrative independence inside Iraq and the establishment of co-ordinated 
co-operation with Kurdish parties outside Iraq”, (McDowall, 2010: 294). 
Nonetheless, soon Rizgari Kurd came under pressure, “dozens were arrested 
and an attempt was made to stifle Kurdish publications. Even ‘Gilawej’, ‘Ibrahim 
Ahemd’s’ literary journal was suspended”, (McDowall, 2010: 294). 
By August 1946 both ‘Rizgari’ and ‘Shurish’ had decided to dissolve 
themselves, “less the result of governmental pressure than a new dilemma 
created by Mullah Mustafa in Iran”, (McDowall, 2010: 295). In 1946, the KDP 
which has had a key role in this part of Kurdistan since; was established by 
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Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Yildiz and Muller (2008). Certainly, the birth of the KDP 
is grounded in some controversies. On the one hand, the KDP has been a 
cause of re-emphasising the lines of the power of the sheikhs and chieftains 
over those that were considered as progressive and somewhat secular leftists. 
Moreover, establishing the KDP in Iraq and separating it from the main KDP by 
‘Qazi Muhammad’ in ‘Mahabad’ “has contributed in endorsing the legitimacy of 
Iraq-Iran border and using the concepts of Iraqi Kurdistan”, (McDowall, 2010: 
296). On the other hand, the KDP became the main and only Kurdish national 
party at least in the southern part of Kurdistan. Thus, all other Kurdish attempts 
within the ICP or other smaller groups were essentially rendered irrelevant in 
the Kurdish struggle under the name of Kurdishness. In 1956, the KDP re-
joined with the group of ‘Hamza Abdulla’ and his “coterie known as KDP-
Progressive Front. Many of the Kurdish section of the ICP also joined the KDP 
in 1957 and for a while, to indicate these amalgamations, the KDP was known 
as the ‘United Kurdistan Democratic Party", (McDowall, 2010: 300). After the 
coup of ‘Abdul Karim Qasim’ and the termination of the role of the Iraqi 
Monarchy in 1958 and establishing the Republic of Iraq; the Kurds once again 
had hopes to gain their rights. Yet, those hopes were frustrated and the conflict 
in Iraq between Ba’athists, Communists and ‘Abdul Karim Qasim’ suppressed 
the demands of the Kurds iterated by the KDP leadership. Thus, in September 
1961, the movement restarted its guerrilla campaign against the central 
government due to the failure of fulfilling the promise that had been given to the 
Kurds.    
On 11 March 1970, the Kurdish struggle reached to a point where it forced the 
Baathist central government to give some sort of autonomy to the Kurds. Within 
the agreement, there were fifteen points that fully recognized the social, political 
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and cultural rights of the Kurds within Iraqi Kurdistan, McDowall (2010). From 
1970 to 1974, the Kurds enjoyed a period of great freedom and self-rule. Yet, 
the central government backed away from the agreement, mainly due to the 
tensions regarding the city of Kirkuk which the Kurds claimed belongs to 
Kurdistan. Therefore, once again the central government started to deprive 
Kurdish people of their rights. 
In March 1975 the Iran- Iraq agreement became a main reason for the Kurdish 
authority to be toppled. Iran no longer supported Iraqi Kurds in favour of 
demarcation of the “Shatt ul Arab” according to the Constantinople protocol in 
1913, (McDowall, 2010: 338). Within a few hours of this agreement, Iran 
stopped all supplies to the KDP and two weeks were given to all fighters and 
their families to go to Iran or surrender to the Iraqi authority. That was known by 
the Kurds as ‘Ash Batall’ collapse. The majority of the KDP fighters chose exile 
lives and most of Barzani’s family members were settled in Iran. They 
announced the termination of the revolution. 
Despite the fact that after a few years, the KDP restarted the struggle under the 
name of ‘Gulan Revolution’. Yet again, due to that collapse, the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan, ‘PUK’ was established and started its so called different way of 
struggle under the name of “the new revolution of Kurdistan”. Soon, the PUK 
became a main political party and the instructor of Kurdish revolution, and they 
started to go back to the mountains and start guerrilla warfare again. Since 
then, there were several on and off guerrilla warfare incidents and attacks on 
the government’s offices and army bases. Nonetheless, the struggle never took 
place in a systematic and effective manner. Thanks to the Iran-Iraq war some 
credits were made to the Kurdish parties in gaining some support from Iranian 
state. 
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As a matter of fact, all the KDP, PUK and other smaller parties were very much 
easily used by Iran in its war against Iraq. They were used for Iran’s interest 
against Iranian Kurdish political parties such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party-
Iran ‘KDPI’ and Kurdistan Revolutionary Group ‘KOMALA’ rather than 
supporting the Kurds and the struggle to gain their rights. It is arguable that this 
point has been continued until today’s date in the case of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government ‘KRG’ under the management of the KDP and the PUK. 
Debatably, the poor performance in the Kurdish parties’ relations with Iran, 
Turkey and other regional states is due to the same reason. The hardest 
moment of the Kurds was the moment that these states supported them mainly 
for using them against each other. Thus, the civil war (bra kuji) between Kurdish 
parties in Iraq had a long history. 
The campaigns of genocide (Al-Anfal) that have killed hundreds of thousands of 
the civil Kurds and attacking of the Kurdish city of ‘Halabja’ by chemical 
weapons took place in the decade of eighties of the twentieth century. After 
1991, and as an aftermath of the first Gulf War, Kurds once again had a chance 
to get some sort of freedom and with the support of western powers, especially 
the UK and the USA, Kurds established an autonomy government and for the 
first time in the history of the Kurds; in 1992 there was a limited democratic 
election for the national assembly of Iraqi Kurdistan. There were about ten 
Kurdish and Kurdistani political parties that participated in that election, 
Stansfield (2005). Since then, despite several internal conflicts and civil war 
between Kurdish political parties, the KRG has been running majority of the 
Kurdish areas within the borders of Iraq. 
The main and important point of this presentation about the Kurds in this part of 
Kurdistan is the focus on the way of ideological motivation behind the struggle 
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of the Kurds in Iraq. As van Bruinessen (1992) argued, in the south part of 
Kurdistan, during the 1960 and 1970s, the revolution by Mustafa Barzani was a 
different movement compared to the revolutions elsewhere. He argues that, the 
Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan was conservative and even backward-
looking in appearance, in spite of the justness of its demands. Bruinessen 
(1992) has suggested correctly, in terms of comparison between Kurdish 
revolution in the south part of Kurdistan and other revolutions in other places. 
However, the pathway that the Kurdish revolution took in the 1960s and 1970s 
can be seen as a continuation of what has happened in almost all other 
attempts of the Kurdish revolts in the history of the Kurdish national struggle for 
gaining some limited rights. Moreover, it has continued until today’s date, even 
after the two decades of having a Kurdish status quo ‘the KRG’ in the southern 
part of Kurdistan. This ideology has been developed and reached to the point 
that became a main strategy of communication between Kurdish political parties 
in the southern part of Kurdistan. It is obvious that at the current time, within the 
KRG government and main political parties even after twenty years, this point is 
a king maker for gaining support among Kurdish people. One may say that the 
PUK came as an opponent of the KDP to rectify this tribal and backward notion 
and make a new wave of progress under the ideology of socialism. 
 It can be argued that the PUK was a semi front party that was made from a few 
different representations or waves of the struggle. The main and most effective 
one was the group of Marxist Leninist of Kurdistan that was known as KOMALA 
most recently. They started with some sort of revolutionary ideas, inspired by 
Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Yet, soon after the assassination of their leader 
“Aram”, they turned out to be under the influence of the mainstream ideology of 
the style of Kurdish political struggle. Thus, the PUK did not and could not touch 
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that point and continued playing the same or a similar role on the same 
pathway as the KDP. This argument can be true until today’s date as it is so 
obvious that there is no any essential ideology and thinking that make 
differences between the KDP and the PUK.  Consequently, soon after its 
establishment, in 1975, the PUK has started to follow same path but under a 
different name.  Interestingly, the difference between the KDP and the PUK on 
the one hand and the PKK on the other can be seen in this point essentially. I 
will investigate this matter in detail in the forthcoming chapters of this thesis. 
Due to the first Gulf war in 1991 and the decision of ‘Saddam Hussein’ by 
invading ‘Kuwait’; an opportunity has come to the Kurdish people and the 
Kurdish movement in the southern part of Kurdistan that is inside the borders of 
Iraq to gain some sort of autonomy. Despite the way and the methodology of 
the struggle and due to external supports and opportunities, the Kurdistan 
Regional Government ‘KRG’ has been established. In relation to this research, 
it is important to elaborate the difference between the pathway and the style of 
struggle in the southern part compared to the northern part of Kurdistan. It can 
be somehow clear that how this entity ‘KRG’ has survived and the obstacles or 
support for KRG by the Kurdish social and political struggle is in the northern 
part as the biggest and most influential part of Kurdistan.  
 
The Kurds in Iran (Eastern Part of Kurdistan)          
The Kurds in Iran are living a different life and have been treated rather quietly 
for a long time. Their cultural and social rights to a small extent were celebrated, 
due to the similarities and having a similar destiny with other ethnic groups in 
Iran. The land that the Kurds now claim was called Kurdistan since the time of 
Seljuk. The region was “governed and administrated under the name of 
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Kurdistan”, (Ocalan, 2011: 82). Yet, the notion of diversity could not bring about 
some sort of democratic rule in Iran across the centuries. For instance, 
education in Kurdish language and political activities are forbidden for the 
Kurds. Since 1514 when the border between the Ottoman and Persian realms 
was allocated as a result of the battle of ‘Chalderan’, Kurdish land has been 
divided into two parts between Turkish Ottoman and Persian Safavids power. 
As Sayfaddin, (2009) argues, “loosing Safavids in the war of Chalderan caused 
the Kurds to have the majority of their lands under the Ottomans”, (Sayfaddin, 
2009: 123). 
Since then, the rest of the Kurdish land and Kurdish people have had a lower 
treatment and level of life in Iran. For a long time, the Kurds were living within 
the land that was called Iran and the origin of the Kurds is related to the 
Iranians throughout history. However, the notion of Kurdishness in one way or 
another has always been kept and manifested. In Iran, the Kurdish struggle has 
always been managed via tribal, feudal characters. This notion has been 
extended until today’s date, especially under the management of the traditional 
political parties such as the KDPI and KOMALA in the eastern part of Kurdistan. 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, there was a rebellion of the 
Kurds by Ismail Aga of Shikak, known as “Simko” in western Iran (Qendil, 2006: 
59). Nevertheless, due to the lack of wider support from other Kurdish tribes, 
soon this revolt was depressed by the central government of the King ‘Shah’ 
from Tehran. Interestingly, in 1946, the Kurds could form a short-lived Kurdish 
entity called “Kurdistan Republic” in the north western Iran in the city of 
“Mahabad”. Despite the short period and having a weak and novice cadres of 
this entity, there was a good example of the self-ruling power of the Kurds at 
that time. Ocalan (1996) argues that the republic of Mahabad was a great 
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model of governing and democratic authority in the history of the Kurds. 
According to Ocalan (1996), the model of Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad can 
be developed and used as a case of self-ruling Kurdish model, as a first 
confederation model and the model that he calls, “Democratic Autonomy”. He 
argues that the steps of the democratic autonomy model of governing started 
from the Mahabad Republic. This notion currently in the northern part of 
Kurdistan is getting stronger. It gives room to be a culture and a model of ruling 
people by themselves. It shows the start of an era that the model of nation state 
is no longer applicable and acceptable in this land, (in the speech of 
anniversary of Mahabad Republic, 1996). 
It is worth mentioning that this Kurdish entity, alongside another local republic 
that is called Azerbaijani Republic in the north west of Iran had support from the 
USSR. Yet, the red army was persuaded  “to withdraw a year later from the 
Mahabad Republic after signing an agreement allowing for soviet participation 
in the exploitation of oil in northern Iran”, (Yildiz and Muller, 2008:10).  Thus, in 
the end of 1946, the Shah’s troops occupied the areas that were under the rule 
of Mahabad again and soon started to kill Kurdish leaders and ban all 
educational, cultural, social and political Kurdish activities. Moreover, the Iranian 
authority hanged the leader of the Republic of Mahabad “Qazi Mohammed”, 
Yildiz and Muller (2008). 
After Qazi Mohammed, until today’s date, there are two traditional political 
parties that are representing the Kurdish cause in the eastern part of Kurdistan; 
the KDPI and KOMALA. Both parties were going through a serious of 
dismantlement and civil wars. Yet, any smaller part within both two main parties 
still wanted to keep the name and the history of the party as their belongings. 
Despite having an educated Kurdish leader in Iranian Kurdistan who was “Dr 
 93 
Abdurrahman Qasimlo”, the Kurdish movement remained weak and could not 
have any essential effect on the Kurdish social, cultural and political spheres in 
Iran. 
In 2002, another Kurdish party started its struggle with different methodology 
and discourse. PJAK derived from the PKK and became an Iranian branch of 
the Kurdish movement within a broader system that is currently called 
‘Unions of Communities in Kurdistan’, in Kurdish, ‘Koma Civaken Kurdistan’, 
the “KCK”. In the next chapters, the KCK will be elaborated in detail. 
According to a senior member of the PJAK management, their model of 
struggle is different from the KDPI and KOMALA, since they are focusing on 
the power of their people rather than external and international powers to 
help them. The PJAK claims that they are rather a social and cultural 
movement than a political party. A senior member of the PJAK argues that, 
“in order for Islamic Republic of Iran or any other authority in Iran recognize 
the Kurdish cultural, social and political rights, we need to start from 
educating our people before expecting anyone to recognize our rights”, 
(interview with B1 on 21/09/2012). 
In the 1990s the Iranian government announced that the Kurdish struggle 
against the state had totally ended and the Kurds accepted their fate. The 
Iranian state claimed that the Kurds accepted the fact that they are only 
Iranian people with limited cultural and no political rights. Iran is a land for all 
Iranians including the Kurds and other minority ethnic groups. That has been 
a discourse of the Iranian authority for a long time. Yet, once again having 
the PJAK as another Kurdish party that are carrying out armed struggle in 
Iran has slightly changed the reality of that Kurdish defeat for decades, 
(interview with B2 on 24/10/2011).  
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Despite that little revival, at the current time, the Kurdish situation in Iran has 
been experiencing its most awful moments ever. There are daily detentions 
and execution of the Kurdish and anti-Iranian regime activists. Yet, due to 
the weakness of Kurdish social, cultural and political struggle, the Kurdish 
national struggle and opposition movements in Iran have been enjoying the 
most silent and inactive period of their lives. 
  
The Kurds in Syria (Western Part of Kurdistan): 
In Syria, the Kurds have a different situation. Not only limited cultural, social and 
political rights were forbidden, but the existence of the Kurds as people has 
been denied, let alone the land and the concept of Kurdishness and Kurdistan. 
After the rule of Ottomans, the land that is now called Syria was under the 
French mandate. As a land, “the Kurdish populations placed under French 
mandate occupy three narrow zones, isolated from one another, all along the 
Turkish frontier: Jazira, Jarablus, and Kurd Dagh”, (Tejel, 2009:9).  Just as 
Arabs and Assyrians live among the Kurdish areas, they are living among an 
Arab majority in Syria. According to Ocalan (2011), the Kurds in Syria mostly 
migrated from other parts of Kurdistan due to the tribal conflicts and other sorts 
of injustice across the centuries. Interestingly, Ocalan (2011) suggests; “such 
migrations contributed substantially to intercultural transformation processes”, 
(Ocalan; 2011: 89). 
On the other hand, due to their special conditions under the Syrian regimes and 
their geopolitical conditions alongside their small populations in comparison to 
the other parts of Kurdistan, until very recently, the Kurds in Syria were very 
much connected to the revolutions and the Kurdish political parties in the 
different parts of Kurdistan. For a long time, the KDP in Iraq had a direct 
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influence on the Kurds in Syria. Afterwards, the PKK became a main player 
within the Kurds in Syria until today’s date. This means that they did not have 
some independent aims and frames of their own, let alone the influence of the 
Syrian regimes and the process of denial, assimilations through an Arabization 
process and the state discriminations against them. 
Nonetheless, the Kurds in Syria still had a potential to become an active 
character in the process of democratisation and respectful diversity. Thus, 
existence of the Kurds can be positive point in bringing about the immense 
diversity in Syria. This also can be a positive and fertile land for bringing about 
great democratic compromises and tolerance in Syria. However, in the ground 
of reality across the twentieth century until today’s date, there were tyranny and 
dictatorship atrocities on the people and especially on the Kurds in Syria. The 
hardest time for the Kurds in Syria came after the establishment of the United 
Arab Republic. Due to the idea of unification between Egypt and Syria in 1958, 
all supports for the Kurds have been stopped and the notion of Arabization has 
been fully implemented.  
Since then, the Kurds have been regarded as Arabs and they are forced to be 
Arabs, Deschner, (2011).  Under the rule of the Al-bath party, the situation is 
getting worse and worse. Thus, the Kurds in Syria have been prohibited from 
their basic cultural, social and political rights until very recent times. Despite 
having some sort of political parties and struggle of the Kurds in Syria, as 
mentioned earlier, mostly Kurdish political and social struggle are under the 
influence of the main parties in other parts of Kurdistan, especially under the 
influence of the PKK from the north and the KDP and PUK from the southern 
part of Kurdistan. This means that, in contrary to other parts of Kurdistan, 
Kurdish national movement in Syria was under the influence of one of the three 
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main Kurdish political parties. Nevertheless, since the Kurdish national struggle 
in the north has been transferred from a political party ‘the PKK’ to a multi 
dimension movement ‘the KCK’ as a main character within Kurdish national 
movement, Kurds in Syria have turned to be organized under the “Ideology of 
PKK”  and started to build their own social, political and cultural entities. 
Understanding this point will only become clearer when the ‘KCK’ and its 
activities will be investigated in the forthcoming chapter. 
Recently, and due to the sequences of so called the Arab Spring in the region, 
Syria has become a very sensitive area for the Kurds. It is for the first time in 
their history “the Kurds are fighting for themselves”, (interview with D1on 
20/06/2012). They are about to build their own home through their cultural, 
social, political and self-defence plan in the Kurdish areas in Syria. The Union 
Democratic Party, “PYD” as a main party for the Kurds in Syria and the Units of 
People Defence, “YPG” and the Units of Kurdish women defence “YPJ” as the 
only Kurdish armed forces in Syria are actively struggling to draw some clear 
lines between both main powers in Syria. All the PYD, the YPG and the YPJ are 
under the hegemony and umbrella of the KCK. 
The Kurdish pathway can be regarded as the third way in between the power of 
the state and the power of the opposition groups such as Islamic state in Iraq 
and Al-Sham (ISIS)1, the front of Al-Nasrah and the Free Syrian Army’ and their 
Councils. The PYD and another nine small Kurdish Parties have created a ‘High 
Committee of the Kurds’ to show people that the PYD is not controlling all 
powers under its hands. However, in reality all other parties including those who 
                                                 
1 ISIS is a terrorist organisation and active Islamist militant group in Syria and Iraq. In 
their ideology, they are calling for Islamic Caliphate, it claims Islamic Law over all 
Muslims and aspires to bring much of the Muslim regions of the world under its direct 
control of its so called state. They recently changed the name of the group to Islamic 
State (IS). 
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are supported by the KDP in the southern Kurdistan region are currently very 
small and, without the PYD, none of them has power. Recently, the Kurds have 
established three autonomous local governments in the predominantly Kurdish 
areas of the northern Syria. As a matter of fact, despite their denial of having 
connections with the KCK, they are not denying their connection with the 
Ideology of ‘Abdullah Ocalan’. The reason for the mass support of the PYD, 
YPJ and YPG from the Kurdish people comes back to the impact of “the 
Ideology of PKK” and the policy of the KCK on the Kurds in Syria. This point will 
be clearer in chapter five of this thesis. 
To be concise, the current situation of the Kurds in Syria is very much 
connected to the Kurdish situation in the northern part of Kurdistan. Also the 
social and political status of the Kurds in Syria and establishing self-ruling 
administrations has started to become reality. This means that the Kurds have 
become an active and positive character in the process of democratization of 
the region. 
  
The Kurds in Turkey (Northern Part of Kurdistan) 
 The main and most complicated part of Kurdistan is situated in Turkey. The 
Kurdish national struggle in Turkey has an effect on the other parts of Kurdistan 
as well as on the whole Turkey. In the wake of the establishment of the secular 
Turkish state, the Kurds were deprived from rights and freedoms of expressing 
of their identity. Soon they were asked to forget about their Kurdish culture, 
language, clothing, singing, their way of practising their religious ceremonies 
and worship; even their way of thinking and dreaming had to be changed and 
they had to start being Turks and do all those activities as a Turkish people. 
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The Turkish state had an intensive and harsh plan of Turkification2 over non-
Turkic ethnic groups in Turkey. Turkification over the other people was a rather 
easy and quick process. However, in the case of the Kurds, it was hard or 
almost impossible. Therefore, the answer to that process was uprising and 
fighting against the state. The cause of this conflict was over a million people 
who were killed, detained or displaced, Badirxan (2010), Koivunen (2013). 
From 1925 when the uprising of ‘Sheikh Said Piran’ started, until 1938 when the 
massacre of “Dersim” a Kurdish city in Turkey took place, there were at least 28 
Kurdish local, regional or national uprisings and revolutions against the Turkish 
state and Turkish governments, Akcura ,(2010). The 29th revolution started so 
late, which was in 1984 when guerrilla units of the PKK attacked the towns of 
Eruh (Siirt Provence) and Semdinli (Hakkari Provence) in the south east Turkey, 
(Casier and Jongerden, 2011: 131). The Turkish state thought that it would be 
easy as before. They thought that since they could depress 28 revolts in the 
past, they could easily depress the 29th one too. Yet, the reality was different 
and the PKK has grown up and become a significantly dangerous case for 
Turkey and consequently became the main and only strong cultural, social, and 
political party that the Kurds rely on and give their support to. 
Between 1938 and 1984, there were several little Kurdish attempts of revolt and 
resistance whether by some Kurdish intellectuals or some little groups which 
published some newspapers. Yet, there was not any serious action to make the 
Turkish state seriously think of dealing with it. Bozarslan (2012) named this 
period as the silent period. On the other hand, most of the Kurdish activists 
were among the leftists and socialist wave of political activities and there was 
not any clear Kurdish struggle literally. Moreover, between 1938 and 1984, 
                                                 
2  Assimilation and Turkification: these two terminologies were used by several 
academics such as Yelidz and Muller (2008), McDowall (2010), Akcura (2010). 
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there were three times in Turkey when military coups have been taken place 
and abolished the governments and a state of emergency was enforced for 
several years, Bozarslan, (2012). In addition to that, the processes of 
assimilation and Turkification were widely and harshly implemented during this 
period, (Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 14). The result of that was making millions of 
the Kurds become Turks and forcing millions of them not to talk about their 
Kurdishness anymore. 
 
The PKK and the Kurdish National Struggle in Turkey 
All these reasons made the Turkish government believe that the Kurdish 
question is no longer in the agenda and does not need to be talked about any 
more. Astonishingly, Kurdistan Workers party ‘the PKK’ has started its struggle 
from six young university students and it has rapidly become one of the most 
special and active organisations in the world, Ozcan (2006). Of course there are 
several reasons behind this fast growing of the PKK; such as the situation of the 
Kurds in Turkey after the 1980 coup by military junta or the situation of Kurdish 
society and their potential inclination for this hard struggle. In other words, as 
social movement commentators argue the political opportunities, Zald and Ash 
(1966) made the PKK to grow up quickly. 
The PKK as a movement began in a different way to other social and political 
movements and especially to how the start of such movements is theorised by 
scholars. The PKK leadership were not only ignoring the notion of rational 
choice and political opportunity, McCarthy and Zald, (1977), 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, (1996), Tilly, (1978); in contrary to that, they 
started with some activities that were absolutely contradictory to rational choice 
and political opportunities. The first action the leadership of the PKK undertook 
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was to attack a chieftain who was a governor in the south east province of Urfa. 
However, for the sake of gaining support among Kurdish people, it was very 
rational to persuade chieftains to support the PKK. Yet, they were thinking of 
gaining support from the illiterate, poor peasants and workers. The reason 
behind this action is the ideological commitments that the PKK members had 
engaged to it from the first day of beginning their struggle. 
As a matter of fact, in contrast to all other Kurdish political parties especially in 
the parts of Kurdistan within the Iraqi and Iranian borders such as the KDPI, 
KDP and PUK they called for autonomy for the Kurds within those states. The 
PKK has claimed for liberation of greater Kurdistan and not recognizing the 
borders that ‘imperialism and tyrant states’ made in Kurdistan. This point was a 
very attractive one that Kurds were dreaming about. In this sense, the point 
could be seen as a rational choice, (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), (McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, 1996), that the PKK thought of. Therefore, the PKK was 
apolitical movement that was aiming at establishing the state and changing 
authority. 
As mentioned earlier in the case of the Kurds in the southern and eastern parts 
of Kurdistan, Bruinessen (1992) argued that in the south part of Kurdistan the 
struggle of the Kurds was different compared to the struggles elsewhere in the 
world. The Kurdish national movement in Iraqi Kurdistan was conservative and 
even backward-looking in appearance, in spite of the justness of its demands. 
Bruinessen (1992) looked for the reasons for this situation in the Kurdish 
revolutions. He suggested that conservatism is due to the persistence of 
"primordial loyalties" which are those to family, tribe, tribal chiefs and landlords, 
and religious figures such as the Sheikhs or the leaders of Mystics. 
In contrast to that, the revolution of the PKK is not following the Kurdish 
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pathway. Nonetheless, the PKK criticised the long history of Kurdish tribalism 
and conservative ideologies among the Kurdish political figures and the Sheikhs 
or the leaders of Mystics. That was through adapting Marxist- Leninist or 
Socialist ideology. On the other hand, rather than rational choice, the PKK was 
always following the ideology commitments, regardless of the consequences. 
The PKK always wanted to follow its ideology and sacrificed its members or 
cadres for it, regardless of obstacles and putting the regional or international 
political and social situation into account. Yet, other Kurdish political parties 
such as the KDP or PUK were looking at the political and social situation within 
the interests of the state and amending their ideology according to that. 
It is arguable that the discourse of ‘ideological commitment’ of the PKK and 
its practice is true until today’s date or at least until 1993 when the PKK 
retreated from the demand of liberating all Kurdistan and started to 
recognize international borders that have divided Kurdistan. Thus, the PKK 
suggested the idea of democratic con-federalism for the Kurds within those 
states that have Kurdish people and Kurdish lands in the Middle East.  This 
was happened due to the change of perspective and ideology of the 
movement and as a result of looking for a solution for the Kurdish question 
through adopting reality rather than ideological commitment as such. 
Analysing the shift that has happened in 1993 will be elaborated and 
criticised much more widely in the next chapters. Yet, it is argued that 
whatever and however the shift has happened, as Akkaya (2011) suggested, 
by all means,  “over the last 30 years, the Turkish state has faced an 
insurgency instigated by the PKK which is one of the most important secular 
insurgent political movements in Kurdistan and the Middle East”, (Akkaya, 
2011: 2). 
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The PKK started its first armed struggle in 1984 after a few years of ideological 
and political preparations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Akkaya (2011) 
argues that “by 1990 the ‘liberation of Kurdistan’ had become not at all 
unthinkable” (Akkaya, 2011: 2). According to Ocalan (2013), by starting the 
struggle of the PKK, the dream of the Turkish state of totally melting the Kurds 
down through the process of assimilation and Turkification has almost clogged 
up. This means that, “the Kurds are not ended due to cultural genocide and 
mass killing any longer”, (Ocalan, 2013: 291). There is a heavy cost of this war 
in Turkey, especially in the south east of Turkey that the PKK until recently was 
calling for the liberation of, as an independent northern part of greater 
Kurdistan. 
According to some official figures from the state and from the PKK, so far the 
cost of that war is the lives of more than forty thousand people. The vast 
majority of the victims were of Kurdish descent, whether by direct conflict 
between guerrilla and the Turkish army or because of the unique phenomenon 
of ‘unknown killing’ or atrocities during the army operation in the Kurdish areas 
in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the war has been considered as “the biggest 
challenge to the Turkish state in the 20th century”, (Olson, 1996, p.2). 
With regards to the issue of equality and minority rights, in Turkey, there is a 
long history of inequalities between Turks and other ethnic groups, especially 
the Kurds. “Due to the previous data limitation, scholars have only begun to 
analyse contemporary inequalities between the Turks and the Kurds”, (Dixson 
and Ergin, 2010:1329). A senior Kurdish politician living in exile argues that 
without the Kurds and Kurdish great knights and fighters, the Ottoman Empire 
could not go until Vienne. Without the Kurds, they would not have been able to 
occupy the land of Africa. Nonetheless, after all this sharing of history, the Turks 
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have deprived the Kurds of all their rights and they became powerless and 
landless, (interview with A1 on 22/09/2012). 
An interesting question here is whether the Turkish state and Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk have recognized Kurdish rights in the wake of establishing the new 
Turkish state and Great Turkish National Assembly (TBMM), Bozarslan (2012). 
This question can help this debate to understand the trends of Kemalism 
ideology with regards to the building of a Turkish nation state and the way of 
treating minorities within that state. On the first of May 1920, in the first 
gathering of the new Turkish parliament, while about 72 Kurdish deputies were 
representing Kurdish areas in Turkey, Ataturk made his address as follows: 
“dears, for preventing the problems, I would like to suggest two points, those 
deputies who are members of our great national council and those who made 
the state of Turkey are not Turks only, not Cherkes, not Kurds and no Laz only. 
But they are a Muslim unity which includes all of them”, (Akcura, 2010: 51).  
According to Olson (1989), this is referring to some kind of autonomy for the 
Kurds in Turkey. Since Ataturk was mentioning both Kurds and Turks in his 
speech several times, it can be said that he had a good will of making a shared 
new state for both Kurds and Turks and other smaller ethnic minorities. 
However, his response to a question from the editor of the time ‘Vakit’ 
newspaper ‘Ahmet Amin’ on the 16th of December 1923 clearly denied any 
right for the Kurds in Turkey. Ataturk stated: “from the view point of our interest 
as Turks, the Kurdish question can never be a subject to talk about. You know 
that the Kurds in Turkey are living in areas that compared to the Turks are very 
small minorities and they are going to be disappeared over time among the 
Turks. Thus, we cannot talk about any border of place for the Kurds within 
Turkey as it will be a cause of abolishing Turkey”, (Akcura, 2010: 53). 
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The Turkish state via Ataturk had a plan to assimilate the Kurds through the 
process of Turkification. On the one hand Ataturk clearly mentioned the necessity 
of promoting equal rights of both Kurds and Turks within the border of Turkey. On 
the other hand, he refused to suggest any geographical solution for the Kurdish 
issue in within Turkey. He continued his arguments by making an assumption. He 
argues: “let us say we make a border from Erzurum and Elegize, to the east of the 
country and call it Kurdistan, how about those Kurds who live in Konya or other 
areas? Can we forget about them? Thus we don’t have to think of geographical 
rights for the Kurds. What we can do is only give autonomy to them in their own 
areas. Therefore, from now on, when we talk about the Turks, we must talk about 
the Kurds and their rights too. If we don’t do that, it means we create a problem 
that can be called Kurdish problem in future”, (Akcura, 2010:53). 
Nevertheless, very soon the arguments about Kurdish rights and any cultural, 
social and political recognition had been forgotten and became forbidden to even 
be talked about. The process of Turkification was suggested and started long time 
before the plan of a new Turkish state. For that, in his book, “political memories”, 
‘Sultan Abdul Hamid the second’ has said: “to strengthen the Turkish nation, we 
need to Turkify all the Kurds everywhere. This is a basic and main point of 
strengthening of the Turkish nation”, (Akcura, 2010: 54).  In the time of ‘Unity and 
Progress Committee’, (Etihad ve Terakihi Cemiyeti), the process of Turkification 
was continued. At that time, they issued the law of spreading (Tehcir 
Kanunu).  Article twelve of this law clearly says that “the Kurds must be divided 
into small groups, they must be disarmed and be transferred to places far from 
their home places and register them in those places while they have to be less 
than 5% of the population of those places. By no means, can Kurdish refugees go 
back to their own places”, (Akcura, 2010: 54). 
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This law was rapidly and actively implemented. According to the written 
document from the general office of the immigration issues in Istanbul, during 
1915 and the following year, about 700,000 Kurds were transferred to western 
Anatolia which is the metropolis in the west of Turkey, (Badirxan, 2010: 47). For 
that time, that amount of people was bigger percentage of all Kurds than the 
number of the more recent displacement process in the 1990s. As a matter of 
fact, during the time of the governments of ‘Suleiman Demirel’ and ‘Tansu Ciller’ 
in 1993 to 1998, about three million people ‘mainly Kurds’ have been 
transferred to the western metropolis during a big plan of the government and 
the destroying of about three thousand to four thousand villages. As Yildiz and 
Muller (2008) argue, “by 1999 it was estimated that 3,500 villages had been 
evacuated and around three million people, mainly Kurds, were displaced”, 
(Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 17). 
It is arguable that these points that have been presented in this part of this 
chapter will help this study to investigate the current Kurdish national movement 
in Turkey and the way of transforming its struggle to the civil and legal in recent 
years. By understanding this history, we can understand the reasons and 
motivations behind the 29th revolts of the Kurds in Turkey. Thus, it is better to 
draw attention to social movement in the Kurdish part of Turkey in the last few 
decades that directly connects to the main question of this study. 
What has been presented so far mainly regards Kurdish social and political 
waves and movements in the different parts of Kurdistan. Yet, it can be argued 
that the national movement on the wider and higher level rather than the local, 
tribal, religious or at the best, regional level has never taken place in Kurdistan. 
This is the answer to the question that I have raised in the very first paragraph 
of this chapter. However, this is a difficult hypothesis and needs to be 
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elaborated according to theories of social movements and with viable methods 
in order to have a clearer image of the current stage of the Kurdish national 
struggle.  
The next section of this chapter will attempt to explore the process of Turkish 
state and its nationalism as well as its impacts on the Kurds and Kurdish 
nationalism. For understanding the importance and sensitivity of the current 
stage and progress of the Kurdish question in Turkey, it is better to draw 
attention to the current issues of the Kurdish national struggle in the northern 
part of Kurdistan. Yet, for understanding the frame and the picture of social 
movement in this part of Kurdistan, it is necessary to briefly elaborate the notion 
of the Turkish state and Kurdish national struggle in the aftermath of the 
establishment of the Turkish state. 
 
 The Turkish State and Kurdish Nation 
During and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the war of 
independence in Anatolia, the Turkish state was established by the members of 
the group that was called the young Turks, later on officially called the 
Committee of Union and Progress, (Etihad ve Terakihi Cemiyeti), “the CUP”. At 
the early morning of the attempt, there was a notion of establishing that state, 
“based on the brotherhood and the yields of the hard work of the Turks and the 
Kurds together”, (Bozarslan, 2012: 24). At the first assembly of the Turkish 
Parliament, there were 72 Kurdish deputies who represented Kurdish areas and 
they were called Kurdistan people deputies, in Turkish ‘Kurdistan Millet 
Vekillere’. Moreover, the founder of the new Turkish Republic, ‘Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk’ clearly declared that in this country, there were not only Turks. Those 
who worked hard to free this land were not only Turks. So there was some kind 
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of promise for the Kurds to have autonomy and self-ruling of their lands, within 
the national territory and under the central power of Ankara, Badirxan, (2010). 
Yet, this promise was short-lived and soon the notion of unity and making 
‘one nation, one language, one flag and one country’ became the main 
notion into the agenda of the state. This shift made Kurds feel that they 
were no longer partners and real citizens as Turks were and no longer 
belonged to this state. This led them to think of revolt and uprising against 
the state and establishing their own entity. It is worth pointing out here again 
that in Turkey there are ‘forty nine’ different identifiable ethnic and religious 
minorities, Toprak (2009). Not only the Turks; all minority ethnic and 
religious groups in Turkey, in the way or another, willingly or unwillingly 
have accepted the state policy and adopted the state ideology of unification 
and Turkification, Bozarslan, (2012).  . 
The Kurds nevertheless, have rejected the policy and started to revolt and 
challenge the state. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, until 
the massacre of the city of Dersim by the new Turkish state in 1938, there 
were at least 28 different local, regional and national revolts by the Kurds 
against the state, (interview with A3 on 25/03/2012). Thus, the processes of 
assimilation and Turkification have been in the agenda in a systematic way 
and with a huge amount of resources for implementing that process. The 
Kurds were the only group that sustained its challenges and revolts until 
today’s date. There is an appropriate quotation by Mango (1999) in this 
respect as he argues that, “In terms of ethnicity and culture, Turkey is 
varied, complex and intermixed. Yet the myth which Ataturk bequeathed to 
his fellow-countrymen insists that there is a single ethnic group, the Turks. 
Nowadays the effects of this myth can be brutal; it can never, in the long 
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run, be successful. While Turkey gives no legal recognition to its large 
Kurdish minority, the problem that dissident Kurds pose for the Turkish state 
cannot be solved”, (Mango, 1999: 1). 
Mango was right, the Kurdish people have been depressed, but they were not 
fully assimilated into the Turkish state sponsored and promoted identity. The 
Kurdish question could not be solved by the Turkish state through the process 
of forced assimilation, Turkification and repression. It is interesting here to 
highlight the entity of Turkish state. One may just ask, what is the Turkish 
State? How has it made its own pillars? It is obvious that the Kurdish nation has 
started the revolt against the state and government political steps and has 
always recognized a line between the Turks as people and the Turkish state. 
Therefore the struggle of the Kurds is not against Turkish people and society. 
Accordingly, the notion of Kurdish nationalism can be a reflection against the 
Turkish state.  
 
 The Turkish State and Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey  
 From a Kurdish perspective, their nationalism can be regarded as a 
suppressed reaction to the success of other nationalisms around the Middle 
East. In Turkey especially, the Kurds started their struggle for their Kurdishness 
only after what they saw from the Turkish state that they want to unify them and 
melt them down within Turkish Nationalism.    
Thus, the notion of the state and especially the Turkish state is very sensitive 
among the Kurds. There is a proverb amongst the Kurds that says: if the state is 
a donkey, don’t trust it and don’t be on it. This is because they never felt that 
the state and the governments might be belonging to them. Therefore, the 
Kurds were always looking negatively towards the state and powerful members 
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of the governments. However, the Kurds always thought that the reason of their 
depression is due to the lack of a Kurdish state. Therefore, they always had a 
dream to have a Kurdish nation state one day. A prominent Kurdish poet, the 
writer of ‘Mem u Zin’ epic has mentioned this dream long ago. He suggested 
that if the Kurds have their own state, they could be equal to Arabs and Ajams, 
even they could make others to be their servants. Khani (2009) says: “had we 
been in agreement, and gathered under one leader. Rumes, Arabs and Persian 
as a whole would have been at our service”, (Khani, 2009: 43).   
Interestingly, the elements of the Turkish nation state are very unique and 
exploring those elements is very useful to understand the reaction of the 
Kurdish nationalism against it. The Turkish nation state has been built based on 
an identity of the special notion of Turkishness, which includes six principles. If 
one wants to be fully accepted by this state, she or he must be 1) a Turkish 
Nationalist, 2) a Muslim, 3) a Sunni, 4) a Hanafi, 5) a Secular and finally 6) a 
Kemalist. This is an identity of any person who wants to be happy and lucky in 
Turkey.  As two members of (TBMM) stated, “ev dibe ku nasnameye Turken 
rastin be”, (interview with A5&A6 on 27/8/2011). This means that this is an 
identity for the true Turkish person. On the other hand, the famous quote by 
Kemal Ataturk that says: how happy the one who says I am a Turk!! ‘Ne Mutlu 
Turkum Diyene’, is the expression of this notion of Turkishness. In addition to 
the notion of Turkish nationalism, one must be a Muslim, Sunni, Hanafi, Secular 
and Kemalist as well. 
 Arguably, this is very fundamental and a unique design in a country where the 
mosaic of population is very diverse. Moreover, the vast majority of people are 
illiterate and never understood secularism and Islamic ideas and schools of 
thoughts. However, a leader like Ataturk comes and makes these harsh 
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principles to build a new nationalist state on. It is not easy to implement that 
policy in the country like Turkey. No-one can associate Islamism with 
secularism, nationalism with Sunnism; Kemalism with Hanfiat.  Nevertheless, a 
harsh military and strong power from the state has helped to establish such a 
strange state after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Implementing the process of state building in Turkey started via all channels 
that the state had in its hands. Education and the school’s curriculum were 
changed. The history of the Turkish people and the notion of Turkishness were 
presented in a different way, Bozarslan, (2012). Religious and other ethnic 
activisms were all totally banned unless through the new law and according to 
‘Ataturk’s’, so-called secularist standards. Wearing cloths even, in offices and in 
public had to be in a way that the state preferred. Ataturk called for chopping 
the heads of those that would not accept that new order, Bozarslan (2012). 
Ataturk even threatened deputies of the Turkish National Assembly in order 
that not try to confront such principles. In the meeting of the national assembly, 
as a speaker and the leader of the country, he clearly told all deputies that “in 
case of confrontation of such principles, some heads must be chopped”, 
(Bozarslan, 2012: 50). Consequently, in order for people to be able to accept 
the notion of new Turkish, Muslim, Sunny, Hanafi, Secular and Kemalist 
Identity, they must have been put through the process that was named as the 
progress of society, (Ilerleme Projesi). This could arguably be seen as the 
seventh principle of the Identity; the principle of progressed citizen. Moreover, 
based on these principles, this state wanted to implement the notion of ‘Unity’ 
that is manifested in the notion of ‘one nation, one language, one flag and one 
religion’. Based on these principles, anyone within the borders of what is called 
Turkey today, must be a Turk, must be a Muslim, must be a secular person, 
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must speak Turkish language only and must respect the Flag and the leader 
Ataturk, the founder of the new secular Turkish state. This notion has given 
legitimacy to confront anyone who cannot become pure Turk. The Aleves and 
the Kurds were first victims of such policy.    
From this point of view, as a reflection against this unique shape of Turkish 
nationalism and the Turkish state, the Kurds have started to confront such 
principles and think of creating their own nationalism as well, in order to 
establish their own entity. However, due to the lack of power, having 
fragmentations and disunity of the Kurdish people, also due to the strong tribal 
and local rather than national affiliations and several other reasons, the process 
of state building and strong nationalism among the Kurds has never been fully 
implemented. As Vali (2003) suggested, among the Kurds, there are individuals 
that are nationalists or ultra-nationalists; yet again, there is not a notion of 
proper nationalism among them, meaning that there is not a collective national 
mind for the Kurds similar to the nations around the Kurds. This suggestion of 
Vali (2003) is true for the Kurds in Turkey during the establishment of the 
Turkish state. It is interesting to mention that there were some notions and 
attempts for the Kurds to highlight the issue of Sunnism as a parallel to Shiites 
of Fars in Iran and the notion of the Shafiiat school of thought within the Sunni 
Islam as a parallel to Hanfiat for the Turks in Turkey. However, the notion of 
unified identity has never been seen amongst the Kurds. Yet, such attempts 
were limited and never become a base for establishing a strong Kurdish 
nationalism. 
Interestingly, the struggle that was started by the PKK in the 1970s has slightly 
changed the perspective of the Kurdish national movement towards the issue of 
Kurdish nationalism and building the nation state. The line between nation 
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building and nation state building has become slightly clearer throughout the 
struggle of the PKK. In 1999 the Idea of nation state was criticized by the PKK 
“Currently the KCK” leader, Abdullah Ocalan. In his new review for the concept 
of the nation and the state, Ocalan (2013) argues that societies have been a 
victim of the state and its various types of authorities since the ‘Sumer empire’ 
time. Always the state could be a cause of restraining the freedom of people 
and become an obstacle in front of having normal, natural and societal 
prosperity. Nevertheless, since the Kurds never had their own state, they were 
always dreaming about having their own nation state like other nations around 
them. 
Since then, the discourse of the building of the nation state has been replaced 
by promotion of building the Kurdish democratic nation. Yet, the process of 
nation building can be developed without going through the process of the 
nation state. In other words Ocalan (2013) argues that democratic nation can 
be built without going through the channels of the state and for the building of 
the state. This new idea of the Kurdish national struggle has been suggested 
through a series of discussions and analysis of democratic models through the 
concepts of ‘Democratic Republic’, ‘Democratic Confederalism’ and currently 
the discourse of the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ in the agenda of the Kurdish 
activists within social movement in Turkey. In the forthcoming chapter, this 
notion will be elaborated in detail. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically presented the historical background of the Kurdish 
struggle in all parts of Kurdistan under the rule of the four different nation states. 
It has shown especially, the reasons and aspects of the Kurdish national 
 113 
struggle failure across the twentieth century in all parts of Kurdistan. The focus 
was mainly on the northern part of Kurdistan and particularly the notion of 
Turkish nationalism and its impact on the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey. Throughout the history of the twentieth century, it has been examined 
that the Kurdish national struggle was always circling around the same question 
and the same method of solution. That was the main dilemma of the Kurds and 
their revolts across the centuries. Finally, the notion of the new method of the 
struggle in the Turkish part under the PKK was partially shown. Through this 
chapter, the whole framework of the Kurdish national movements across the 
four parts of Kurdistan was examined. Thus, the notion of transformation of the 
Kurdish national struggle in the northern part could be better understood in the 
next chapter of this thesis. 
In the next chapter, the main focus will be narrowed down on the Kurdish 
national struggle in Turkey, investigating the main characters of the Kurdish 
national movement and the detail about the PKK as a controversial political 
party that became the main actor of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey until 
the early 2000s. It will also particularly highlight the detail of the KCK system, 
and its multi-dimensional activism through its wide cultural and social branches. 
The other section of that chapter will be a focus on ‘the ideology of PKK’ as a 
new term within the Kurdish national struggle.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: DOWN TO TURKEY: OVERVIEW OF THE PKK 
AND THE KCK 
  
  
The Kurdish people simultaneously exist and do not exist. 
The Kurds are human being and yet they are not. 
 There are more paradoxes of this kind”, (Ocalan, 2011:126). 
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Introduction 
The PKK was a product of the Turkish state denial of the Kurdish existence and 
its identity. It was a reaction to the state policy towards the Kurds. Therefore, it 
was a political party that was struggling to build a nation state for the Kurds. 
However, the KCK is a multi-dimensional project that can challenge the post- 
PKK era as the new social, cultural and political struggle to build the democratic 
nation rather than the nation state. The ‘ideology of PKK’ is an ideological 
school within the KCK system that can direct the whole movement and 
challenge the new era of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. 
In this chapter, the focus will be on three main points. 1) Presenting the PKK as 
a king maker in the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. It will investigate the 
PKK as a controversial political party that became the main actor of the Kurdish 
national struggle in Turkey until the early 2000s. 2) It will focus on ‘the ideology 
of PKK’ as a new ideological school that is frequently referred to within the 
Kurdish national struggle activism. 3) The last section of this chapter will draw 
attention to and highlight the detail of the KCK system, and its multi-dimensional 
activism through its wide cultural and social branches. Since the PKK and the 
KCK will be thoroughly examined in this chapter; therefore, understanding the 
entire process of the reasons behind transformation from the PKK to the KCK 
will be more tangible in the forthcoming chapters of the thesis. 
  
What is the PKK? 
Despite mentioning and discussing the PKK several times earlier in this thesis, 
it is however, necessary to present and analyse this organisation in detail. The 
benefit of this elaboration mainly is the fact that the PKK is an organization that 
has had a main and exclusive impact on the current Kurdish national movement 
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in Turkey and actually across the whole parts of Kurdistan. Therefore, the 
phenomenon of the PKK must be elaborated and investigated in order for this 
thesis to have a clear sight in analysing social movement in the Kurdish part of 
Turkey and especially the main current actor of the movement which is the 
KCK. Similar to the question above ‘what is the PKK?’ we will see in the 
forthcoming section the question; ‘what is the KCK?’ 
The best method for examination of the PKK can be focusing on the speech 
and analytical viewpoints of those who are active members or founders of the 
organisation such as ‘Abdullah Ocalan’ and his senior comrades on the one 
hand. On the other hand, we need to look at those who are against the PKK 
and wrote not in favour of Ocalan and his senior comrades. To make the task 
easier and better, on the one hand we will analyse the discourse of the PKK 
and the KCK narratives by focusing on Cemil Bayik and Ocalan through their 
speeches and analysis, especially focusing on Ocalan and his evaluation and 
criticism of the PKK. Debatably, this is the first time in the history of the Kurds 
that a leader of a movement can bravely and outspokenly criticise his own 
movement and show so many insufficient and negative points. On the other 
hand, we can focus on the arguments of some academicians and writers who 
are critically viewing the PKK and the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. We 
can look at the Yeldiz and Muller (2008), Marcus (2009), Bozarslan (2012) as 
academic authors and journalists who had a long method of observing the PKK. 
Sometimes those authors have a very negative view on Ocalan and his PKK 
also. Thus, we can see both sides of the coin. 
Historically, the PKK was established on the 28th of November 1978 in a village 
just outside Diyarbakir, known as ‘Fis’. This was a meeting of about 22 or 23 
members (two of them female) of the group that called themselves ‘Apoists’ 
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refereeing to their leader Apo ‘Abdullah Ocalan’, Marcus (2009). However, the 
party and especially Ocalan himself had started their activities in the early 
1970s.  Ocalan tries to refer back to his early years of childhood when he had to 
walk about a few kilometres from his village to another in order to study at his 
primary school. He argued that he had to walk a long way to forget his mother 
tongue ‘Kurdish’ and compulsorily learn another language ‘Turkish’, (Ocalan, 
2013: 11). Bozarslan, in Kasaba (2008) suggests that at the time, the power in 
Turkey was an ultra-Turkish nationalist and so called ‘Secular State’. It was 
harshly against the two notions: the “Kurdish question and the religious 
reaction”, (Kasaba, 2008: 333). 
Ocalan argues that he was trying to challenge the state through highlighting 
those two notions since his childhood. He argues that he was gathering his 
classmates for leading collective prayers on one hand and the struggle of not 
forgetting his Kurdish language due to his school and learning Turkish on the 
other. He argues that as a reaction to the notion of showing the Kurds and 
Kurdishness as best, he had to be the first and best student in the class, Ocalan 
(2013). Consequently, as a founder and charismatic leader of the PKK, Ocalan 
had reactions against the system and the state from very early times of his life. 
Nonetheless, the era of 1970s uniquely affected his perspectives, thinking, and 
his actions towards the Kurdish question and struggle for his people. 
In the 1970s, the conflict between both socialists and capitalist blocs reached 
very high levels. In Turkey, that conflict had affected all social, ideological and 
political activities. Ocalan was one of those young and active individuals who 
were in front of two opposite paths. He had a tendency towards religious right 
wing groups on the one hand but also had a feeling that leftist and socialist 
groups are those who could bring freedom and dignity to him and to his 
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forgotten nation on the other hand. He claimed that between Islam and 
Marxism, there was a conflict within his mind and that he was lost in between 
both. He argued that after reading a solid amount of both ideologies, he got to 
understand that in the fight inside his head, Mohammed will lose and Marx will 
win, (Ocalan, 2013). This means that Ocalan and his PKK from the first day did 
not have a clear vision and perspective. Therefore, the practice of the PKK was 
not predictable afterwards. 
Ocalan once said, “people think that our first bullet has been shot on the head 
of our enemy, the Turkish state solders. But I say, we have shot our first bullet 
on the head of the Kurds”, (interview with C3 on 16/09/2012). This means that 
the PKK wanted to wake the Kurds up from the long term sleep of being 
alienated. The PKK has argued that after a long time of the process of 
assimilation, the Kurds no longer recognised themselves. Nevertheless, the 
PKK has started its struggle with strange steps that cannot be harmonized with 
theories of social movement’s organisations, (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995: 
167). It is interesting that the PKK has been created after the total triumph of 
the Turkish state and burying the dead body of Kurdishness and any sort of 
struggle and resistance of the Kurds. Moreover, the only little hope of the Kurds 
of the northern part of Kurdistan for the revolution of Mustafa Barzani in the 
south was also lost. In 1975, the Kurdish revolution collapsed and Barzani 
suggested that his job is done and every one must go home. The majority of the 
Kurdish fighters ‘Peshmarga’ came down from mountains and surrendered 
themselves to the Iraqi government as a result of the agreement of ‘Algeria’ 
between Iran and Iraq and as a result of the announcement of Barzani to end 
his struggle and leave to go to America, (McDowall, 2010). 
Thus, there was no any hope for the Kurds in the northern part of Kurdistan. 
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There was no any light or torch on the dark road of Kurdishness and struggle 
for freedom. Ocalan at this very moment stated that the “Kurds are neither 
humans nor animals. They could be a third type of existence in between those 
two”, (Ocalan, 2013: 428). In essence, thus meant that the PKK and under 
Ocalan’s leadership came to criticise the reality of the Kurds. They came and 
started from the point that no one could see it as the rational way. The step that 
the PKK had started was harsh and unfriendly with Kurdish people. They told 
people that they were no longer humans. They had no honours and dignities. 
They were degrading people to follow them rather than establishing a positive 
and friendly relationship with them. These were the bullets that were shot on the 
head of the Kurds. Telling the Kurds that they have to be human again, they 
must struggle to have their own dignity, honour and independent country 
‘Kurdistan’. At that time, talking about Kurdistan was practically impossible. It 
was not easy to persuade anyone that such a place even exists. Ocalan has 
come with two sentences. There is Kurdistan, and it is a colony. What has been 
done by the PKK is what can be called as anti-rational choice.   
Despite both the PKK and Ocalan’s criticisms of Marxist Leninist ideology, they 
still thought that it was the most effective vehicle for attaining their goals. During 
his study in Istanbul and Ankara, Ocalan has participated in several 
demonstrations; he met several leftists and saw several events that affected his 
belief to join the leftist groups. Nevertheless, he always had his Kurdishness as 
a main point to struggle for. He was looking for a channel to express his ideas 
and develop his plan towards a solution for the Kurdish cause. As a matter of 
fact, the notion of the crises of both modern waves - socialism and capitalism - 
has had an impact in shaping the PKK. 
Bozarslan, in Kasaba (2008) argues that the three main concepts of both 
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modern waves ‘Capitalism, Nation State and Industrialism’ made all parties 
focus on the nation state as the only way to rescue the nation from its problems. 
Therefore, all parties and movements, including leftists, communists and 
socialists in Turkey only focused on the notion of Turkishness and could not see 
the Kurdish question as a legitimate right for the Kurds whatsoever. All what 
they said with regards to the Kurdish question was recognizing the rights and 
freedom of everyone in the country under the umbrella of the greater Turkish 
nation state, Bozarslan, in Kasaba (2008). This notion made the PKK get out 
from the mainstream left and socialist wave and think of establishing a group 
that can work for the Kurds similar to Turks. Especially the notion of the nation 
state as the best and only solution for nations to get independence and 
sovereignty, has led the PKK to suggest an ‘independent free socialist greater 
Kurdistan’ as a highest aim during its struggle, (Cudi, 2008: 335). Therefore, the 
matter of Kurdishness of the PKK was not accepted by the Turkish leftist 
movements.  
In the first few years of the seventies, Ocalan and several friends of him 
including ‘Haki Karar, Kemal Pir, Duran Kalkan, Cemil Bayik, Mustafa Karasu’, 
and Sakine Cansiz were joining Turkish leftist groups. Ocalan himself had joined 
Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths ‘DDKO’ and Revolutionary Youth ‘DEV-
GENC). Yet again, due to his thirst for the revolution and uprising; due to his 
feelings for his Kurdishness; he could not be persuaded that such organisations 
could mobilise the Kurds and make them be aware of their reality and the 
threads around their social and cultural existence. Thus, he had to think of 
bringing about a different group that could be an answer for the thirst. Therefore, 
with his few friends, mainly students in Ankara University, they started to 
reschedule and revise their leftist ideology towards some sort of Kurdishness. 
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Ocalan was referring to a point that was indicated several times during the 
discussion with his comrades. He argued that Kurdistan is a centre for their 
revolution. Thus, he wanted to leave Ankara and come to the mountains of 
Kurdistan to continue revolutionary struggle. Therefore, moving to Kurdistan 
was a first step towards making a party. After several years of ideological mix 
and match activities, Ocalan and his comrades made themselves slightly 
clearer and came to Kurdistan ‘East Turkey’ and established the Kurdistan 
Workers Party, in Kurdish ‘ Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-PKK’. 
Ocalan (2013) argues that at the time of starting their struggle, they were very 
much under the influence of the ‘Constructed Socialism’, (Ocalan, 2013: 294). 
That was the terminology which he used so often, referring to the Soviet copy of 
socialism. He claims that at the current time, they have put this notion of 
socialism aside and the nature of their struggle is beyond that classic and 
undemocratic dictatorial proletariat notion of socialism.3 The outcome of the 
perspective of the PKK at that time was only promoting the notion of nation 
state building. Therefore, the PKK had seen the notion of a Kurdish nation state 
as the only way of bringing back the dignity and survival for the Kurdish nation 
that was in the deep holes of cultural and social genocides. 
Another point that the PKK has focused on was preparing for guerrilla warfare 
against the state. They were not only struggling through the politics and raising 
awareness among the Kurds. In contrary to that, they were focusing on the 
illiterate and disadvantaged peasants and workers in the Kurdish villages and 
the cities. Thus, the step from Ankara to Diyarbakir did not only change the 
group to the party, but made them a party that has guerrillas and in their own 
                                                 
3 The matter of democratisation within the PKK or even the current KCK is different 
from the matter of creating an opportunities for democratic notion within the Kurdish 
society due to the PKK and currently the KCK's new steps. We will discuss this matter 
in the fifth chapter. 
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words is ‘the fighters of free Kurdistan’. Marcus (2009) argues that at the time, 
the PKK was the only group which could fight against the state and landowners 
who were under the rule of the state. In July 1979, the PKK tried to kill a 
Kurdish member of parliament who was a landowner from a famous tribe near 
the city of Urfa. That attempt took place only several months after the 
foundation of the PKK. Nonetheless, implementing that assassination failed. 
However, as a former PKK militant argued, “the assassination attempt received 
wide notice leaflets laying out their goals which were scattered through the 
region”, (Marcus, 2009: 46). Hence, the PKK attempts were to make people 
know that a new and different group has been established.  
Therefore, the first step of the PKK from theory to practice, from thinking to 
action, had successfully been taken. The PKK also had a chance to protect and 
rescue most of its senior members including Ocalan himself by getting out of 
the country before a military coup in September 1980. Moving to the Middle 
East, mainly Syria and Lebanon had a positive impact on the PKK in two ways. 
The first one was that Ocalan became the only and charismatic leader so that 
his words were the first and last words in any decision of the party. This meant 
that, Ocalan had become a leader whose comrades could no longer challenge 
him and take his position. It is true that this impression can be seen as moving 
the party to a dictatorial one; especially making Ocalan himself as a harsh 
dictator, Ozcan (2006). Nevertheless, it was a strong point to prevent the party 
from dismantlement and partition. 
The problem that all Kurdish movements and parties in the history of twentieth 
century have suffered from was partition and dismantlement. The harsh style of 
Ocalan’s leadership has prevented dismantlement within the PKK to a very big 
extent. The second benefit was that the PKK had access to some military, 
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diplomacy and financial support from some movements and governments in the 
Middle East, especially from the Palestinian liberation movement and Syrian 
government. Therefore, the PKK started to educate and train its guerrillas and 
prepare them for the guerrilla warfare inside Turkey. 
On August 15th 1984, the PKK launched an attack on the military barracks in 
both Eruh and Semdinli towns in the south-east. According to a former 
commander of the attacks ‘Sari Baran’, “the goal was not to kill solders, but 
instead to break the link between the solders and the people and to read the 
announcement [announcing the founding of HRK armed units]”, (Marcus, 2009: 
81). Baran continues by saying: “we wanted to make an attack that would give 
people the trust in us”, (Marcus, 2009:81). Therefore, the PKK became a party. 
It became a party with its distinctiveness to other revolutionary parties. It had 
the Kurdistan Liberation Units ‘Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan HRK’, and later, 
became Kurdistan people Liberation Army ‘Artesa Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan 
ARGK’. It also had several dedicated members in the cities and towns to recruit 
guerrillas and mobilize sympathisers. It had a strong and hard core ideology, a 
combination of Marxist Leninist Stalinist socialism alongside the notion of 
Kurdishness and the fight for a free independent greater Kurdistan. This means 
that the PKK has slightly become an entity that can survive and continue its 
struggle. 
All these points allowed the PKK to be a main and later on, only party that can 
give a limited hope to the Kurdish and depressed people in the region. 
Nevertheless, within the PKK, there were a huge amount of agents of the state 
and collaborators that were aiming at pacification of the PKK and looking for 
their own tribal, personal interests. This is one of the points that Ocalan 
illustrated and called it a ‘Kurdish Dilemma’. According to Ocalan (2010), the 
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history of the Kurds and those people who lived in the land that is currently 
called Kurdistan, from 5000 years to the current time, is full of collaborations 
with external enemies. He refers to the ‘Epic poetry of Gilgamesh’ and arresting 
the rebel leader ‘Humbaba’ who was from the mountain, through the help of 
‘Enkidu’ who was from the same race as ‘Humbaba’. 
To Ocalan, the story of Enkidu is the story of the first collaboration in the history 
of the Kurds and its continuation among them until today’s date. In the myth, 
“symbolizing the concept of the system of power in the character of Gilgamesh 
against the concept of barbarism through the character of Humbaba can be 
seen”, (Ocalan, 2010: 170). He tries to analyse the concept of collaboration 
during the course of the whole history of the Kurds. He argues that this is a 
Kurdish dilemma. The main task of him and his PKK was to tackle this dilemma 
among the Kurds. Ocalan (2010) suggested that without tackling this issue, the 
process of cultural and social genocide against the Kurds cannot be stopped. 
However, Ocalan is exaggerating when he puts all blame on the shoulders of 
collaborators. The notion of collaboration is not only specific to the Kurds. The 
PKK itself was a party that was a product of the reality of the 1970s in Turkey. 
Therefore, the failure was not only due to the collaboration. 
It was true that among the PKK senior militants, there were many collaborators 
and traitors. However, as Marcus (2009) tries to suggest, all the leaders and the 
PKK cadres who wanted to say anything against Ocalan or even have any 
different or suspicious ideas were accused as collaborators and traitors. In that 
case, their lives were at risk. Arguably, Ocalan himself is obsessed by the 
theory of conspiracy. He sees every political step around him and against the 
Kurds through the spectacles of conspiracy theory.  
Surprisingly, in contrary to all the history of the PKK and all current and 
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previous leaders of the PKK and current KCK leaders, Ocalan himself 
believes that the attack of 15th of August 1984 was weak. Due to the 
existence of this ‘Kurdish dilemma’, the attack was insufficient and smaller 
than their aims and the struggle that their militants had. Ocalan (2013) 
argues that they lost great, honest, loyal and sparkling guerrillas in most of 
the wars only due to the greed and personal interests of the actual leaders of 
the operations. However, since there was no any other similar or even 
weaker resistance whatsoever at that time, the PKK soon became a source 
of hope among some Kurdish people from villages and towns in the Kurdish 
areas. It can be argued that the main and only task for the PKK was the 
point that it had to stop the process of denial of the Kurds and Kurdistan. It 
can be true that the PKK slightly brought back the notion of Kurdistan and 
the struggle for it. However, Ocalan and the PKK failed in bringing back the 
Kurdishness. The PKK never had a serious concern about Kurdish 
language, culture and Kurdish social life as such. This was because of the 
strong tendency for the leftist ideology within the PKK rather than clear 
Kurdish perception. 
Nonetheless, at the time of the harsh process of cultural, social and political 
denial of the Kurds and Kurdistan, the PKK has started its struggle and 
brought back a hope to the depressed Kurdish people by challenging the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish landowners who have lost their own self-
esteem and dignity due to the harsh cultural genocide process by the state. I 
argue that since the main task of the PKK is to stop the process of cultural 
and social genocide of the Kurds, then the reason for the existence of the 
PKK still valid. However, the apparatus and the methods of the PKK are no 
longer appropriate for facing the reality and approaching the Kurdish 
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question. That was the point that the PKK and Ocalan himself understood. 
Therefore, they have tried to change the methods and tools of their struggle. 
This is a main point of this work that I try to investigate and present it as 
transformations. In the forthcoming chapters, this point will be investigated in 
detail. 
From 1985, the PKK entered another stage of its struggle. The notion of 
collaboration which was a main obstacle in front of the PKK’s struggle had been 
limited due to the decisions that were taken in the third PKK congress. Ocalan 
had made it clear to the PKK members that without him; no one could or should 
do anything. According to Cemil Bayik and some other senior leaders of the 
KCK, due to the third congress, the attempts of collaborators or traitors were 
drastically limited. ‘Kesire Yildirim’4 (former wife of Ocalan) and some other 
senior military and political members of the PKK were working against Ocalan 
and his line. Based on social theories, this action by the PKK can be called as 
organizational maintenance, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987:121).  
After that congress, the influences of those members of the PKK were eliminated. 
Therefore, from the third conference onwards, the best PKK cadre had to be the 
most loyal to the line of Ocalan. Another idea that has been implemented was 
creating an army for the PKK. Previously, there was a small group of guerrillas 
that was called ‘HRK’. It was only a few small units and mainly used for 
propaganda among Kurdish people. But after the third congress, the ARGK was 
established, which has become a huge army. On the name of a legend of the PKK 
commander ‘Mahsun Korkmaz’ known as “Agid”, the ARGK was established. It is 
worth mentioning that the death of ‘Kemal Pir’, a well-known founder of the group 
                                                 
4 The mystery story of ‘Kesire Yildirim’ and her influence on the party and Ocalan 
himself is a controversial matter. It needs to be elaborated in a different work. Yet, the 
purpose of this work is not such elaboration. 
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and close friend of Ocalan, has become an inspiration for the announcements of 
the PKK in 1978. The “death of ‘Agid’ has also become an inspiration for 
establishing the ARGK”, (Cudi, 2008: 372). This means that the PKK has started 
and grown up while it was inspired by the blood and martyrdom. 
Interestingly, the PKK came across with strange ideas. The decision was made 
that the PKK must adopt compulsory military service for the Kurdish young 
people. This means that the PKK started to take young people from the villages 
and use them as Kurdish soldiers or ‘guerrillas’. Cemil Bayik, the current co-
chair of the KCK claimed that at the time, Kurdish people in the ‘Botan region’ 
proposed the plan of compulsory recruitment of the guerrillas. The PKK at that 
time believed that revolutionary legitimacy allowed them to take young Kurdish 
people and use them as guerrillas. 
At that time, the PKK argued that since the Turkish state was recruiting solders 
compulsorily, why should the PKK not also have the right to do so. On the other 
hand, the PKK has committed a series of horrible criminal activism in the 
villages and towns. The reputation of the PKK was under the risk due to the 
tyranny and misbehaving militants and commanders of the PKK in the Kurdish 
regions. Ocalan (2013) clearly confesses such crimes and despotisms. Yet 
again, he always put the blames on comrades who were under the influence of 
the concept of collaborationists and traitors. Therefore, establishing the ARGK 
had a negative impact too. As Ozcan (2006) argues, due to the internal power 
conflict, the concept of banditry developed within the PKK. 
The first few years of 1990s can be seen as a slight move towards change and 
transformation of the PKK in several aspects. Ideologically, the PKK has 
instigated a series of changes. The notion of nation state has been under 
scrutiny. Ocalan himself was looking for an exit door. The aftermath of the 
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Soviet Union collapse and creating a small entity for the Kurds in the south part 
of Kurdistan ‘KRG’, affected the ideological approach of the PKK. Ocalan 
(2011) argues that he thought that “the need for a new understanding of the 
concepts of the state and revolution is the heart of all the problems socialism 
has experienced”, (Ocalan, 2011:56).  Thus, the movement decided to develop 
a new approach in terms of nation state and national struggle on the one hand. 
On the other hand, the movement attempted to develop the notion of revolution. 
The concept of revolution was slightly reviewed and expanded to a ‘total’ 
revolution, rather than focusing only on guerrilla warfare. As a result of that 
review, on the one hand the PKK tried to persuade the state to start negotiation. 
As a matter of fact, some sort of indirect negotiation has started with the state. It 
has been pursued by President ‘Turgut Ozal’ through the secretary general of 
the PUK ‘Jalal Talabani’. Yet, the negotiation has been provoked due to some 
unwelcome activism by some PKK commanders by killing thirty three off duty 
soldiers in an eastern province of Bingol. On the other hand, the PKK 
developed political activities and legal struggle as has been seen through the 
HEP and other legal pro-Kurdish parties. The step of entering a political 
activism has been a very important turning point in the Kurdish national struggle 
in Turkey. 
The idea of focusing on the political and civil struggle has been seen as a 
required topic since 1993 within the PKK. Yet, the actual implementation of this 
notion was delayed until the middle of 2000s. The imprisonment of Ocalan in 
February 1999 made the PKK retreat its army out of the Turkish borders, 
announcing unilateral ceasefire and to start thinking of reorganizing itself. Thus, 
there are several years where the Turkish state has triumphed and announced 
its victory over the terrorism issue in the country. Suddenly, in 2004, the PKK 
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started its guerrilla warfare again. Nonetheless, the political wing has actively 
continued its struggle in the Kurdish areas. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
PKK has started its shift since 1993. However, it cannot be regarded as a clear 
and active transformation until the creation of the KCK system.  
Since the nature of this thesis is not an historical presentation, there are several 
important events within the Kurdish national struggle that cannot be presented 
and investigated here. Therefore, in the current chapter, only those points are 
presented that can help this thesis to be able in the forthcoming chapters to 
elaborate the issue of transformation of the main actor of the Kurdish national 
movement in the northern part of Kurdistan. The next sections of this chapter 
will examine ‘the ideology of PKK’ as an ideological pathway. Likewise, the 
main current Kurdish national struggle actor ‘the KCK’ will be under 
examination.  
 
The “Ideology of PKK”: 
 An explanation of the terminology of the “Ideology of PKK” is necessary for this 
thesis. In the current Turkish political and even academic works so often 
mistakenly the name of the KCK is used through its old name, the ‘PKK’. 
Currently and since 2005, the PKK as a practical political organisation has been 
melted down within a wider organisational formulate. Since then the PKK no 
longer exists. It has been through a series of a renaming and reshaping process. 
Firstly, it has been reshaped and renamed as Freedom and Democracy 
Congress of Kurdistan “KADEK”, and later on as Kurdistan Union of 
Organisations “KKK” and currently there is a formal name for it, which is Unions 
of Communities in Kurdistan, the ‘KCK’. Yet, the terminology of the “Ideology of 
PKK” still remained as an ideological wing of the movement. Thus, the PKK is a 
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small, but important part of the KCK at the current time, (interview with A4 on 
14/09/2012). Nonetheless, the PKK is used as a former political party that 
slightly merged into the KCK. In other words, the PKK renamed and reshaped 
itself and currently the KCK is the main entity that is the subject of this thesis. 
With its ideology and the harsh manner of its struggle in Turkey, the PKK soon 
became the main and only political power among the Kurds in Turkey. Despite 
having several other Kurdish or pro-Kurdish movements and individuals during 
the 1960s and the 1970s, the PKK has rapidly gained its protagonist state 
among the Kurds. As mentioned earlier, the PKK was taking the wrong pathway 
according to social theories. It did not look at the political opportunity and rational 
choice with regards to mobilization of the Kurdish people in Turkey, Zald and 
McCarthy, (1987). 
Rather than having a positive approach to the Kurdish chieftains and 
landowners, the PKK declared a war against them before starting any war 
against the state and Turkish nationalist powers. Rationally, if they had a good 
approach to the land owners and if they respected Kurdish tribe leaders and 
gained their support, it could provide a great human and financial support for the 
revolution. Yet, the “ideology of PKK” pushed the struggle beyond tribal and 
religious influence. As Icduygu, et al (1999) argue, “the PKK, has for the first 
time politicized and united Kurds on a much more ethnic nationalist basis than 
on a tribal or religious one, (Icduygu, et al, 1999: 994). Thus, their approach was 
against that step and they wanted to make politics in a different way to the other 
traditional Kurdish movements such as the KDPI in the eastern part of Kurdistan 
since the Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad, or the KDP and the PUK in the 
southern part of Kurdistan, or former revolts in the northern part of Kurdistan such 
as the revolts of ‘Sheikh Said Piran’ in 1925 and ‘Saied Reza of Dersim’ in 1937. 
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In contrary to the tradition of previous revolts, the first action that the PKK took 
was an attempt to assassinate the chieftain in the south eastern province of 
Urfa and the killing of a man who killed his wife due to her being badly-behaved 
with regards to the matter of honour. Those two activities were taken as 
symbolical attempts to show respect to the freedom of peasants and workers on 
the one hand, and the freedom of women on the other, (interview with A9 on 
07/08/2011). Surprisingly, in contrary to rational action and the theory of rational 
choice, the PKK has maintained a positive result. 
On the one hand, the PKK was losing supports of religious figures and 
landowners or chieftains that were irrational choice at that time. Yet again, it has 
gained support of workers and peasants on the one hand and gained support of 
women on the other. In addition to that, the PKK did not want to take 
consequences into account. It was not important for the PKK what would 
happen as a result of its harsh struggle. Alternatively, the notion of ‘ideological 
commitment’ was taken into account. This means that the PKK wanted to follow 
its Ideology no matter what the price would be. Despite the reality of the Kurdish 
society structure, the PKK has walked a different path. 
 It is obvious that most of the Kurdish inhabited areas in Turkey are in the less 
developed regions and people until recently were living in rural areas. As 
Bozarslan, in Kasaba (2008) argues, “until the end of 1970, most of the 
Kurdish-inhabited provinces had an overwhelmingly rural population with strong 
tribal affiliations and weak economic integration with the rest of the country”, 
(Kasaba, 2008: 335). For that, in contrary to the few previous attempts that 
have focused on the Kurdish notables and the middle class, educated people in 
Turkey, the PKK had to organize itself among such illiterate Kurdish people. As 
the PKK has claimed, the main aim of starting this struggle was bringing about 
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freedom and dignity for these enslaved and marginalized people. However, the 
founders of the PKK were a few students that had studied in Ankara and who 
were influenced by new waves of socialists and communist ideologies. 
Moreover, most of them were from non-Kurdish ethnic backgrounds. It is 
interesting that on the one hand, the founders of the Turkish nationalism are 
not originally from Turkish ethnics, they were mainly Kurds and other ethnic 
minorities. For example, Ziya Gokalp who he considered as a father for 
Turkish nationalism was from a Kurdish background and he was from 
Diyarbakir. On the other hand, those students who founded the PKK with 
Ocalan were mainly not Kurdish. For instance, two of the very prominent 
friends and founders of the PKK, ‘Hakki Karer’ and ‘Kemal Pir’ were originally 
Laz and Cerkes or formally Turks and from the north part of Turkey close to 
the Black Sea. Ocalan’s friends came to the Kurdish areas and started this 
movement while they had no familiarity with the language, culture and the 
custom of people in Kurdistan. This is another irrational step of the start of the 
PKK. 
Thus, for the comrades of Ocalan, it was an enormous and hard task to work 
among the Kurds. How can such ideology be implemented among people who 
are affiliated with rural traditions and religion to a certain degree and very 
much affiliated to tribalism and mysticism?  So how could the PKK amend its 
Marxist-Leninist ideology to such an environment? The answer for this 
question is easy somehow. It can be argued that the PKK never amended this 
ideology according to the social, political and cultural environment. 
Nonetheless, it harshly tried to amend the society according to its ideology. 
That is the point that made the PKK different from all previous social and 
political movements across the whole parts of Kurdistan. 
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Despite following the principles of the rational choice theory and coping with the 
society that it struggled for, the PKK took its steps against the rational choice 
and political opportunity. Nonetheless, the PKK had rapid growth and soon 
became an organisation that could by no means be ignored anymore. On the 
other hand, the time of emergence of the PKK was not a good time; during the 
very harsh military coup and after a long time of silencing all voices that could 
mention the Kurdish question and Kurdishness, let alone mentioning the word 
of Kurdistan. There was not any rationality and wisdom behind starting such an 
active and extraordinary organisation that harshly called for Kurdish rights and 
establishing a greater independent socialist Kurdistan state. That was 
excessively considerable for that time. Borrowing the words of a senior member 
of the KCK, “nobody could believe that this organisation would be sustained for 
more than a few months”, (interview with A8 on 06/08/2011). 
An important question here is; how the PKK survived? There might be some 
extraordinary power behind the PKK that was making it sustainable. Perhaps, 
some other elements or helpful points existed that provided an inspiration to the 
movement to be sustained. There were some rumours among commentators 
that the PKK had been aided by the Turkish state itself to start this game. 
However, no-one can be sure about this. How could be logic for a state to grow 
an enemy such as the PKK after deleting and denying even the existence of the 
Kurds for several decades? After a long time of depressing any voice that 
comes out in Kurdish and for the Kurds, why would the state itself want to 
create a voice and make such a significant problem for itself? However, some 
anti and even pro PKK commentators say that at a stage, some individuals from 
the Turkish state funded the group of ‘Apoists’ and wanted them to develop. 
Some anti PKK individuals and parties argue that the reason for that was to limit 
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the power of chieftains and landowners in the Kurdish areas and to silence 
other Kurdish or pro-Kurdish organisations that already had some limited 
activities, (interviews with A10&A11 on 02 & 04/09/2011). Yet, once again this 
was not rational and was politically incorrect for a state that had been harshly 
depressing the voices of the Kurds since 1925. Social theories can help to 
make this point understood. It is argued that during the movements against the 
state, the wave of the activities and the direction of the progress very often 
would be in the interest of the state. In other words, the state will always be a 
breadwinner. In other words, the function of the state here is shaping political 
conflicts in the interest of “its survival and aggrandizement”, (McCarthy et al, 
1996:44). 
For instance, at the beginning of the Turkish republic in 1925, the state made a 
new political party to show the notion of a multi-party system in the country. 
Nevertheless, after one year, it was banned as the role of that party was not 
genuine, but it was made for temporary political tactics, (Bozarslan, 2012: 52). 
Therefore, it could be possible for the Turkish state to give the PKK a little 
support, hoping to do a little good work for the state and any time they were no 
longer needed, the support for and the existence of the PKK both could be 
ended.  Perhaps, the Turkish state had this notion in helping the PKK. It is 
argued that Ocalan himself once said that the state had given them some 
financial support through a man that did not want to be named. As senior 
member of the previous PKK stated: “but we realized that he came from some 
official figures”, (interview withA13 on 17/04/2012). 
If this argument is correct, then the question is why the state helped the PKK? 
Was it for stopping and limiting other revolutionary forces? If so, why did the 
state want to stop other parties by creating an opportunity for activating a more 
 135 
radical and influential party?  There is not a clear answer to that. However, it will 
become clearer in the next chapter when there will be more discussion about 
the KCK especially after 2009 and the operation of the state to limit Kurdish 
activities that are under the “Ideology of PKK” through the campaign against 
Kurdish activists that were called the ‘KCK operations’ by the Turkish 
government. What is important here is to continue discussing the point 
regarding how the PKK became the main and almost only party in Turkey that is 
struggling against the state and functioning for the Kurdish question. 
In other words, as Bozarslan in Kasaba (2008) argues, the PKK’s place as the 
primary Kurdish supporter of independence and nationalist actor both inside 
and outside Turkey appears to be intact. The answer for this issue can be found 
through a few different arguments according to several Kurdish political activists 
within the KCK and through the explanation by academic commentators. First of 
all, by ignoring chieftains and landowners interests and declaring a fight against 
them, Kurdish peasants and workers were given hope for a better tomorrow and 
freedom. That made them support the PKK and see hope from it. Secondly, the 
struggle and the patience of the PKK members in prisons and some 
extraordinary suicidal acts, gave the courage to Kurdish people to join the group 
and fight for their rights. After the military coup in 1980, hundreds of Kurdish 
intellectuals and activists were arrested and tortured, and a widespread 
repression targeted all kinds of manifestations of Kurdishness. Thousands of 
Kurdish and leftist politicians and activists were killed or taken to the jails. 
According to several senior Kurdish politicians and Members of Turkish 
Assembly, other Kurdish or pro-Kurdish parties were not that patient and brave 
to challenge such a harsh policy of military force at that time, (interviews with 
A5, A6, A9 & A11 on 28/07, 07/08 and 04/09/2011). Yet, the PKK members 
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were challenging the phase and confronting the state inside prisons. Despite 
risking their lives, the PKK members in jails did not accept what the state asked 
for. They were killed in the most brutal ways; especially in the main prison of 
Diyarbakir, (interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). The famous story of a senior 
member of the PKK ‘Mezlum Dogan’ who celebrated Kurdish New Year 
festivities ‘Newroz’ by self-immolation in March 1982 has become a symbolic 
and heroic story. Such stories gave much hope to the Kurdish people and 
became a reason for guerrilla recruitment at that time. Thus, it gave hope to the 
people that the PKK could be a different way for their struggle (interview with 
A5&A6 on 28/07/2011). This argument mainly comes from pro-PKK people that 
only want to see and say the best of it. 
However, these are reasonable points, in view of the fact that at the time of the 
disappointment of the Kurdish people in having any power to make any step or 
move towards freedom; the PKK became hope and started its struggle in a 
harsh and active manner for the Kurdish people. On the other hand, according 
to some experts, there were other points that made the PKK develop and 
survive in that harsh era. Bozarslan in Kasaba (2008) argues that, due to the 
long term Turkish- Syrian conflicts, the PKK had a chance to get support from 
Syria and organize itself. It especially had an impact on the position of Ocalan 
as the first and only leader to have total power over any plan and decision. 
It is argued that “Ocalan’s success derived from the tremendous changes that 
his party had gone through during its short period in exile. Before 1980, Ocalan 
was still a primus inter pares in the PKK. During the Syrian and Lebanese 
years, however, and along the lines of Ataturk in Turkey, and those of other 
Middle Eastern ‘leaders’, he remodeled the PKK into a party dominated by a 
single man”, (Kasaba, 2008: 351). This can be understandable to a certain 
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degree as Ocalan became number one and the only man who was beyond 
question and criticism within the party. In addition to that, in contrary to the 
Kurdish political movements in other parts of Kurdistan, which always had and 
currently have internal conflicts and dismantlement, the harsh and tight policy of 
Ocalan and his party gave a very small room and chance for organisational 
internal conflicts and dismantlement. 
Thus, it became the only party in the northern part of Kurdistan that could be 
regarded as an owner or representative of the Kurdish question. Therefore, the 
nature and the norms of this movement were predominantly, against the 
mainstream policy of this era of political and social vision. In the words of the 
previous PKK senior member and leader of the KCK, “Cemil Bayik”, “this 
movement can be seen as a river that has always been making new waves and 
going through different valleys. Its philosophy and ideology come from a source 
that cannot be understood according to the mainstream and common logic. 
Since the PKK has not been established based on common logic it is therefore 
out of the common and mainstream system of thinking and performance. 
Accordingly, the common system of thinking cannot understand the KCK”, 
(Cudi, 2008: 476). This means that the movement always manifests its struggle 
through activities that are not going parallel to the mainstream policy of the 
common and new world system. Therefore, this thesis needs to examine the 
KCK as a unique and different entity that has difficulties with social theories and 
mainstream examinations. 
  
What is the KCK? 
The question of the shift and transformation of the struggle in the structure and 
policy of the main actor of the Kurdish national movement discourse has very 
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strong ties with the phenomenon of the ‘Unions of Communities in Kurdistan’, in 
Kurdish; ‘Koma Civaken Kurdistan’, or “KCK”, in Turkish, ‘Kurdistan Topluluklar 
Birliği’. First of all, there is a huge ambiguity around this new organisational 
body. This ambiguity is not only from the state and Turkish politicians, neither 
only in Turkey, nor from academics or social nor political commentators, but 
from the ‘KCK’ activists themselves as well. This is due to the uncertainty and 
confusion of the leader of the KCK, ‘Abdullah Ocalan’ himself while he was in 
jail and his party went through a serious of huge difficulties in all different 
aspects. 
Moreover, the hegemony of his long-term socialist and nationalist ideology 
could not be shifted that easily. Ocalan himself has confessed that after the 
collapse of the socialist bloc, he was in a situation of ideological chaos. He 
knew that in order for his movement to be sustained; he must develop another 
discourse, but he was not sure how and what discourse must be developed, 
(interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). Principally, Ocalan had to think of 
developing a critical discourse regarding the issue of criticising the notion of the 
nation state, and the struggle for achieving the goal of an independent state for 
the Kurds. In other words, he had to revise his ideology with regards to the 
long-term dream of establishing the independent socialist greater Kurdistan. 
In fact, the movement was in a great need of change. Therefore, Ocalan had to 
think of opening this deadlocked road in front of his struggle. Thus, the idea of 
establishing the KCK was not systematic, nor based on clear theoretical 
enhancement. Therefore, some people describe the KCK as a synonym for the 
PKK. Others say that it is a system that has been created by former PKK leader 
‘Abdullah Ocalan’ as an alternative model to the current Turkish state. The point 
which is of important concern here is that, in all cases, the KCK has a crucial 
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role in the mobilization and managing of social movement in Kurdistan. Ocalan 
himself describes the KCK as a wide and diverse system that can be an 
alternative for the state. The project of the KCK for managing society is not 
based on the pillars of the nation state that is a top-down project. Nonetheless, 
it is based on 'Democratic Confederalism' through a “Democratic Autonomy” 
that could be bottom-up project. In other words, he suggests an alternative 
model under the name of ‘Democratic Confederalism’ with a project of 
‘Democratic Autonomy’ 
Ocalan argues: 
“The Democratic Confederalism of Kurdistan is not a state system; it 
is the democratic system of a people without a state... It takes its 
power from the people and adopts to reach self-sufficiency in every 
field including economy. The Democratic Confederalism is the 
movement of the Kurdish people to found their own democracy and 
organize their own social system... The Democratic Confederalism is 
the expression of the democratic union of the Kurdish people that 
have been split into four parts and have spread all over the world... It 
develops the notion of a democratic nation instead of the nationalist-
statist nation based on strict borders”, (DTF, 2012). 
Through the new approach of Ocalan and his KCK, the ‘nation state is 
naturally dictatorial as it takes its power from some illusion or at least some 
ideology that is holy and blessed by heaven. In other words, according to 
Ocalan (2009), nation state has a notion of transcendental inspiration that 
makes the leaders of the nation regard themselves as God or the deputy of 
God on earth. Therefore, the notion of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ has been 
developed by Ocalan as an alternative for the nation state model in the 
Middle East. The notion of ‘Nation State’ verses the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ 
need to be elaborated in much more detail, from the point of scholars on the 
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one hand and from the view-point of “the Ideology of PKK” on the other 
hand. Yet, this can be postponed for the next chapters when the concept of 
Democratic Autonomy and the policy of the ‘KCK’ and implementing it w ill be 
investigated.    
According to a senior member of the ‘KCK’ who does not want to be named; it is 
a system that is managing all aspects of Kurdistan society and produced as an 
alternative for the state model. This means that, the KCK can be seen as an 
umbrella for all active political, cultural, social, and societal organisations within 
the areas in which Kurds live. On the other hand, the notion of this umbrella is 
to refuse the model of the nation state. Thus, it is not only about the Kurds, it is 
about all ethnicities and religions; cultures that exist on the land that is called 
Kurdistan across all four countries (interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). In other 
words, it is about nations not states. Nevertheless, there is a contradiction about 
this suggestion of presenting the KCK from Ocalan. On the one hand, Ocalan 
has given up the notion of nation state or even democratic state and is focusing 
on the democratic confederacies, celebrating the notion of diversity and a multi-
coloured society. On the other hand, the notion of Kurdishness and the struggle 
for free Kurdistan, makes one think that there is no such clear vision about 
overcoming the notion of the nation state. 
Due to his imprisonment in ‘Imrali Island’ for more than a decade, Ocalan’s 
absence in the political arena has affected his organisation. Yet again, his 
character as a political leader has flourished and he became social movement 
leader that can be wider than merely the leadership of his former political party 
the “PKK”. Currently, Ocalan is seen not only by his followers as the Kurdish 
people's leader ‘Seroke Gele Kurd’ or ‘Kurt Halk Onderi’, but, also by a 
significant amount of the Kurdish people and Pro-Kurdish activists in Turkey 
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and in the other parts of Kurdistan. Therefore, there is a position on the top of 
the body of the KCK that is called the leadership. The word leadership in the 
context of the KCK means ‘Abdullah Ocalan’ himself, meaning that, his 
followers - who have become more than several millions - see him as a leader. 
Moreover, the management of the KCK has regarded him as an institution that 
is called leadership rather than a person only. It is better to postpone criticizing 
the KCK in this stage of the thesis and simply present the details about it just for 
now.  
The KCK was established in 2005 after the confusion and ideological retreat 
that happened in the PKK’s struggle and while Ocalan was in jail for six years. 
In 1999, when Ocalan was captured, similar to his recent call on the 21st of 
March 2013, he ordered the PKK guerrillas to retreat from Turkish territory and 
have unilateral ceasefire. Despite huge loyalty for Ocalan even when he was in 
jail, the inner conflict was more visible due to his absence. Thus, the PKK was 
dismantled by some of its actual leaders and Ocalan was not very much aware 
of the new situation of the PKK. Hence, the organization was diminished and it 
was just about to be another example of the Kurdish failure similar to that in 
which happened to all other Kurdish political parties in the history of the Kurdish 
national movement in the twentieth century across the whole parts of Kurdistan. 
The issue of fragmentation and dismantlement has become an inevitable reality 
in the history of the Kurdish struggle. That was a point that Ocalan wanted to 
make distinct about his movement from other previous Kurdish movements. 
However, suddenly a group of members under the management of his younger 
brother ‘Osman Ocalan’ declared another party that was called the ‘Patriotic 
Democratic Party’, in Kurdish, ‘Partyia Walatpareziya Democratik’  “PWD”. 
Nevertheless, due to the distinctiveness of the struggle of the PKK and 
 142 
extraordinary loyalty for Abdullah Ocalan within the movement, the 
dismantlement did not affect the struggle and the PKK has continued intact and 
as the only party that can claim of representation of the Kurdish cause in 
Turkey. 
On the other hand, due to the Turkish pressure on the EU and the US 
administrations to label the PKK as a terrorist organisation and put it into the list 
of terror, the PKK tried to change its name to Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress “KADEK”. As a result of this shift, there was an 
ideological gap within the organisation. Therefore, day by day, the KADEK was 
getting closer and closer from being diminished and decayed. Following this, 
the party went through a stage of “shock and retreat”, (Akkaya and Jongerden, 
2012); it was in front of a huge challenge to move up and get out of the stage of 
deadlock or reconstruct its organisation once again. Therefore, in 2005 the PKK 
was re-established again but this time in a different position and for a different 
purpose. 
It can be suggested that the real notion of transformation of Kurdish national 
movement can be recorded from the process of rebuilding the movement and 
the transfer from the PKK to the KCK. The PKK was a political party with a 
different and much more progressed policy and practice compared to other 
Kurdish political parties prior to the PKK in all parts of Kurdistan. However, the 
KCK is a social movement that has worked on the ‘changing of the values’, of 
the Kurdish society, Castells (2012). Thus, the event of creating the KCK, 
(named as KKK at the beginning) is intended as the first step of transformation 
from political movement to social movement. It is about affecting the way that 
people think, behave and speak; the way people produce or reproduce several 
new terms and concepts or at least redefining the concepts and giving them 
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different values. That was what the KCK did and has been doing since 2005 
until now. 
Historically the PKK has been a common and familiar name. However, the PKK 
is a small part of the KCK at the present time. The PKK has only ideological 
tasks of the body that is called the KCK system as an umbrella for all cultural, 
social and political aspects of the movement. This means that the KCK is the 
main actor and character of social movement in Kurdistan since it is covering all 
aspects of activities. If this argument is not very much applicable for all parts of 
Kurdistan, it is clearly applicable in Turkey and in the northern part of Kurdistan 
and to the Kurdish areas and people in Syria. It is obvious how well organised 
the Kurdish people who are acting under the Kurdish party in Syria which is the 
Democratic Union Party ‘PYD’, Democratic Movement ‘TEV-DEM’ and the 
Kurdish army of People Defence Units ‘YPG’ and women wing of the Kurdish 
army YPJ in contemporary Syrian revolution against the Syrian state and so 
Called Islamic state of ISIS. The example of implementing the KCK system is 
very visible in the Kurdish areas in both Turkish and Syrian parts of Kurdistan. 
Moreover, establishing a self-ruling entity in the Kurdish areas in Syria by the 
KCK actors based on the project of Democratic Autonomy is another point of 
effectiveness of the KCK in the region at the current time. Discussion about that 
implementation will be postponed for the next chapters of this thesis. Once 
again it must be argued that despite all vagueness and contradictions in the 
policy of the KCK as well as the matter of its illegality in Turkey; the movement 
is effective and has a huge impact on the peoples’ lives and on the state policy. 
The main point to be presented here is examining the detail of the ‘KCK’. 
During an interview with a senior Kurdish politician who considers himself as 
a citizen of the KCK; he suggested that the KCK has hundreds of small, 
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medium and big organisations across all parts of Kurdistan, in the Turkish 
large metropolises and in diaspora, (interview with A9 on 07/08/2011). 
Therefore, at the current time, the KCK is the main and widest entity that has 
covered all activities of the Kurdish and Kurdistani people. The terminology 
of the PKK is used only for a section that is responsible for ideological 
education within the committee of ideology under the management council 
and under the leadership of the KCK. 
The goals of the KCK are defined by its leader and theoretical designer as 
such: 
 “To create a society in Kurdistan based on the principles of radical 
democracy, that lives according to the essential elements of 
democratic societal co-federalism, and which is organized 
democratically, based on equality of the sexes and ecological 
awareness. To fight against every kind of backwardness in Kurdish 
society, and to both create and advance individual and societal 
spiritual and financial development. To see that every faction of 
society is able to create its own democratic organization, to create 
regional people’s parliaments based on the policy of ‘equal KCK 
citizens.’ To bring about a transition from an economy based on profit 
to a communal economy based on user value and sharing. To fight 
against any attacks on the leadership of the Democratic 
Confederation”, (İSTEGÜN 2011). 
When we look at this statement of Ocalan, we can easily see the notions of 
social movement in the objectives and procedures that are presented. In 
other words, there is a timely discourse for creating an umbrella for the 
social movement that is already out there. There is a sense of injustice, or a 
sense of “moral indignation”, (Githens-Mazer, 2006:16). There is a sense of 
collective identity and a sense of having an agency or there is some  “belief 
that the individual can, in so far as they participate in sustained collective 
 145 
action, alter conditions and politics through the mechanisms, institutions and 
actions of social movement”, (Githens-Mazer, 2006:16). 
 Looking at the hierarchy of the body of it, on the top of the KCK there is a 
council that is called leadership. Actually there is not any committee or council 
as such. It is only Ocalan himself but they call him leadership rather than a 
leader. Most likely after his death, this leadership body will be changed or totally 
erased as it is only a symbolic body. However, Ocalan has a crucial role in 
making any decision despite his condition as a prisoner for the last 15 years. 
Thus, hypothetically the position of leadership is the main and highest policy 
maker for the KCK. 
Under the leadership, there is another assembly that can be similar to a 
parliament. It is a legislative branch of the KCK that is called the ‘Kurdistan 
People Congress’ in Kurdish ‘KGK’ or “Kongra Gel”. All the policies are made 
and decisions are taken by this assembly. Thus, Kongra Gel can be regarded 
as the main policy makers and decision takers too. “In compliance with the KCK 
contract, -which can be regarded as a constitution of the KCK- Kongra Gel 
consists of three hundred members. These members are elected bi-yearly by 
the KCK’s citizens”, (Sandikli, 2011).  Members are from all parts of Kurdistan 
and from all different ethnic and religious minorities that reside in Kurdistan and 
from Kurdish people in diaspora. The place of this council is unknown or it is not 
in a particular place but mainly it is in the Kurdistan Mountains.  A member of 
this assembly has stated that “every two years an election is held for Kongra 
Gel’s members and it is held in one of the mountains of Kurdistan”, (interview 
with A1 on 22/09/2012). The management system of this assembly is based on 
co-chair leadership; a man and a woman have fifty-fifty power as co-presidents 
of ‘Kongra Gel’. 
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Within the “Kongra Gel” or it can be said beside it, there is another council that 
is called the management council or ‘Executive Council’, in Kurdish “Konseya 
Reveberi”. From the members of Kongra Gel that are three hundred members, 
thirty members of them will be elected for the executive council. All executive 
tasks are on the shoulders of this council. Within the thirty members of the 
executive council, there is a team that consists of six members of the council 
that are managers of the executive council; two co-presidents and four 
assistants. 
In addition to the legislative and executive councils, there is a ‘Judiciary Council’ 
on the same level as the other two. Thus, the judiciary council of the KCK is 
“made up of three different courts which report to one superior court under the 
name of the Court of Administrative Justice. These three separate courts are 
namely the Courts of People’s Liberation, the Superior Military Courts and the 
Administrative Courts”, (Sandikli, 2011). The members of the judiciary council 
are also elected by the legislative council. Thus, the members of both executive 
and judiciary councils are elected within and through the members of “Kongra 
Gel” which is the highest authority of the KCK. 
As a matter of fact, all of the KCK leadership system is based on co-leadership 
for the institutions and organizations within the KCK. However, some parts of 
the system have very recently changed the one leader system. For example, 
the president of Kongra Gel was ‘Ramzi Kartal’ and the president of the 
executive council was ‘Murat Karaylan’. However, even before the change, in 
terms of practice, both bodies were run through a co-leadership management 
system. In July 2013, in the ninth conference of the Kongra Gel which was held 
in ‘Qendil Mountains’, the co-leader system for both ‘Kongra Gel’ and ‘Executive 
Council’ were announced. Both ‘Ramzi Kartal (male)’ and Hager Zagros 
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(female) became Kongra Gel co-leaders and both ‘Cemil Bayik’ (male) and 
‘Base Hozat’ (female) became executive council co-leaders. It can be argued 
that this step of the KCK can be regarded as organisational transformation and 
maintenance, (Zald and McCarthy, 1987). 
As mentioned earlier, the executive council has thirty members. Each few 
members are the head of a committee. There are six main committees that are 
responsible for all policies and decisions that Kongra Gel provides them, 
(interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). The committees are as follows: 
1- Political Committee ‘Komiteya Siyasi’: this committee is responsible for 
political activities across all parts of Kurdistan. The main and most prominent 
political parties that are currently active on the scene are the BDP and the HDP 
in Turkey or in the north part of Kurdistan, the PJAK and in Iran or in the east of 
Kurdistan, the PCDK in Iraq or in the south of Kurdistan, and the PYD in Syria 
or in the west of Kurdistan. Moreover, there are plenty of other political activities 
through individuals within other political and social organisations that have 
direct or indirect connections with this committee. 
 2- Ideological Committee “Komiteya Ideolojik”: this committee is responsible 
for preparing cadres, social activists and politicians and educating citizens of the 
KCK with the ideology of the system. It is also managing academic camps in and 
outside the territories of Kurdistan. The main body within this committee is the 
‘PKK’. As mentioned earlier, the PKK is no longer a main body of the movement. 
This means that it is not the PKK that ‘Abdullah Ocalan’ and his friends established 
from the 1970s. This ‘PKK’ which is inside the body of the KCK, is a part of a 
committee within six committees under the executive council of the KCK. Thus, the 
PKK is responsible for all ideological progress and preparing active members only 
from the ideological perspectives. Also there is an education and enlightening 
 148 
organisation within this committee. In addition to that, this committee is managing 
media activities of the KCK in terms of ideological discourse and agenda. 
Thus, the PKK is responsible for preparing lectures and programs for the whole 
movement. In other words, the PKK is nothing but an ideological school and a 
method of thinking and mobilizing the system of the ‘KCK’. In this case, the 
terminology of the ‘PKK’ no longer means Kurdistan Workers Party as it was 
until 2005. It is only a symbol of an ideological wing of the KCK. Yet, the PKK is 
a label and much more usable by the state, media and by Kurdish people 
themselves as well. 
It is just worth mentioning some of the lectures and topics that are delivered 
by this committee to the ‘KCK’ cadres. There are subjects within the 
curriculum of the PKK academic schools such as philosophy, history in 
general and the Middle East and Mesopotamia history, and ideological 
schools of thoughts; Marxism and socialism especially; analytically, 
criticizing the role and impact of religions, positivism and capitalism, focusing 
on feminism and gender studies. More importantly, teaching the history of 
Kurdish national movement especially over the last 40 years, ecology, self-
defense and finally some special lectures about the leadership and the 
personality of the KCK leader ‘Abdullah Ocalan’. The final one is delivered 
only by a senior member of the ‘KCK’ who spent most of his life with Ocalan, 
(interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). This means that, life and personality of 
Ocalan within the KCK became symbolic and every cadre of the movement 
has to be fully loyal to him. This is one of the extreme points that the KCK 
could not be free from it easily.   
Anyone who is considered as a cadre must have at least six months study in 
the academia, regardless of their residence of living, age or education levels. 
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After six months, they can be a citizen of the KCK and they should promise 
the committee that they are cadres. In this case, there is a commitment that 
makes cadres put all their personal freedom and destinies in the hands of 
their movement. By having an ‘oath’ as a cadre, personal freedom such as 
getting married or living in a town or city, staying in town or going to 
mountains, and all other important things will be out of the hands of cadres. 
This means that personal freedom must be given up by the cadres. 
 3- Security committee “Komiteya Parastine”: this committee is responsible 
for all security and warfare activities. Preparing and training of guerrillas is 
implemented through this committee. The main and most prominent 
organisation within this committee is the Forces of Protecting People “HPG”, in 
Kurdish; ‘Hezen Parastnen Gel’. This is an army that has equipment and 
recruitment. Guerrillas are belonging to this organisation under the committee of 
security. Also “YJA STAR”, the female wing of the HPG has the same or similar 
equipment and recruitment for female guerrillas. 
There is a link between other armed wings of the groups that are under the 
KCK umbrella; such as the PJAK and the PYD that both have an army and are 
under the committee of security of the KCK. There are education and training 
courses that are provided by the HPG for most of the other Kurdish groups that 
have an army and guerrilla activities. However, there is some kind of semi-
autonomy in the working and acting of other organisations in all parts of 
Kurdistan. It depends on necessity and opportunity, the nature and context of 
the struggle of each party, (interview with A4 on 14/9/2012). 
4- Ecology Committee “Komiteya Ekolojik”: this committee is responsible for 
activities with regards to ecological issues; there are several civil organisations 
that are struggling for a clear and clean environment in Kurdistan. As mentioned 
 150 
earlier, within the committee of ideology, there is an important subject that is 
delivered in the academic lectures which is ecological concerns. Also the 
literatures of the KCK and Abdullah Ocalan himself have exposed a great 
awareness to ecology and the environment. On the other hand, most of the 
societal organisations that are connected to the committee of society are 
actively contributing to the ecological concerns. According to the agreement of 
the KCK citizenship, citizens must protect the environment and have a clear 
concern about ecology, (interview with A2 on 23/09/2012). Before the KCK, 
majority of Kurdish people never understood how important ecology is. Even 
when Ocalan had mentioned this concern in his speech, very few people 
understood why this man was making this matter so important while Kurdish 
rights and identity were still under a huge risk. However, as a senior member of 
the KCK argues; to their movement, “ax u xoza qasi mirov u chand gingin”, 
(interview with A6 on 28/07/2011). This means that the land and nature are as 
important as the human and culture. This can be regarded as a turning point of 
the movement in terms of ecology and respecting the nature. 
5- Economy Committee “Komiteya Abory”: this one is responsible for 
economic issues such as taxation, incomes and expenditures of the system. 
Managing the financial aspect of the system comes from this committee. Within 
the KCK there is a tight economic system that looks to the socialist economic 
system for the movement, (interview with A9 on 07/08/2011). What is very 
interesting here is the power of the KCK to manage its financial needs. It is not 
clear how and from which way the KCK is fulfilling financial resources. In the 
KCK agreement -or can be called constitution-, there is some kind of taxation 
system that has been mentioned. Yet, this is not a complete answer for this 
important aspect of economic issues. Since the KCK is an outlawed body, no 
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one can very certainly get to the answer of how the source of funds for it has 
been fixed. Therefore, several different presumptions are presented in this 
regard. Yet, none of them are certain and all of them can be somehow true. 
6- Society Committee “Komiteya Civaki”: this committee is very important for 
the KCK, there are tens or, one can say hundreds, of organisations under this 
committee. Since the KCK can be regarded as the main actor of social 
movement in Kurdish part of Turkey, therefore, cultural and societal activisms 
are very wide within this system. In Turkey, the main and most prominent 
organisation that is under this committee is the Democratic Society Congress, in 
Turkish, Demokratik Toplum Kongresi “DTK”. This is a societal committee that 
is responsible for all social and cultural activities. Some of these organisations 
are legal and have members who are not citizens of the KCK; they are only 
legal citizens of the country in which they live. Yet, the policy of the most of 
these organisations cannot be delivered without the hegemony and power of 
the KCK. 
An example of those organisations that are influenced by the “Ideology of PKK” 
is the Human Rights Association, in Turkish; Insan Haklari Dernegi “IHD”. This 
organisation has members across all Turkey, yet in the cities where the KCK 
has hegemony, most of the members are working for the benefits of the 
ideology and policy of the KCK but the works are all run according to the 
Turkish legal boundaries. Other examples are, “Kurd-Der” and “Mezlum Der” in 
Turkey. The two latter organisations are legal according to the constitution of 
Turkey. However, the policy and program is under the control of the KCK. The 
state does not have evidence that such institutions are belong to the KCK. 
However, similar to plenty of other organisations, there are legal boundaries 
that protect them from closure, (interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). 
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Apart from these six main committees, there are plenty of sub branches and 
bodies within the KCK. As mentioned earlier, since the KCK is illegal in Turkey, 
it has an invisible feature but powerful and visible affection. The point that 
needs to be cleared here is that the KCK framework cannot be totally drawn. 
The figure (1) below has made the KCK structure clearer. 
 
Figure (1): the KCK Structure, Sandikli, (2011) 
It is worth mentioning a fact that within the KCK, the role and presence of 
women is very active and obvious. Any position and decision within any 
organ of the KCK has to be regarded and taken by the power, presence and 
participation of women. Almost all the high positions on the level of national, 
regional and local are divided equally between men and women. For 
example, the leadership of the DTK is held by two leaders, “currently Mr 
Ahmet Turk and  Miss. Aysel Togluk” and for the BDP it was both “Mr 
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Selahattin Demirtaş and Mrs. Gultan Kisanak”, (A2). At the current time, for 
the HDP as a largest pro-Kurdish Party under the KCK, the co-chairs are 
Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. This model is very new for Turkey 
and almost for Europe. Only a few political and social movements in Europe 
are following the co-chair system and no Turkish social and political 
movement has followed this model. 
On the other hand, for the leadership of any organ within the KCK, at the 
different levels and on the different aspects, there is a management team of 
the committees and councils that is made from three members. The first one 
of the three has to characterize general people, so the member could be a 
man or a woman; the second one is representing women so the member has 
to be woman by herself. Finally, the third one is representing the youth within 
the committee. No matter if the member is male or female they have to be 
young. So it sometimes happened that the female members of the 
management committees and councils are in the majority. A senior member 
of the KCK argues that more than %65 of the managers of the KCK positions 
are female and more than %80 of their decision makers are young members, 
(interview with C2 on 07/10/2011). This means that the KCK has a notion of 
regeneration within its body. Yet, the hegemony and full commitment for the 
Ideology of the PKK is crucial for the members still.  
By observing the diverse activities of the KCK within and outside Turkey and 
Kurdistan, it can be easily noticed how actively women are representing the 
social and political activities. Thus, the pillars of the patriarchy system have 
been shaken at least relatively since the “Ideology of PKK” has started to 
have the hegemony on Kurdistan society. Therefore, this could be another 
face of transformation within the Kurdish national movement.  
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There is another point that is worth mentioning here which could be the issue 
of personal and individual interests. Conflict within the members due to 
personal and individual interests rarely can be seen. It just seems to be that 
the system has made the cadres not to think of themselves any more. In other 
words, no-one can raise any personal issues and fight for their own individual 
rights and interests. It is a very tiny scope for individual interests for the cadres 
who are working within such organisations that the KCK has ideological 
hegemony on.  Somehow, it must be collective struggle and only collective 
aims are in the agenda of the institutions. The evidence for what is mentioned 
is very clear and obvious. It can be seen simply through observing the leaders 
and main activists of these social and political organisations with the KCK. 
These activists are deprived from almost all or most of their individual 
interests, their welfare and well-being. During one year of close observation of 
the main activists and high members of those organisations that consider 
themselves as loyal to the KCK, this point has been remarked so obviously. 
During an interview with the KCK senior members that are on the very top of 
the pyramid of the KCK, It was remarked that there is no any different 
between them and any simple member who has no power and responsibility. 
It was remarked that the hard work of the senior member and the tea server, 
who is working in the kitchen of the office, are rewarded equally. Thus, there is 
no any difference between members at least in terms of life-style, clothing and 
eating and in terms of their place of sleeping and having any special 
treatment. This means that the KCK is managed by mentality and policy that is 
not familiar with nowadays organisational management. This is the point that 
argues that the KCK cannot be understood by mainstream policy and 
mentality. 
 155 
All what has been seen above about the shape of the KCK in a broader 
context, can be seen in a smaller picture on the levels of all parts of Kurdistan. 
This means that within the borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, there are 
legal and illegal institutions which are belong to the KCK. They have 
assemblies and councils, they have committees and organisations. They have 
social, cultural, economic and political institutions that are working under the 
“Ideology of PKK” or the policy and practice of the KCK system. Meanwhile, it 
is obvious that there are some sorts of independence and autonomy according 
to social and political situations and opportunities, (interview with D2 on 
03/06/2012). 
Since the struggle of the PKK historically has mainly focused on the Turkish 
part of Kurdistan and the majority of the Kurds live there, the main and most 
powerful part of the KCK’s struggle has been working there. In Turkish 
Kurdistan, there are organised bodies for all the committees and councils 
under the name of Assembly of Turkey, “Meclisa Turkiye”, (interviews with A1, 
A2 on 22&23/09/2012 & with A14 on 03/06/2011).  At the top of the power of 
any assembly of Turkey, there is an assembly that is similar to the “Kongra 
Gel” but on the level of Turkey only. It is called the Democratic Society 
Congress, in Kurdish, Kongra Civaken Demokratik “KCD” or “DTK”, (interview 
with A13 on 17/04/2012). This assembly is somehow controversial. On the one 
hand, it is a legal body that has permission in Turkey according to the 
legislation and under the name of a cultural activities organisation. On the 
other hand, it is illegal since it is the main and most powerful body of the KCK 
in Turkey. In the next chapter, there will be a deep interpretation of the DTK 
and its role in the social, cultural and political arena in Turkey and in Kurdistan 
especially. 
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What is interesting in this respect is that the DTK in Turkey is the main body of 
the KCK in practice and reality. However, it is legally called the DTK in its 
Turkish name and it is a non-political entity. It is a cultural association 
according to the legal sphere in Turkey that is involved with cultural events 
only. This is very common in the political arena in Turkey and among the Kurds 
too. This means that there are several names on the scene that do not have 
real powers. Nonetheless, there are some hidden actors that have essential 
invisible powers. For instance, in the case of Turkish political movements, 
there is a movement of well-known Muslim cleric ‘Fethulla Gulen’ that has a 
huge invisible political power through its social, cultural, educational and 
religious activities under the name of social and religious services ‘Hizmet’. 
However, there is no any visible power in the hand of this Cleric and his 
movement, Olson (2011).   
This argument even goes further to touch the main point in the Turkish political 
arena that has been elaborated under the concept of the state and deep state 
agenda in Turkey. Thus, there is an undercover power that is protecting the 
ideology and interest of the political entity of the state. In the case of the KCK, 
there are several characters and deep characters that are engaged with the 
struggle within the national movement of the Kurds. Yet, their names and faces 
cannot be seen easily. On behalf of them, there are other names and faces. 
In addition to the KCK that is active on the land of Kurdistan, Kurds in 
diasporas have their own institutions under different names; those who are 
living and struggling according to the “Ideology of PKK” or at least are under 
the hegemony of that ideology; working within an institution that is under the 
KCK somehow. This association is called the “Democratic Society of the 
Kurds” outside Kurdistan or in diaspora; in Kurdish, Civaken Demokratika Kurd 
 157 
“CDK”, (interview with A1 on 22/09/2012). This is only an approach to protect 
the KCK activities and adapted its legacy according to the EU and other 
countries’ legal systems. Therefore, the leaders of the KCK who are in Europe 
are mainly active members of this entity that is called “CDK”. 
Moreover, there is another assembly that is gathering occasionally in Europe, 
which has an annual general congress and election for the leader and members. 
It is called the Kurdistan National Congress, in Kurdish, Kongra Netewiya 
Kurdistan ‘KNK’. It has its main headquarters in Brussels. This congress has 
Kurdish and Kurdistani members across the world and from all parts of Kurdistan. 
Once again, this is under the KCK umbrella and working under the “Ideology of 
PKK” as well. The KNK is the successor of another assembly that was called 
Kurdistan Parliament in Exile; in Kurdish, Paliamntoya Kurdistan Derve Welat, 
‘PKDW’, (interview with A2 on 23/09/2012). This assembly was formed as a body 
to represent the legal form of the Kurdish struggle outside Kurdistan. Yet, due to 
the rapid changes in the Kurdish political party’s agendas and lack of unity and 
national scheme rather than regional or local agenda, it could not be an umbrella 
for all Kurdish social activists and political parties. Currently, the KNK can gather 
several Kurdistani political parties across all parts of Kurdistan. Yet, those parties 
that accept the KNK are only those that are directly or indirectly under the 
hegemony and control of the “Ideology of PKK”. 
As mentioned earlier, the “Ideology of PKK” has affected the Kurdish national 
movement across all parts of Kurdistan, with some difference from one part to 
another. However, the main and most effective impact that this ideology has had, 
can be seen in the northern part of Kurdistan. As mentioned earlier, the main and 
most powerful body of the Turkish council of the KCK is Democratic Society 
Congress, in Turkish, “Demokratik Toplum Kongresi” ‘DTK’. Also politically, there 
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is a Peace and Progress Party; in Kurdish, Partya Asityi w Demokrasi, ‘PAD’, in 
Turkish, “Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi” ‘BDP’. We should refer to those two main 
organizations in their Turkish acronyms, as ‘DTK’ and ‘BDP’, since they are 
known mainly by these acronyms in the public and in the social and political 
arenas. In the next chapters this thesis tries to investigate the nature of these two 
institutions in detail and the manifestation of the KCK’s policy and the “Ideology of 
PKK” through both the ‘DTK’ and the ‘BDP’.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter was very important for the entire thesis since it has provided a  
enormous amount of presentation and critical discussion about three main 
intertwined elements of the Kurdish national struggle and social movement in 
the Kurdish part of Turkey. It has focused on the PKK with all its controversies, 
the ideology of PKK with all its limitations and complications as well as the KCK 
system with all its vague manifestations and wide range of presence. The PKK 
became a base for the Kurdish revival and ending the era of Kurdish denial in 
Turkey. It was discussed that the ideology of PKK as a new and reshaped 
school of the KCK system has made promises to follow the new pathway of the 
Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. Moreover, the KCK was critically presented 
in detail. Theoretically, the KCK was regarded as a new and multi-dimensional 
movement that has started its wide range of activism in Kurdistan and in 
Turkey. In the next chapter, the practical and visible faces of the KCK will be 
under analysis. That would be through social and cultural activism of the KCK 
as the main actor of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. Through this 
analysis, the reasons behind the process of transformation from the PKK to the 
KCK will be better examined.  
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Introduction 
This chapter will investigate the reasons for the first steps of the main actor of 
the Kurdish national movement towards change and transformation of the 
struggle. It will look at the Kurdish civil and legal activism in Turkey and the 
political activities that have been pursued in a different way since the KCK has 
been established. For that, it will particularly examine activisms of the newly 
established KCK as a multi-dimensional entity that has provided new and 
different characters for the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. Through the 
focus on the cultural and social activism of the KCK within the Kurdish part of 
Turkey, the policy of the movement from political to social, from nation state to 
democratic nation building will be investigated. 
In order to make the picture of Kurdish national movement  flawless, there must 
be an attempt to envisage the whole framework of the movement. The 
character and functions of the main game players of the movement need to be 
illustrated. For that, the changes of the political and social contexts in Turkey 
and in the broader regional states can be widely seen on the one hand, 
alongside the transformations of the main actor of the Kurdish national 
movement from a one-dimensional ‘struggle’ to a broader and multi-dimensional 
‘struggle’ on the other hand, (Touraine, 1981). Nonetheless, the types of 
struggle and demands have been changed from Kurdish ultra nationalist and 
political demands to more societal, democratic and multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural demands. 
It is attention grabbing that on the one hand, within the Kurdish national struggle 
and social movement in the Kurdish areas in Turkey, diverse and multiple 
ethnic, religious and cultural characters can be seen. However, mainly the 
struggle and the control of the whole frame of the movement is under the hands 
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of Kurdish powers and circling around the issue of Kurdishness through cultural, 
social and political rights for the Kurds and other minorities. It is not an easy 
task for the Kurds and their institutions to manage civil and legal activities within 
the Turkish borders and according to the Turkish constitution boundaries. 
However, in recent years, Kurds and other minority groups  who are living in the 
Kurdish areas in Turkey or have ties with the Kurdish national movement have 
actively established several institutions and groups to proceed with the struggle 
and fight for their rights and agendas. These institutions are diverse from social 
to political, from cultural to ecological, from human rights to language and craft 
learning activities. 
In Turkey, all such institutions and groups that are working in favour of the 
Kurds and the notion of Kurdishness are mainly managed by an ideological 
agenda that comes from the policy making and decision taking of the ‘KCK’. 
Under the umbrella of the KCK, there are hundreds of organisations from small 
to medium and large in size, (interview with A3 on 25/03/2012). This thesis 
argues that all Kurdish and pro-Kurdish political parties such as the BDP, HDP, 
Hak-Par, and KADEP are working directly or indirectly, compulsorily or 
voluntarily under the control of the KCK. In terms of social activities, there is the 
same or a similar case for social and cultural organisations such as the Human 
Rights Association ‘IHD’, the Kurdish Democratic Culture and progress 
Association ‘Kurd-Der’, and the Human Rights and Depressed people 
Association ‘Mezlum-Der’. Moreover, for the administrations and municipalities, 
there are about one hundred municipalities which are directly or indirectly under 
the hegemony or the control of the ideological committee of the ‘KCK’; in other 
words, all municipalities that are in the Kurdish areas and have been elected by 
some Kurdish votes to be in the office “are run by the commission of regional 
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management within the committee of the ‘Ideology of PKK’ which is the main 
ideological part of the KCK”, (interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). 
Moreover, the strategy and tactics of the Kurdish national movement all are 
under the control of the KCK. Since 2005, a series of discussions has been 
seen. The discussions were to develop and argue about ‘Democratic Republic’, 
‘Democratic Confederalism’ and recently the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ 
that were suggested by the KCK. All these discussions were held through the 
KCK’s main umbrella organisation within Turkey that is called the Democratic 
Society Congress ‘DTK’. These projects have been put into the agenda and 
presented through Kurdish activists, mainly by the Kurdish political parties such 
as the DTP and later by the BDP and the HDP. The projects could be regarded 
as an ideological transformation of the Kurdish national movement towards 
societal democratization through the development of the concept of ‘Radical 
Democracy’, (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012). As a matter of fact, all such ideas 
came from the KCK policy makers and especially its leader ‘Abdullah Ocalan’. 
For that, it is necessary to dedicate this chapter to focus on the KCK and its 
organisations, as it is important to present the range, power and limitation of this 
entity as it has successively become the main actor that is managing the 
Kurdish national movement. Without understanding this umbrella organisation, it 
is not easy to understand the source and power of all such activities in Turkey 
by the Kurds and their institutions. Here this chapter begins with showing the 
reasons and examining the shift of the Kurdish movement’s discourse.  
 
Shifting the Discourse of the Movement after Ocalan’s Capture 
Not only after the capture of the leader of the PKK, (Currently the KCK) 
Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, but since 1993, this movement wanted to show the 
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notion of changing their discourse in terms of their policy and their demands. 
The main point that the PKK had brought into the Kurdish national movement 
agenda at the beginning of the movement was standing above the notion of 
tribalism and religious hegemony on the Kurdish movement. As mentioned 
earlier, other social and political movements prior to the PKK focused on the 
religious figures and chieftains in the rural Kurdish areas in Kurdistan, 
Bruinessen (1992). Nonetheless, the PKK came to the arena to show that the 
freedom of the Kurds must be started from the challenge and struggle for 
making people free from any sort of slavery and tyranny. 
Thus, the PKK has claimed that freedom starts from freeing the Kurds from 
tribal leaders before making them free from the state and its despotism, 
(interview with A14 on 26/07/2011). After a long time of depressing Kurdish 
revolts since 1938, the state used the tribal leaders and chieftains as a tool for 
depressing any Kurdish revolution or movement. The character and personality 
of such local notable figures were no longer to be relied on to start the revolt 
through their support. Thus, the PKK focused on changing the values and 
perceptions of the Kurds towards themselves first, then towards the state and 
its occupation of their land. 
Moreover, the PKK came with its discourse essentially to bring the freedom of 
greater Kurdistan into its agenda rather than struggling only for the Kurds in 
Turkey. Thus the struggle was for the people of Kurdistan rather than the Kurds 
only, and for the whole of Kurdistan, rather than one part only. That was the 
discourse at least theoretically, let alone the power and possibility of 
implementation of this ideology. That was the discourse of the movement, 
especially under that very restricted situation in the 1970s and the 1980 when 
the PKK started its struggle. 
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Yet, the notion of greater Kurdistan and overcoming the limit of focusing on the 
tribal leaders and chieftains’ support for the revolution has become a unique 
starting point for the struggle. In a very long interview about the History of the 
PKK, a senior member of the KCK, “Cemil Bayik” explicitly argues that the 
movement never wanted to see itself as responsible for the struggle only in one 
part of Kurdistan. They have never stated that they struggle for only one part 
and do not care about the other areas. For the PKK, the Kurdish question is one 
question not several questions in the different parts of Kurdistan, Cudi (2008). 
‘Cemil Bayik’ argues: “we always saw Kurdistan as a whole and we struggled 
for making a national unity among all social and political parties across all 
Kurdistan”, (Cudi, 2008: 346). 
Nevertheless, from day one of the struggle, the main figures of the PKK wanted 
to show some power and base to persuade the state and the government of 
Turkey to start negotiating with them. Yet, this opportunity never came and the 
state always wanted to depress the struggle and their activities. The Turkish 
state was always handling the Kurdish question through both a military and 
security perspectives. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hegemony 
of the new world system under the USA; the PKK had to think of changing its 
discourse to a rather different approach from the traditional Marxist-Leninist 
approach. Thus, the change has been made in terms of reviewing the struggle 
and relations with the regional powers. Before exploring the reasons for shifting 
the discourse of the “Ideology of PKK”, it is necessary to highlight the aims and 
the discourse of the PKK from the first stage of the struggle. 
Having a highlight on the objectives of the PKK could make some of the 
discussions flawless. Did the PKK have a national aim as Kurdish national 
liberation? Was that the main agenda of the movement? Or did the PKK start its 
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struggle to liberate the people of Kurdistan rather than Kurds only? Did it want 
to struggle for all people in Turkey rather than Kurds within the country and 
other countries that Kurdistan is situated within? Ozcan, (2006) argues that at 
the beginning of the struggle of the PKK, the objective was the creation of an 
independent greater socialist Kurdistan through revolutionary socialism and 
internally it was organised around the principles of democratic centralism. 
Members of the party had to involve with total dedication and full-time 
commitment to the cause; they had to forego their private lives and individual 
interests and initiatives for the sake of their ideology. Therefore, the PKK was a 
Kurdistani movement rather than a Kurdish party only. It also combined with the 
motivation of socialism and revolutionary enthusiasm. 
However, as Ozcan (2006) suggests, the PKK has tried to nationalize or 
‘Kurdicize’ the ideology of socialism in order to gain a space for spreading it 
among Kurdish people. Ozcan (2006) argues that the PKK is a “Kurdicized copy 
of those customary communist parties that undertake a nation’s ‘national’ 
liberation as an ‘initial stage’ of the ultimate socialist revolution. The ideology by 
which the PKK formulates this initiative’s aims and objectives is a Middle-
Eastern translation of traditional Marxist socialism”, (Ozcan, 2006: 20). Thus, 
the PKK has become the first Kurdish political movement that has called for a 
Kurdish independent state in the twentieth century since the massacre of 
Dersim in 1938. 
There is a clear distinction between what Ocalan did and what Mustafa Barzani 
and Qazi Mohammed did a few decades before Ocalan. Also this is a main 
difference between the PKK and other main Kurdish political parties in 
Kurdistan such as the KDP and the PUK in the southern part and KOMALA and 
the KDPI in the eastern part of Kurdistan. However, in the current time when the 
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KRG has been established and Kurdish people in the south of their land have a 
de-facto state and are legally accepted by Iraqi constitution as a federal region 
within Iraq; due to the tension and conflict with the central power in Baghdad, 
Kurds are very close to declaring independent and Kurdish political parties; the 
KDP especially are very much talking about independence and declaring a 
Kurdish republic in the very small part of the historical motherland of Kurdistan. 
Thus, the discourse of the KDP has slightly changed towards state and nation 
state, while the discourse of the PKK has shifted toward a model behind the 
state and nation state. Discussion about the KDP issue is outside of the main 
aim of this thesis. Yet it is necessary to see the reasons for changing the 
discourse of the PKK and how hard it is for the PKK policy makers and for 
Kurdish people to accept this new shift and forget about their long-time dream 
to have an independent state of Kurdistan. 
  
From Independence to Confederation 
Not only for Kurdish people, even for the PKK leaders and especially for Ocalan 
himself, it was a hard decision to come across such an idea and overcome the 
notion of the nation state. Ocalan (2011), argues that for him coming out from 
the hegemony of thinking of the nation state was not easy at all. This was due to 
the fact that for a long time in the history of the Kurds, it was a big dream and all 
hope and the future were connected to the notion of having a state such as other 
nations. Despite the reality and the nature of all Kurdish political parties that had 
no power and agenda to call for a free independent Kurdistan. However, Kurdish 
people always had this dream and hope. They always sacrificed for this aim and 
fought for a free independent Kurdistan. In contrary to all previous Kurdish 
political parties in all different parts of Kurdistan, at the first stage, the PKK came 
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with an idea of establishing a ‘free independent socialist Kurdistan state’. 
One of the points that have made the PKK evolve rapidly was focusing on the 
notion of a greater independent Kurdistan state. Nevertheless, when the PKK 
came up with the idea of leaving the notion of state and building nation-state 
alone, once again it was different from other previous parties. The decision of 
ideological shift and transformation from the independence of Kurdistan as a 
sovereign and recognized state to the idea of a free and democratic Kurdistani 
people within the borders of those countries that Kurdistan is situated in; has 
come from the notion of changing the ideological perceptions and progress of 
the knowledge of the PKK policy makers. Taking the reality and possibility of 
achieving their goals into account was a main point in changing this discourse. 
The policy and ideology of the PKK mainly comes from the books and lectures 
of Abdullah Ocalan. During his imprisonment, Ocalan had a good chance to 
think and reshape the policy and ideology of his movement. Ocalan (2011) has 
argued that “for the time being”, (Ocalan, 2011: 10) the notion of the nation 
state in the case of Kurds and Kurdistan must be left alone. Thus, I argue that 
the PKK did not and, the current KCK does not totally reject the notion of state 
and a greater Kurdistan. By observing the KCK and its activities, one can easily 
notice that the notion of a free and independent nation and building a sovereign 
nation for the Kurds is still on the agenda. Yet again, in the current discourse of 
the KCK through the “Ideology of PKK” that was manifested through the Road 
Map of the KCK and the projects of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, one can 
notice that the KCK does not want to harm the sovereignty of the states that 
Kurdistan has been divided into. 
Here, the main point is how the notion of the nation state was left alone “at least 
for the time being” and the discourse of free, autonomous and democratic 
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nations and societies came on the agenda. As it is argued earlier, the PKK was 
a product of the era of the denial of the Kurds and its ideology was 
predominantly under the influence of the traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
The analysis of the PKK was developed within the framework of scientific 
constructed socialism. Thus, at that time, there could not be any further 
progress and interpretation than advancing the discourse through the notion of 
the nation state. Therefore, it can be argued that the PKK was only “a practical, 
political movement”, (Ocalan, 2011: 50) within the frame work of the nation state 
building. 
The concept of ‘political movement’ versus ‘social movement’ (Castells, 2012), 
could be a centre of the argument in this regard. The transformation process 
from a political movement to a social movement is a main point that can be 
focused on here. In other words, in terms of the organisational aspect, the 
transformation can be seen from the PKK as a political movement to a wider 
entity that named the KCK as a social movement. The notion of changing 
values of society as a main point of the tasks of social movements (Castells, 
2012) could not be achieved through the PKK as a practical political party. In 
Ocalan's (2011) expression, tackling the cancer of “Kurdish dilemma” needed 
the establishment of a wider social movement to change the destiny of the 
people and free them from long term slavery. Nonetheless, the task of the PKK 
was confronting the crucial reality that was leading Kurdish people to be wiped 
out under the notion of the unification, Turkification and assimilation policies of 
the Turkish state in the twentieth century. 
It can be argued that the struggle of the PKK was successful and the survival of 
the notion of Kurdishness and the existence of the Kurds and Kurdistan at least 
in the northern part of Kurdistan is the result of the struggle of the PKK. 
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However, the PKK was not successful in bringing about a Kurdish nation state 
as it was in the objectives. Therefore, the PKK went into cul-de-sac and it had to 
be changed. In the process of transformation of the Kurdish national movement 
in the northern part of Kurdistan, it could be said that the transformation from a 
one-dimensional to a multi-dimensional struggle has been in operation since 
1993, and it has been manifested later on by establishing the system of the 
KCK. This means that the PKK has been abolished and replaced by a much 
more developed and multi-dimensional entity that is recently known as the KCK. 
This new entity has put the notion of the nation state aside and developed the 
notion of confederation and democratic autonomy for the Kurdish people and 
entire Turkey. The task of the PKK was confronting the process of denial of the 
Kurdishness through the process of Turkification and assimilation. Perhaps, the 
process of de-Turkification has slightly been implemented by the PKK. 
  
Turkification and De-Turkification 
The process of Turkification started even before establishing the new Turkish 
state. It goes back to the time of ‘Sultan Abdul Hamid II’. The process of 
Turkification was not implemented only on the Kurdish people. It was on all the 
people in the region. The process led the state to commit a huge massacre 
against Armenians and non-Muslim minorities in the region. However, the 
genocide process on the Kurdish people was not physical per se, as it was in 
the case of the Armenians. In the case of the Kurds, it was cultural genocide in 
deed. As mentioned earlier, in his book, ‘political memories’ ‘Sultan Abdul 
Hamid the second’ has suggested that; “to strengthen the Turkish nation, we 
need to Turkify all the Kurds everywhere. This is a basic and main point of the 
strengthening of the Turkish nation”, (Akcura, 2010: 54).  
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It is very interesting that the sultan suggested such an idea at that time, when 
the Ottoman Empire had several problems and had started to lose its influence 
and power in the most part of its territories. Moreover, the only ethnic group that 
had full loyalty to the empire was the Kurdish one. The process of Turkification 
was implemented soon after the Armenian genocide process. According to 
Akcura, (2010), the ‘Young Turks’ and the group of Union and progress 
Committee’ (Etihad ve Terekki Cemiyeti) ‘CUP’, were at the centre of starting 
the implementation process of the Kurdish cultural and social genocide. The 
only difference in the genocide of the Armenians compared to the one of the 
Kurds was that the former had been done through physical massacre while the 
latter was achieved through the Turkification process. 
The culture and the social status of the Kurds were targeted. In the republic era, 
especially under the command of ‘İsmet Inonu’ the process of social and 
cultural genocide of the Kurdish people reached its peak. The process went too 
far in terms of assimilation of the Kurdish people totally. All the Kurdish names 
of the cities, towns, and villages were replaced by Turkish names. No Kurdish 
child could have Kurdish name. Besides, physical mass killing in a Kurdish city 
of ‘Dersim’ took place, Akcura (2010). Moreover, in 1993 there were about three 
million Kurds from the Kurdish areas in the south east of the country forced to 
leave their villages to the metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. That 
happened mainly due to the war against the PKK (war on terror) and the status 
of emergency in the Kurdish provinces. 
Other reasons could be due to the lack of stability, and very poor social, legal 
and economic conditions; most of the people had no choice but to leave their 
home towns and villages for the western part of Turkey. That was a very 
systematic plan of the state to make people leave their own places of origin. By 
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no means could people go back to their original places, Bozarslan, (2012). This 
migration could have been an effective method to make the Kurds forget their 
language, culture and the notion of Kurdishness and their support of the PKK. 
Until recent years, when the process of De-Turkification was started by the 
KCK, there were no any symbols, signs or cultural activities that could be 
referred to as a Kurdish. This means that, to a very high extent, the process of 
Turkification was successful in the cities. Almost all people were speaking the 
Turkish language. Everybody was listening to and watching the Turkish media; 
essentially, there were only Turkish media. 
Therefore, the state wanted to complete the process by destroying all the 
villages. Destroying villages had several benefits for the Turkish state. First of 
all, the process of Turkification could not be successful in the villages due to the 
lack of proper education; most rural people in Kurdistan were uneducated. But if 
they were forced to live in Turkish huge cities, they would have no choice but to 
adapt to the new conditions. The second benefit was cutting support for the 
PKK from the people of the villages. It was obvious for the state that the villages 
were a great source of food and shelter supply for the PKK fighters. Moreover, it 
was easier for the PKK to recruit guerrillas amongst rural people rather than 
educated urban people, Cudi (2008). 
Nevertheless, the reaction to that severe process of Turkification has always 
been taking place. The process of de-Turkification started from the day one of 
the process and has continued until today’s date. Yet, the process of 
Turkification was always stronger and much more effective than the reaction of 
the Kurds against it. Soon after the state establishment in 1923 the process of 
Turkification was institutionalized by the state. The education system, social, 
legal and political sphere were all became Turkish. Though, the struggle of the 
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Kurds has been much more visible and mature. It can be argued that the revolt 
of ‘Sheikh Said’ in 1925 was principally against the process of Turkification. Yet, 
the process of de-Turkification was very weak and slow. In other words, the 
resistance in front of the wave of Turkification was weak. Being a Turk in Turkey 
was giving a person all opportunity to live as equal to other real Turks. 
However, resistance against the process would make a person face all sorts of 
problems and difficulties. A person who did not want to be a Turk, would lose 
his job, would be taken to jail and even killed in jail or in front of his family and 
friends. A senior member of the KCK stated that his father was killed in the 
Diyarbakir prison just because he refused to be a Turk”, (interview with A9 on 
07/08/2011). Therefore, almost all Kurdish people in the cities had to become at 
least formally Turks. In order for children not to ruin their future, mothers and 
fathers did not want them even to know that they were originally Kurds. 
Nowadays, after several years and a few generations of that process, the 
majority of the Kurds do not even realize that they are from Kurdish origin 
(interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). In an announcement in 1925, ‘Ismet Inonu’ 
the prime minister of the republic clearly said: “we are obviously nationalists. 
Nationalism is a main reason of our unity. Compared to the Turkish majority, 
other ethnics don’t have any importance. By any cost, we want to make all our 
populations Turks. Whoever stands against Turks and Turkism, we will kill 
them. The first point for us to recognize any good citizen is Turkishness and 
Turkism”, (Bozarslan, 2012:64). 
Due to the process of Turkification, the notion of Kurdishness has become a 
shameful thing and no-one wanted to be labelled as a Kurd. After four decades of 
the process under the new state of Turkey, the fourth president of the Turkish 
republic ‘Cemal Gursel’ went beyond what ‘Ismet Inonu’ addressed; he made his 
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famous speech about the respect of being a Turk and how to react if someone 
was insulted by being a Kurd. He simply asked for “spitting on the face of whoever 
describes you as a Kurd”, (Bozarslan, 2012: 97).  Therefore, the notion of 
Turkishness became an unavoidable choice. The Kurds had no choice but 
accepting that reality. The majority of the Kurds accepted the reality as their fate. 
Thus, for the majority of them, the struggle to come out from that bitter reality was 
not even a matter. The state has examined several methods for implementing that 
process. In the last few decades, one of the methods that successfully worked in 
the process was making a semi-army from the rural Kurds as village Guards 
‘Korucu’. In other words, the state obliged rural people to join an irregular huge 
army that has been created under the name of village guards from the Kurds 
themselves against the Kurdish national movement. 
The villagers were given a “choice between signing up as ‘Village Guards’ 
(Korucu) and give up the villages”, (Jongerden, 2007: xxii). Those villagers that did 
not join the army mainly left their villages to the western metropolis. In many 
cases, “the only inhabited left were (Korucu) villages”, (Jongerden, 2007: xxii). 
According to informal sources, there are about 70,000 members of this army, 
(interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). The number is huge, seven to ten times bigger 
than the number of the actual guerrillas of the HPG under the KCK5. These village 
guards ‘Korucu’ are familiar with their own people. Therefore, they can attack the 
actual social and cultural points of Kurdishness better than the Turks that are 
coming from the other side of Turkey. Thus, the negative impact of collaboration is 
harsher than the state atrocities through the process of Turkification. 
                                                 
5  Recruitment of Kurdish collaborators was not only in Turkey. Iranian and Iraqi 
regimes were taking this plan as well. As a matter of fact, under the regime of ‘Saddam 
Hussein’ in Iraq in the 1980s, the numbers of the Kurdish armed collaborators were 
200,000 while the numbers of Kurdish freedom fighters ‘Peshmarga’ were only 8,000, 
(interview with C1 on 27/02/2012). 
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Since the PKK has started its struggle, the process of de-Turkification has 
been activated. In the first step, the PKK has announced the war against the 
notion of collaboration as an effective method of genocide and the state policy 
of denial through the process of Turkification. Since the state had multiple 
methods of the process, the movement of the Kurds also had to react against 
the state through the same multiple methods. However, the PKK made a huge 
mistake which was the issue of bringing back the language into the public 
sphere among the Kurds and its guerrillas and cadres. The PKK has mainly 
focused on rebuilding the Kurdish personality and bringing back dignity and 
morale to the Kurdish people. That was a hard task to stand against the 
process of denial at the time. The PKK thought that struggling against the 
collaboration and local internal enemies of its goals was the first and most 
important step. Thus, the issue of language and bringing about using the 
mother tongue was less important for the PKK at the time. 
However, since the KCK has been established, the process of de-Turkification 
has made great steps through various channels. For instance, the KCK has 
established a Kurdish organization ‘Kurd-Der’, for the struggle in bringing the 
Kurdish language back into the public sphere. Despite all the obstacles and 
series of closures of it offices across Turkey and Kurdish areas, since 2005, 
‘Kurd-Der’ has graduated more than (70,000) Kurdish students so that they can 
speak, read and write Kurdish again. It also graduated more than (10,000) 
Kurdish teachers, (interview with A15 on 17/06/2012). The mission of ‘Kurd-
Der’ is reactivating Kurdish culture and bringing the Kurdish language into the 
public life again. 
 Therefore, the range of its activism is not only delivering Kurdish language 
teachings, (interview with A15 on 17/06/2012). Currently, there are several 
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social, cultural and political activities that are taking place in the Kurdish 
language. All the language tasks and enquiries from other institutions under 
the KCK are coming back to the ‘Kurd-Der’. For instance, preparing a cultural 
or political formal speech, or at least correction or proof reading such reports 
and articles so often are sent to the teachers and cadres of ‘Kurd-Der’, 
(interview with A15 on 17/06/2012).  Moreover, there is a social and political 
will to bring the Kurdish language into the formal and legal education system. 
The Turkish state recently has limitedly allowed the Kurds to use their own 
mother tongue in their informal daily life. They are about to accept learning the 
language in the education system only as a chosen subject. This means that, 
Kurdish children can learn their language (if they want to) in limited sessions 
only. 
Nevertheless, Kurdish social and political will wanted to bring the language into 
the education system. Thus, Kurdish people could study in Kurdish similar to 
what is going on in the Turkish state system in the Turkish language. In other 
words, Kurdish children from primary schools until university should study 
various subjects in Kurdish. This model has been implemented in the south 
part of Kurdistan since the 1970s. The Kurdish students can study physics and 
biology in Kurdish not in Arabic or English. Thus, the Kurdish political will 
through the KCK wants the Kurds in Turkey to study all subjects in their own 
mother tongues. In short, the process of de-Turkification has started and been 
activated since the KCK came into being. Moreover, the notion of Kurdishness 
and promoting nation building has been continuing through civil, legal, cultural, 
social and societal activisms. 
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Kurdish Civil and Legal Activities in Turkey 
There is an important point that can be regarded as a transformation or at least 
the start of the process of transformation in the Kurdish national movement in 
Turkey. It is the focus of civil and legal activities for the Kurds within the borders 
of Turkey and under the rule of the Turkish state constitution. Despite all 
difficulties and almost impossibility of such things under the name or even the 
notion of Kurdishness, yet again the Kurds started to draw more attention to this 
aspect of their struggle. Until today’s date, by definition and according to the 
Turkish constitution, all people who live within the Turkish borders are Turks. 
This has been harshly implemented during the last ninety years of the period of 
the new Turkish state, (McDowall, 2010). For the Kurds especially, the situation 
was harsher. Thus, there has not been any activity under the name of Kurds 
since then, let alone the word Kurdistan, as it was a big crime and it was too 
dangerous for anyone to refer to the Kurdishness. 
As a result, all Kurdish or pro-Kurdish political or social activities under the 
name of Kurdishness is regarded as a crime and the punishment is rising for the 
actors. Therefore, until today’s date, there is no any legal Kurdish institution 
under the name of Kurdishness or Kurdistan. They must find names that can be 
suited to the Turkish constitution. All of the BDP, DTP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP 
and HEP are Kurdish or Pro-Kurdish political parties without referring to or 
mentioning Kurdistan or Kurdishness within their party tabloids. For instance, a 
Kurdish assembly that is called the Democratic Society Congress, “DTK” is for 
the Kurds at least regarded as the Kurdish Parliament in the capital city of 
Kurdistan in Turkey ‘Diyarbakir’. However, it is not under the name of Kurdistan 
or in a clear Kurdish name, Olson (2011). 
Despite all that has been mentioned above, Kurds have kept fighting for 
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advancing the struggle through civil and legal aspects. A Kurdish political base 
was established for the very first time in 1990 after establishing the HEP. 
Nonetheless, there were several individual or even collective actions that were 
aimed at Kurdishness and Kurdish civil and legal activities. Yet again, previous 
attempts have never been effective and visible actions. Therefore, they have 
never been able to make any difference in the social and political arena. That is 
why starting Kurdish or pro-Kurdish civil and legal struggle can be regarded 
from establishing HEP in 1990. Once again, what is meant by legal and civil 
activities here are those activities that are legally allowed to be commenced 
under the roof of Turkish law and constitution. Otherwise, there are several 
political activities that are not allowed in Turkey and actually are very effective 
and have a strong tendency of involvement with such outlawed activities. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to highlight this point and focus on the Kurdish 
national movement throughout legal and illegal activities alike. In particular, this 
chapter aims to focus on activities of the KCK as an entity that is outlawed and 
behind the scenes. Yet, it can be regarded as very active and a main character 
of Kurdish national movement in Turkey. 
  
Kurdish Social and Cultural Associations 
 Social and cultural activities by the Kurds in the Kurdish areas and the 
whole of Turkey are managed under several legally allowed associations on 
the one hand, and under the management of the DTK as a main umbrella for 
all KCK activities in Turkey. The DTK has two main tasks; first of all, it has to 
perform as a legal entity that covers all cultural and social activities. Within 
this task, the DTK has to organise meetings, events and promote the notion 
of diversity among the social, cultural, ethnic and religious groups and 
 178 
associations. The second task is dealing with political difficulties through 
social and cultural activism, (interview with A3 on 25/03/2012). 
As a matter of fact, several groups that are directly or indirectly under the 
hegemony of “the Ideology of PKK” are connected to the DTK. Thus, similar 
to the case of the KCK in a broader context, the DTK has a vague identity 
and blurry borderlines. On the one hand, several organisations from diverse 
ranges of activities are working through the back-up of the DTK. On the 
other hand, the DTK itself can be seen as a small and limited entity that is 
working legally and has legal permission from the government. Elaborating 
this blurry point can be achieved through the analysis of the KCK as a 
system. The DTK is a smaller picture; the Turkish picture of the KCK. Thus, 
the system of the DTK is run via some unknown actors that sometimes 
cannot be clarified through policies and programs. On the scene, there is a 
management committee and co-leaders of the DTK. There are several 
known and long term runners of politicians and notable communities’ 
characters within the DTK. Yet, there could be another management of the 
DTK that is behind the scenes. Actually there are different networks and 
organizing process that are running the policy and mission of the DTK. It is 
simply similar to the bigger frame of the KCK, (interview with A4 on 
14/09/2012). Therefore, Kurdish social and cultural activisms run through 
autonomous institutions that are legal in Turkey but their policy and ideology 
come from the KCK. The best Kurdish social and cultural notion can be seen 
from the activism of the municipalities that are run by the BDP in the Kurdish 
areas. 
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Political Activities, Political Parties 
In Turkey, there is an opportunity for some political activities under the roof of 
the Turkish constitution only. Kurds in Turkey have had political activities as 
always. Nonetheless, very recently the Kurds have started putting their political 
activities into a frame of legal political parties. Thus, political activities can be 
legal or sometimes outlawed, based on the rule of law of the states and 
governments. However, political parties must be legal and recognized by the 
law and constitution of the state. Until today’s date, according to the constitution 
in Turkey, there is no any chance to make any political activity or establish any 
political party based on ethnicity and religion. Thus, any political activity that 
aims at promoting ethnic or religious rights in Turkey must achieve their goals 
through different ways and names. This was a huge barrier in front of the Kurds 
to express their demands and work to achieve their goals in Turkey during the 
last century. 
It can be argued that only this reason can give some sort of legitimization to 
some outlawed political activities in Turkey. For instance, there could be 
legitimacy for the PKK that was struggling against the state for three decades 
while it was prohibited from all activities under the name of the Kurds or 
Kurdishness. Moreover, legitimization sometimes comes from the people 
supporting in different contexts. It is true that the PKK did not have a legal 
chance to struggle in Turkey and has been labelled as terrorist group by several 
states. However, it has gained some sort of legitimization by those people who 
are supporting the PKK. Therefore, the issue of legal activities or outlawed 
activities in the context of Turkish politics is in some predicament. It is 
suggested that, the discourse of terror and terrorism must be reviewed and re-
conceptualised with regards to the Turkish political and constitutional arena. 
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The aim of this point is to verify the fact that in Turkey and according to the 
“Turkish Constitution”, there is an institution that is illegal and their members 
must be taken into jail. Since 2009, thousands of Kurdish political activists and 
members of Pro-Kurdish political Parties such as the HDP, the BDP and former 
DTP were taken to the prisons as they were accused of having a link with an 
outlawed terrorist organization that is called the PKK. The operation that started 
in 2009 against such people is called the ‘KCK operation’, Olson (2011). Thus, 
we need to know in detail about the situation of this body that is called the ‘KCK’ 
and see whether their economic, political, social, and cultural activities are 
illegal as the Turkish constitution stated or whether they have some real and 
political legitimization among the Kurds in Turkey and other areas. On the other 
hand, we need to see the situation of some pro-Kurdish political parties that are 
playing their political games according to the Turkish law and constitution. This 
can help this research to get closer to the object of investigation of the aspects 
of transformation in the Kurdish national movement and struggle in Turkey. 
  
Pro-Kurdish Parties and Civil Organisations in Turkey and Europe 
Since its first days of activities, the PKK has been trying to regard itself as a 
pan-Kurdish movement. The PKK has claimed that it is struggling for all the 
people of Kurdistan in all its different parts regardless of race, religion, sex, 
language and cultural differences. Therefore, soon after its inception, the PKK 
became one of the main players of Kurdish national movements across all parts 
of Kurdistan. However, due to the presence of the KDP and the PUK in the 
southern part and KOMALA and the KDPI in the Eastern part of Kurdistan, the 
main impact of the PKK was on the northern and western areas of Kurdistan in 
Turkey and Syria. In the current time, where the PKK has been replaced by the 
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KCK, the “Ideology of PKK” has covered almost all aspects of Kurdish national 
movement in the northern part of Kurdistan. Moreover, there is an obvious 
impact on every single political movement in all parts of Kurdistan including the 
PUK and the KDP in the south and their federal Kurdish government within Iraq, 
“KRG”. 
In Turkey and in the northern part of Kurdistan, there are several Kurdish and 
pro-Kurdish civil organisations and political parties that are covered, or are run 
by and under the direction of the “Ideology of PKK”. Even those Kurdish or pro-
Kurdish political and cultural institutions that are not considered as a part of the 
KCK, in one way or another are still under the hegemony and directions of the 
“Ideology of PKK”. Small parties such as the Freedom and Rights Party “Hak-
Par” and the Participatory Democratic Party “KADEP” that are two Kurdish 
parties in Turkey, claim that they are not inside the range of the “Ideology of 
PKK”. Yet, it can easily be noticed that they never made any steps or could 
make any effective acts that are against or out of the will of the KCK. In addition 
to that, these small parties can sometimes be called small political shops or 
signboard parties, in Turkish “Tabela Partisi”. These small parties remain very 
small and have never been able to gain one seat in Parliament or even a seat in 
municipalities’ elections. That is in contrary to the current HDP and DBP and 
previously the DTP, HADEP, DEHAP, DEP and HEP, that are inspired by the 
“Ideology of PKK” and gained support from Kurdish people who are 
sympathisers with the PKK. 
 According to a senior member of the Democratic Society Congress, DTK, there 
are hundreds of small, medium and large organisations only within the borders 
of Turkey, that are working within the range of this ideology, (interview with A9 
on 07/08/2011). Also Kurds in diaspora are mainly organized through the 
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“Ideology of PKK” and are mainly working under the control of the KCK 
directions. From this viewpoint, it can be argued that the KCK is a social 
movement by itself, as its managers and founders describe it as an umbrella for 
all Kurdish struggles and activities. Social theories tell that a social movement 
cannot be limited in one or two organisations only, (As Zald and McCarthy 
1987).  The KCK is not limited in one organisation or few only. It has hundreds 
of social, cultural and political organisations within the range of Kurdish national 
struggle. 
This is not only inside Turkey, not only inside all other parts of Kurdistan even; 
the KCK has activities in other countries, in Europe and especially in Germany. 
To a lesser degree than Europe, other continents also have activities. Since 
there are Kurds everywhere in the world, there are the KCK members and 
sympathisers everywhere in the world as well. As a matter of argument, the 
range of the KCK activities are various, including social, political, cultural, media 
and financial. Despite the fact that there are restrictions on the KCK as it is 
described in the list of terrorist organisations by the USA, the EU, and Turkey, 
yet, the KCK is pursuing its struggle under individual names and different 
cultural, financial and political institutions in Turkey and other countries around 
the world, (interview with A7 on 05/08/2011). 
In terms of politics, it can be simply said that inside Turkey, there are several 
political parties that are fully or partially under the umbrella of the KCK, for 
example the DBP and the HDP which is the biggest pro-Kurdish political party in 
Turkey and is marginally the number one party in the Kurdish areas of Turkey. It 
is very obvious that the HDP and the DBP are parts of the KCK despite their 
denial of the fact that they are run by the “Ideology of PKK”. Other pro-Kurdish 
parties such as Hak-Par and KADEP claim that they are not part of the KCK. 
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Yet, they could never do anything outside of the agenda of the “Ideology of 
PKK”, (interview with A9 on 07/08/2011). 
In terms of media, there are several newspapers, and radio and TV stations 
that are connected to the KCK. TV stations such as IMC and newspapers 
such as “Azadiya Welat” and “Ozgur Gundem” are connected to the KCK. The 
Human Rights Association “IHD” in Turkey is very much connected to the 
KCK. Having the “IHD” under the influence of the KCK might have some 
rationale. It is mainly due to the complexity of the cases of human rights in 
Turkey that predominantly have connections with the Kurdish national struggle 
and the cases that are related to ‘Unknown Killings’ and the ‘KCK Operations’. 
There are also several cultural and social organisations that are connected to 
the KCK in Turkey. “Dicle-Firat” Cultural Centre and “Ciger Xwin” house in 
Diyarbakir can be regarded as the two active centres that are very much 
under the will of the KCK policy. Once again, all such institutions deny 
connection with the KCK, simply due to political and legal restriction by the 
Turkish state, (interview with A4 on 14/09/2012).  
Outside Turkey and especially in Europe, the KCK has several organizations 
and media resources. One very explicit and active organisation is the 
Kurdistan National Congress “KNK”, that is similar to the Democratic Society 
Congress “DTK” in Turkey. In terms of media resources, there are several TV 
stations in Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. The main one is ‘Sterk 
TV’ in Brussels that is the successor of ‘Roj TV’ 6. It has broadcasted its 
programs in “Kurdish with all different dialects and in Turkish, Arabic and 
Persian as the main three languages that are around the Kurds”, (Cudi, 2008: 
472). Since then, there has been a series of Kurdish and multi-lingual TV 
                                                 
6 For the first time in the history of the Kurds in Turkey, ‘MED TV’ started to broadcast 
its programs in 1995. 
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stations such as Media TV, Cudi TV, Mesopotamia TV, and Newroz TV. All 
those Kurdish TV stations have faced a series of closures and restarts under 
the new names. 
The main point in this struggle is that all of these media resources are 
somehow under the KCK policy and the hegemony of the “Ideology of PKK”, 
(interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). Thus, when the issue of transformation is 
addressed, it can be seen in all different aspects in terms of the social 
movement struggle.  Therefore, having a step like establishing media and 
broadcast corporations by the Kurdish movement was a great leap compared 
to the struggle of all other movements in the region. Yet, due to the Turkish 
state pressure on the EU and finding legal points to shut the Kurdish media 
down, there are several attempts to limit the chance of broadcasting in and for 
Kurdish on the one hand; on the other hand there are several preparations by 
Kurdish activists to re-establish their own institutions and media corporations 
as a successor for any channel that is faced with shutting down. 
In 2012, ‘Roj TV’ was closed down by the Danish high court and both ‘Nuce 
TV’ and ‘Mesopotamia TV’ have been shut down by French and Belgium 
authorities. Yet, as soon as the states want to shut a Kurdish organisation in 
Europe, the Kurds are immediately establishing another similar institution to 
cover the legal aspect of their activities within the EU. Therefore, the ‘Sterk 
TV’ started its broadcast soon after the closure of ‘Roj TV’ with ‘Nuce TV’ and 
Mesopotamia TV’, (interview with A2 on 23/09/2012). 
  
The DTK and the BDP: Their Roles within the Kurdish Struggle 
 The Democratic Society Congress, in Kurdish Kongra Civaken Democratic 
‘KCD’, its Turkish acronym ‘DTK’, is the council or assembly of the Kurdish 
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national movement in the northern part of Kurdistan. It is the main and highest 
institution that can be regarded as a parliament of northern part of Kurdistan 
within the system of the KCK. This cannot be proven or clearly declared by the 
leaders and members of the ‘DTK’ itself. This is simply due to legal and security 
circumstances in Turkey. Yet, the reality of the struggle of the Kurds in Turkey 
can easily be told during some deep observation and a closer look at the 
situation. The ‘DTK’ can be regarded as a smaller picture of the KCK that 
covers all activities of the system within the Turkish borders. Thus, the same or 
better to say very similar picture of the KCK can be seen when it comes to the 
DTK nature and works in Turkey, (interview with A4 on 14/09/2012). 
Similar to the KCK, the DTK has co-leadership system, and a council that has 
eight hundred members across the whole Turkey. In each city, town, and some 
villages also there is a council. This can be dependent on the size of the area 
and the number of Kurdish or Kurdistani people that have the commitment to or 
regard themselves as citizens of the KCK, (interview with A3 on 25/03/2012). 
Within this assembly there are similar committees to those that are in the KCK 
to divide the jobs and tasks within Turkey. Thus all the committees are 
somehow connected to the main assembly. Yet, there is significant scope for 
independence and autonomy of the plan, policy, initiatives and activities 
according to the needs of reality, the opportunity for implementation and the 
condition of the different areas. 
On the political level, the KCK in Turkey, and under the umbrella of KCK’s 
Turkish Council ‘Meclisa Turkiye’, had and has several political parties that were 
and are legally having a management of political agendas of the KCK, Olson 
(2011). The connection is always denied by the Kurdish political activists due to 
the legal obstacles and sensitivity of confessing the link with the KCK. Currently, 
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the very visible and active political character is the ‘BDP’. It was established in 
2008 as a spear party to be a successor to the main pro- Kurdish political party 
that was called the Democratic Society Party ‘the DTP’. As mentioned earlier, 
Turkey has an aggressive reputation of closing down political and social 
organisations due to the clash with their constitution. 
So far, seven Kurdish or pro- Kurdish parties were closed down by the courts, 
alleged with having connection with outlawed and terrorist organisations. Very 
recently, in December 2012, another cultural and social organisation was 
established by Kurdish and Turkish activists based on the fear of closing down 
the main party of the Kurds, the ‘BDP', and in order to widen the struggle to all 
Turkey not only Kurdish areas. The new organisation was called the Democratic 
Societies Congress, in Turkish, Halkler Demokratik Kongresi ‘HDK’ similar to 
the DTK. Within this organisation, the Democratic People Party ‘HDP’ similar to 
the BDP has been established also. Yet, this party was not needed and 
remained a small and only registered one as a spear for the day when the 
‘BDP’ will close down. The HDP only had a few limited activities and claims that 
this is a party for all freedom and justice seekers across Turkey. 
 Moreover, they claim that they are acting as an umbrella for all depressed 
and minority groups rather than the Kurds only. It is exactly the same claim as 
the claims of the current BDP and former DTP, HADEP, DEHAP and all other 
pro-Kurdish political parties. Thus, we could argue that the HDK and HDP are 
nothing but a spear bodies for the DTK and BDP's successor in case of 
closure. However, in contrary to expectations, the HDP has been activated for 
the Turkish areas parallel to the BDP for the Kurdish areas of Turkey. What is 
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important here for the Kurdish movement activists is that all the BDP7 and the 
HDP are very much under the influence and control of the KCK. Moreover, 
despite the frequent changes of the forms and the names of characters, the 
essence and hegemony of the KCK still remain.  
Therefore, the project of organizing Kurdish society through the KCK can be 
regarded as a unique phenomenon in the current Kurdish national 
movement in Kurdistan generally and in the northern part of Kurdistan and 
Turkey in particular. Nevertheless, the question that might appear here is 
whether this entity would be able to implement this plan or project? In other 
words, to what extent the KCK can be a representative of the Kurds and 
Kurdistani people who live on the land of Kurdistan? Also, what about those 
Kurdish and Kurdistani people who do not accept the “Ideology of PKK”? 
Perhaps, discussing the recent project of the KCK in relation to the 
alternative system for the Kurdish and Kurdistani society will help the 
process of elaboration of the range of the KCK’s power in terms of policy and 
practice of the different values for society. The notion of changing values of 
the KCK to society is manifested through the project of ‘Democratic 
Autonomy’ that will be examined in the next chapter. In the next section, 
there will be a highlight on the municipalities that the KCK uses them as 
channels for implementing its policy. 
  
                                                 
7 On 11th of July 2014, the BDP had an emergency conference to appoint its new co-
chairs and changed its name to Democratic Regions Party, ‘Democratik Bolgeler 
Partisi- DBP’. Amina Aiyna and Kamuran Yuksek became this new party co-chairs. As 
a result of the recent change in the BDP and merging its Parliamentary group into the 
HDP; the new DBP became a Kurdish regional party and the new HDP became wider 
political party for all Turkey. 
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Municipalities 
The process of running the office locally has had a complicated nature 
throughout the history of the Turkish state. On the one hand, local democracy 
was not taken that important and people’s motivation was not respected as it 
was supposed to be. On the other hand, the Turkish state never let people have 
full power and elect their local representatives by themselves. Currently, Mayors 
and members of the municipalities are elected by local people. Yet, power and 
resources mainly are under the hands of governors that are centrally appointed 
by the state. As Incioglu, (2002) in Ulas Bayraktar, (2007) has suggested 
“historically, the Turkish administrative system has had a strong centralist 
orientation that reflected the relative weakness of local institutions vis-à-vis the 
state. Burdened with the excessive and financial controls exercised over them 
by the central resources, municipalities remained weak and dependent on 
Ankara”, (Ulas Bayraktar (2007: 2). This means that, only by running the local 
elections and having representatives of the people directly, people cannot see 
big political, social and cultural differences under the state centralist model of 
the rule in Turkey. 
Municipalities have no political tasks according to the constitution. Ulas 
Bayraktar (2007) argues that “ article 15 of the law allocates 76 different duties 
to the municipalities in areas such as urban infrastructure, basic urban services, 
town planning and controls, the provision and the control of clean food, health 
and some religious services, cultural activities, housing and social aid 
facilities…etc.”, (Ulas Bayraktar, 2007: 8). Therefore, the notion of a strict 
centralist state is not tasked with developing the game of municipalities and 
local election. This means that the concept of local democracy under the rule of 
the current government has not been developed. However, from the very 
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beginning of the establishment of the Turkish state, the founder Ataturk was 
emphasising the model of bottom up power and respecting individual. Yet, this 
idea has never been implemented. 
Ataturk has mainly focused on the principle of populism rather than state 
centralism. In his early addresses he suggested that “within our organisation… 
the national paramount… every individual must become personally concerned 
with his destiny. A structure that in this way rises from below to the top, from the 
foundation to the roof, will surely be sturdy… I have been gratified to observe 
that our national organisation… has reached down to its true point of origin, to 
the individual, and that from there the real structuring upward has also begun”, 
(Ulas Bayraktar, 2007: 3).  Nonetheless, the central power from Ankara was 
reluctant to put all such principles into practice. 
Interestingly, the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ by the KCK focuses on 
similar or almost the same principles as Ataturk has focused on earlier. 
Currently, in the south east -and if there is a chance in all Turkey as well - the 
DTK wants to implement the principles of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ which focuses 
on democratic, free and societal power as an alternative to the strict centralist 
state power. In the case of minorities in Turkey - especially Kurdish activists and 
their political parties that are running for the local elections - it could have some 
effect on the political process and raising awareness towards democracy, 
freedom and the notion of Kurdishness against centralists’ model of the state in 
Turkey. However, the process is not as easy and democratic as it supposed to 
be, let alone the outcome and effect of such election with regards to the choice 
and voice of the local people in the Kurdish areas. 
In the very recent local election in Turkey, the BDP as the main and only 
Kurdish representative party won more than one hundred municipalities 
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including Wan, Mardin and Diyarbakir cities as the three major Kurdish cities in 
Turkey. As a matter of fact, winning the election by the BDP doesn’t come from 
their better services through municipalities. It mainly comes from the Kurdish 
people who vote for their identity rather than better services of the other Turkish 
parties such as AKP. However, the BDP cadres are actively in the municipalities 
offices. Staying in office for them is rather unique and twice as difficult 
comparing to other parties. Despite the constitutional condition that gave little 
power to municipalities, their presence in the office with limited power of 
providing services; gave them a chance to use this role for their political 
agenda, doing this via the legal allowance as it has been allocated by the 
constitution. Moreover, despite their denial of having connections with the KCK, 
due to the legal and political restrictions, the BDP has been pursuing their 
agenda as a legal face of the KCK. A senior member of the KCK who was a 
senior member of the DTP before his escape from Turkey to Europe stated that, 
“all municipalities that are won by the BDP are run by the commission of 
regional management within the committee of the Ideology of the KCK”, 
(interview with A9 on 14/09/2012). 
The main point to be mentioned here for making elaboration and analysis for 
the action of municipalities is; that Kurdish cultural, social and political activities 
through running municipalities can be regarded as one face of several faces of 
transformation within the Kurdish national movement in Turkey. 
Kurdish civil and legal activities are not limited only within the municipalities. 
The roles of various NGOs that have been created by the KCK are very obvious 
in the current Kurdish reality. As mentioned earlier, there are hundreds of small 
‘local’, medium ‘regional’ and large ‘national’ organizations in Turkey that are 
working illegally, semi legally or legally. The DTK is a Turkish umbrella for all of 
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these organizations. A point that is very important here is that the KCK does not 
rely on personnel and personal interests. Thousands of activists are working 
voluntarily, without getting salary or any other interests. They are working as 
unknown soldiers for their cause. Yet, within these huge social and cultural 
activities; there are some names and characters that are very noticeable. This is 
due to the necessity of the movement. However, the interest and ideology of the 
movement is always over the interests of individuals and particular groups, 
(interview with A3 on 25/03/2012). 
 It can be argued that the Turkish state does not have full control over the 
Kurdish areas. The Turkish state has some formal power and through some 
methods such as military and security operations. Nonetheless, on the social 
and societal levels, the KCK has power and hegemony on the people, public 
sphere and institutions. The best example for the power and hegemony of the 
KCK is organizing demonstrations and cultural events in the Kurdish areas. It is 
obvious that how in the Kurdish new year’s eve of ‘Newroz’ the KCK with its 
various flags and symbols shows itself among millions of people in cities such 
as Diyarbakir ‘Amed’, Van ‘Wan’ and several other cities and towns. Recently, 
the KCK has started to practice a noticeable way of its protest against the state 
through some activities that they lately called civil disobedience. We try to have 
a special focus on these sorts of activities here. 
  
Civil Disobedience 
 The Kurds in Turkey have at least two decades of civil national struggle. Since 
the establishment of the ‘HEP’ in 1990, politics have been pursued in line with 
clear pro-Kurdish interests. Despite the various legal and political obstacles, the 
Kurds have developed civil and legal activisms. Recently, the KCK called for 
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civil disobedience against the Turkish state and government policies in 
Kurdistan. However, what has been called civil disobedience was unclear. No 
one could be sure about what the protesters wanted. On the one hand, Kurdish 
people were undertaking some social activities, similar to the normal social 
activities as before, but under the Kurdish names and with Kurdish flavour. For 
instance, those Kurdish people who were following the KCK orders boycotted 
formal mosques during Friday congregations and started having their worships 
on the streets and in the parks or city centre squares. They called this worship 
civil Friday congregation, ‘Sivil Cumaa’. In contrary to the formal way of worship 
that has to be prepared only in the Turkish language, the KCK Muslim citizens 
were practicing their worships in Kurdish. To them, that was civil disobedience, 
(interview with A5 on 28/07/2011). 
On the other hand, the KCK politicians in the Turkish prisons rejected to defend 
themselves in the court sessions in the Turkish language. They stubbornly 
wanted to answer the judges only in their mother tongue ‘Kurdish’, (interview 
with A6 on 28/07/2011). However, these activities never become a central point 
to change anything in the government policy. It can be argued that the KCK 
never used these activities as essential strategic steps. Nevertheless, these 
activisms were only used as some daily tactics to feed people with some 
political activism. Otherwise, all Kurdish people, who were working as the public 
sector employees, such as all teachers, doctors, lawyers…etc., were normally 
continuing their daily jobs under the terms and conditions of the Turkish state. 
The KCK leaders claimed that they did as Mahatma Ghandi did in India. Yet, 
what Ghandi did was a genuine call to all people to boycott the state and British 
hegemony in a peaceful way. The boycott of the KCK was partial and limited to 
a few aspects that could not be of any harm to the Turkish system. The reason 
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for that was looking for a solution within the system of Turkey.  The KCK does 
not want to boycott the Turkish state and all Turkish institutions. It only wants to 
warn the state to take a step towards the solution of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey. Thus, civil disobedience was only a political show that started and 
ended quickly. However, the main point of the activism was focused on the 
Kurdish language and the struggle of the language to come back to the public 
sphere. Therefore, the struggle for language has continued in different ways. 
The notion of education in mother tongue has become the main demand for the 
Kurdish political will in parliament, for the Kurdish politicians and in the public 
sphere. Nonetheless, as the KCK always emphasises, they are not waiting for 
the state to approve any action. The KCK wants Kurdish people to undertake 
their own initiatives and continue their lives in accordance with the recently 
suggested project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’. 
  
Conclusion 
In order to get closer to the main point and having an appropriate answer for the 
main question on the thesis which is the reasons behind transformation from the 
PKK to the KCK; this chapter has focused only on the recent time and 
highlighted the current situation of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. It has 
examined the steps of the change in the ideology and perspective of the main 
actor of the Kurdish national struggle in the context of Turkey and developing 
an alternative model for the Kurdish struggle with regards to nation building. It 
argued that the Kurdish struggle for the last decades was nothing but a reaction 
to the state policy against the existence of the Kurds through the process of 
Turkification. For that, the Kurdish political and legal activism in Turkey and the 
shift of the PKK ideology have been examined. More than that, the legal, social 
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and cultural activisms of the KCK, through the DTK and the BDP have been 
discussed. 
For the next chapter, this thesis will investigate the two main proclaimed 
projects of the KCK as the solution for the long term Kurdish question and as an 
alternative for the current nation state model in Turkey. The first project is called 
the Road Map for peaceful solution for the Kurdish question and the second 
project is the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ that has been suggested by the KCK legal 
characters within Turkey. The philosophy behind the presentation and critically 
examination of the KCK projects is to highlight the picture of the reasons behind 
alteration of the PKK to the KCK.  
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Introduction 
The KCK as a multi-dimensional  entity that has become the main actor of 
social movement in the Kurdish part of Turkey has recently become an umbrella 
entity for all political, cultural, social and societal activities. Therefore, as a main 
actor of social movement, the KCK has to have plans and projects to widen its 
range of activisms and keep making people  gather around its ideology, 
(McAdam, et al 1996: 340-341). The main task of this chapter will be examining  
two projects of the KCK that have become effective on the Turkish state and 
society on the one hand. The projects have opened civil and democratic ways 
for the Kurdish national struggle on the other hand. 
Both projects have been  articulated based on the series of discussions and 
analyses that have been advanced by the KCK within the frame of the concept 
of Democratic Confederalism. The first project is the ‘Road Map’ that has been 
suggested by Ocalan in 2009 as a solution for the Kurdish question. The other 
project is the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ that has been suggested by the DTK and 
the BDP as legal faces of the KCK in Turkey. The second project has been 
prepared based on the Road Map for solving the model of the nation state and 
presenting the model of a democratic nation. Examining these two projects will 
be so beneficial for understanding the notion of transformation from the PKK as 
a party that approached the Kurdish national struggle through the nation state 
perspective to the KCK that is approaching the struggle through the concept of 
democratic autonomy perspective. 
  
The Road Map of Ocalan to solve Kurdish question in the Middle East 
The road map has been presented through a small book that was written by 
Ocalan during his solitary confinement in Imrali Island. It is part of his legal 
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defence report that was written to the European Court for Human Rights. 
Ocalan wrote approximately six thousand pages as a defence reports to the 
Turkish, Greek and finally European Court. His papers recently became series 
of books and were translated then printed in several languages. The road map 
is an independent small book that was written in August 2009. Nevertheless, 
the Turkish authorities confiscated it and did not hand it over to the judges for 
more than a year and half. Through reading this part of his defence, the Turkish 
authorities understood who is Ocalan and started to seriously think about the 
impact and influence of Ocalan over the Kurdish people and its movement. 
Therefore, the peace process that has recently been started could be the result 
of understanding the Turkish power holders of the road map and the importance 
of the analysis of the struggle for a nonviolent and democratic resolution for the 
essential problems of Turkey. Ocalan claims that the road map focuses on 
Turkey’s “lack of democracy” and “the Kurdish question”, (Ocalan, 2012: 2). 
Fundamentally, the road map focuses on ten principles. Theoretically, these 
principles are confirming the notion of democratic nation, changing the current 
system in the region and in Turkey especially, creating an opportunity for all 
colours to be seen and all voices to be heard and respected in the region. 
Therefore, based on those principles, some solutions are presented in the road 
map. The solution to the Kurdish question according to the road map is the key 
of establishing a democratic system in Turkey. 
It is useful to very briefly, present the principles here: 
1- Democratic Nation Principle: This signifies the nation form of a democratic 
society that is not based on any particular ethnicity, religion, language, class or 
state but is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and does not leave opportunity for the 
notion of class otherness or state privileges. It is based on unrestricted and 
 198 
equal entities. Such a democratic nation consists of democratic peoples, groups 
and is built upon a flexible nation pattern of non-built-up cultural identities, 
(Ocalan, 2012: 28). 
2- Common Homeland Principle: It signifies the figure of homelands that are 
without restrictions and justly shared and where no individual or community is 
excluded by any other individual or community, (Ocalan, 2012: 28). 
3- Democratic Republic Principle: It signifies the autonomous of society and 
individuals to have democratic openness to the state. The association of the 
government and the democratic association of the people are two different 
phenomena that are based on respecting each other and have democratic 
relationship in order for the republic to be a democratic umbrella for all citizens, 
(Ocalan, 2012: 29). 
4- Democratic Constitution Principle: This is the constitution prepared 
through a social contract between people and the state based on protecting the 
autonomous citizens and communities against the power of the nation-state, 
(Ocalan, 2012: 29). 
5- Democratic Solution principle: this principle complies with the idea of 
coexistence and peaceful relation between citizens and the state. This is 
through making a democratic constitution to limit the state and allows the 
peoples and communities to act freely and democratically, (Ocalan, 2012: 30). 
6- Inseparability of the Individual and Collective Rights Principle: Individual 
and collective privileges are two different features of the similar people 
objective. Although the communities are made up from individuals, yet they are 
still different to the whole of individuals. This is rather related to a medallion not 
having a particular side and must have mutual rights and tasks. Therefore, it 
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cannot be any society or individual that has either the individual rights or the 
communal rights only, (Ocalan, 2012: 31). 
7- Ideological Independence and Freedom Principle: Ocalan argues that the 
democratic nation solution cannot be attained if the positivist sociopolitical 
domination of capitalist modernity and its liberal slavery remodeled as 
individualism are not overcome. Self-consciousness about its own social nature 
is the awareness condition for a democratic nation resolution, (Ocalan, 2012: 
31). 
8- The Principle of Historicity and Present: Social realities can be seen as 
historical realities. The realities that were practiced in the past continue to exist 
at contemporary and within the current progresses with very little change. If the 
connection between history and now is not determined properly then the 
selfishness of the capitalist modernity that has been stripped off its history and 
the identical, immediate and provisional social mentality cannot be 
overwhelmed. The precise understanding of history and the contemporary is a 
necessary complaint for the democratic nation solution, (Ocalan, 2012: 32). 
9- Morality and Conscience Principle: To reach a comprehensive solution to 
any specified social problem, there is a necessity to alternative to morality and 
integrity. The solutions of modernity that exclusively rest on control and law do 
not yield consequences but suppress and misrepresent the difficulties. 
Understanding based on morality and principles is vital within the democratic 
nation solution, (Ocalan, 2012: 33). 
10- The Self-Defence Principle of Democracies: There are no society or 
groups of people, not even living beings without considering some sort of self-
defence. Democratic societies are the most advanced existences of nature and 
they could not show up and endure their existence without self-defence. 
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Therefore, in democratic nation solutions, the necessities of the self-defence 
principle must be seen, (Ocalan, 2012: 34). 
All these principles are focusing on one point. It is to present an alternative 
for the current nation state system that is based on unification of every 
colours and voices in the Turkey. According to this project, the alternative is 
a democratic system that can recognize all differences of people with their 
own colours and voices and let them freely and democratically manifest 
themselves. For that, the road map has presented an action plan for a 
solution. Ocalan (2012) tries to look at three solutions for the Kurdish 
question. The first and second ones have been examined by the regional 
states and international powers. Nonetheless, the result was negative and 
has been unsatisfactory so far. The third and final solution is the one that 
Ocalan suggested in his road map. He calls it as the democratic solution 
plan. 
The first solution plan has been examined by the Turkish state for the last 
ninety years. It is the solution plan of a traditional policy of denial and 
annihilation. For a long time, these plans have been developed and 
implemented to attain such solution. Ocalan (2012) argues that, there are 
groups that came into being as middle-class bourgeoisie and bureaucracy 
latent upon the capital reached from the state. They have been unprotected 
and isolated both internally and externally. Yet, they do not pause to enforce 
their annihilation tactics through insidious and ruthless approaches. 
The response of the Kurds, (apart from the traditional ‘Kurdish 
collaborationist’ sections), against the implementation of this approach has 
been to stage the most complete confrontation of their history. It can be 
suggested that the KCK which is in the management position of the 
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confrontation, has the capability and the power to systematically implement 
its own action plans against the state approach. The KCK is in a position to 
make changes from inactive defence plans to active one and to maximum 
confrontation plans, (Ocalan 2012: 83). In the forthcoming periods, it may 
be predictable that the KCK makes the change to the extreme resistance 
plan because there can be severe blockages to be experienced in the 
democratic solution in Turkey. 
On the other hand, the second solution plan was examined through 
international powers towards the Kurdish question. It is about creating a small 
Kurdish entity in a small part of the Kurdish land and excludes the whole 
Kurdish resistance and freedom seekers. In other words, large powers wanted 
to create a Greek and Arminian model of Kurdistan. Ocalan (2012) named the 
second model as the federalist and nationalist solution plan. This plan also has 
being applied in different areas and dimensions. He argues that it is the old-
style colonial nation-states and international hegemonic authorities that are 
behind this plan that has been applied in the Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG). Although 
they each have a different goal, there is a general agreement. International 
powers support this plan because they wish to falsify the revolutionary and 
autonomous potential of the Kurdish people. 
The United States administration is the hegemonic authority that most 
willingly supports the ‘KRG’. Ocalan (2012) argues that the US and its allies 
know that the KRG plays a strategic role in controlling the countries of the 
region. Throughout the history of resistance of the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
all Turkish, Iranian and Syrian administrations have been supporting the 
“Small Kurdistan” plan through numerous tactics since the Second World 
War in the southern part of Kurdistan in order to create a disruption to the 
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resistance of their own Kurds and to discount their own Kurdistan. Therefore, 
when the Kurdish people wish to overcome the role that was chosen to 
them, these forces raise their oppositions all together. Politics and plans 
based on ‘divide and rule’ are being mostly applied by the “Small Kurdistan” 
project. For that, the socialist revolutionaries and Kurdish struggle based on 
the notion of radical democracy are countered in this way. 
In case of Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Ocalan (2012: 102) claims 
that an important objective of the plan is the isolation of his movement. To 
him, there is a comprehensive ‘Gladio’ operation to isolate and eliminate the 
KCK in return for a protecting the plan of “Small Kurdistan”. Moreover, this 
plan receives wide-spread funding from the arena of international 
diplomacy. The US, Turkish and Iraqi managements, who have now 
involved the KRG between them, are for now in agreement with this plan 
and are trying to draw the KCK away from the armed struggle. But this plan 
is not sufficiently applied due to the opposing interests of the regional and 
international countries. It can be argued that their application remains 
limited. It holds no hope because it is not widely reinforced by the mobilized 
Kurdish people in Turkey and because it only serves the concentration of a 
narrow leading sector. Therefore, it is bare and isolated more day by day. 
The response of Kurdish national struggle and the KCK to this plan is not 
to surrender and continue to struggle. Ocalan (2012: 102) argues that 
many PKK personnel, who were undecided; who were morally and 
ideologically weak, for a long time in their ranks ran away and took refuge 
with the holders of such a plan. Despite the wish of the large powers of 
creating a new ‘collaborationist movement’, it did not take long before they 
were uncovered. Kurdish nationalism is traditionally reasonably weak. 
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Therefore, it does not allow for developing a consistent nation-state plan. It 
has, so to speak, become their fate to become corrupt and then be 
eliminated. They have held all their confidence to the breakdown of the 
KCK’s resistance. 
The Turkish state also has given all its hopes in much the same way for a 
long time. It had hoped for help from the Kurdish nationalism based on 
“Small Kurdistan”. Ocalan (2012) argues that the large powers tried to 
implement a plan similar to the one implemented against the Greeks and 
Armenians to the Kurds on the basis of “Small Kurdistan”. However the 
difference in the conditions and the position of the new Kurdish movement 
has left the plan counterproductive. As a result of that, the reactions of 
Kurdish people and their KCK are becoming even stronger, (Ocalan, 2012: 
103). 
In point of fact, the first two plans have not specified much confidence and 
have been very costly on all fronts. Moreover, they have twisted the temper 
of the republic of Turkey in the direction of democratisation plans. 
Therefore, the third and new solution plan that has never been examined 
yet; has been suggested by Ocalan. It is the “Democratic Solution Plan”. In 
fact, contemporary developments also support such advancement. Both 
internal and external conditions show that this third solution is more 
appropriate and worth examining. 
Ocalan (2012) suggested that the need by the USA and EU and  the similar 
tendency exposed by the broadcasting corporations, civil society, the 
general public as well as all the Kurdish people  increase the viability of the 
democratic solution plans for the first time ever since, (Ocalan, 2012: 104). 
In spite of all the counter resistance of the nationalist fascist propensities, 
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which have lately become negligible, the important organisations of the state 
also are not in contradiction of the democratic solution projects. In addition to 
that, they are taking on important parts to prepare the ground work. Such 
progress might growth the chance to rehearsal the solution plans. 
Ocalan (2012) is optimistic about the ‘Road Map’. He calls for an agreement 
amongst the important organisations of the state and the government over 
the main structures of the recommended democratic solution plan. He also 
calls for support from the Kurdish people organised with the support of 
democratic parties and people. Ocalan (2012) believes that Kurdish people 
will listen to him and support the solution plan. He suggests some stages of 
implementing the plan. He argues that in the face of this new historical 
situation a possible action plan between the parties needs to pass through a 
few phases. 
Three stages for implementing this democratic solution plan have been 
suggested. The first one is asking Kurdish armed struggle to enter a period of 
inaction. However, during this stage the state and the KCK both should be 
careful not to be triggered, to have a tighter control over their own forces and 
endure to make the overall community. For the second stage, and through 
the management initiative, a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” should 
be established, (Ocalan, 2012: 104). This step must obtain authorization and 
approval through the Grand National Assembly of Turkey ‘TBMM’. The 
commission must prepare suggestions that will contribute in the elimination of 
legal difficulties. Moreover, consensus will be required amongst all parties in 
the arrangement of the commission. With regards to the confessions and 
fortifications presented to the commission, the commission will propose an 
institution of amnesty to the ‘TBMM’, (Ocalan, 2012: 104). 
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Ocalan (2012) suggested that in the case those legal obstacles are as such 
removed; Kurdish guerrillas will then be able to withdraw their extra-legal 
structures outside the borders of Turkey under the supervision of a board 
consisting of authorities from the USA, EU, UN, KRG and Republic of Turkey. 
By then the KCK will be able to position its forces in different areas and 
countries. Ocalan (2012) vigorously calls for the release of Kurdish prisoners in 
the Turkish jails. He argues that the critical point at the second stage is that the 
“release of those detained and convicted for the KCK activities and the 
withdrawal of guerrilla armed forces outside the borders are jointly planned. 
Here, the principle of neither shall be implemented without the other must 
apply”, (Ocalan, 2012: 104). 
At the third stage, Ocalan (2012) has focused on the constitutional and legal 
steps in order for the system of the republic to be democratic, also calling for 
creating a chance to start a gradual return home of all the Kurdish activists that 
have been forced to leave their homeland - especially for those who are actual 
guerrillas or commanders within the Kurdish freedom movement. The main 
point is approving the legality of the KCK. In that case, the armed struggle no 
longer needed within the borders of Turkey. Therefore, Kurdish movement will 
base itself on all features of legal and democratic political, social, economic and 
cultural actions. 
After three years of Ocalan writing the ‘Road Map’ the Turkish government has 
come to the point that there is no chance to pursue the Kurdish question 
through the first and second solution plans. Therefore, the state and 
government have been persuaded to start negotiations with a man who has 
suggested the Road Map. The so called peace process that has been recently 
started is more or less going accordingly based on the Road Map.  
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There are plenty of points that have been hidden behind the process of 
negotiations towards the Kurdish question solution. As a result of the Kurdish 
struggle in recent years the implementation of the long process of unification, 
Turkification and assimilation were confronted. For now the processes are 
slightly slowed or have been drastically challenged. At least in the case of the 
Kurds and Kurdishness, the process is not as active as before. Moreover, the 
notion of Kurdishness and getting back to self-awareness and self-recognition 
was started actively. This can be seen through the wide activities of Kurdish civil 
societies and cultural activities. This means that the notion of transformation is 
visibly started to be implemented due to the KCK new struggle and its projects. 
The second project of the KCK is ‘Democratic Autonomy’. 
  
Democratic Autonomy 
Theoretically, the project of Democratic Autonomy was suggested by the DTK 
and the BDP as the main two bodies that represent the “ideology of PKK” in 
Turkey as a whole and in the Kurdish areas in particular. In other words, this 
project has been suggested by the KCK through its Turkish council activists that 
legally have opportunities to act within the Turkish borders. It can be argued 
that the project is the soul of transformation from the PKK to the KCK.  
To analyse this project, we have several sources. The best source is the 
manifesto of the project published by the DTK in 2011. Principally, this project 
was prepared as an elaboration of Ocalan’s anti or post state ideas. The project 
can be seen as an alternative for the state. In other words, the project manifests 
the ideology of the KCK since it refuses the notion of the nation state or in the 
KCK words, of a tyrant state. Nevertheless, the project is presented in a way 
that cannot directly refuse the state and assures everyone that this project does 
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not harm the sovereignty of the state and does not want to touch the borders of 
the countries that the Kurds live in. Therefore, there are some contradictions or 
limitations in the project theoretically, let alone in the practice or the possibilities 
of implementation and the consequences of such a model in Turkey or among 
the diverse ethnic, religion and cultural societies in Kurdistan and Turkey as a 
whole.  
According to the politicians and decision makers of the DTK and the BDP in 
Turkey, this project is not only for the Kurds or for Kurdish areas in Turkey. 
They want to generalize it as a project that can be adopted by parliament and 
become a possible catalyst for the change from an undemocratic constitution to 
a more open and democratic one, (interviews with A5&A6 on 28/07/2011). 
However, the project has several limits and contradictions, and yet, it was a 
positive project to make the movement active once again and give hope to the 
political activists, despite the pressure of the government and the state on them; 
especially the pressure through the process of significantly detaining Kurdish 
and pro-Kurdish activists under the name of the ‘KCK operation’. Thus, on the 
one hand, it can be seen as a serious and strategic project by the KCK through 
its legal actors within Turkey. On the other hand, it can be seen as tactical and 
as a part of the daily routine politics that the KCK needs to make people 
hopeful. The main issue in this respect is the KCK policy makers and decision 
takers having only a vague vision towards the concept of ‘Democratic 
Autonomy’. 
No one can be very sure what the KCK wants and means by ‘Democratic 
Autonomy’ or establishing ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’. In addition to 
this, the Turkish government also does not understand what is happening 
exactly. So it is a vague condition for the state too. Soon after the 
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announcement of ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’ in Diyarbakir in July 
2011, the Turkish government doubled its operations for hunting the KCK 
members across Turkey.  The Turkish government also stopped the undercover 
negotiations in ‘Oslo’ with the KCK. The state also stopped all meetings with the 
leader of the KCK “Abdullah Ocalan” in Imrali prison. Moreover, since July 2011 
the weekly meetings with Ocalan by his lawyers and sometimes family 
members were totally forbidden. All this happened within a month. The so called 
undercover peace process between the state and the KCK almost went into a 
cul-de-sac. Most of the Kurdish activists and democratically elected members of 
municipalities were sent to prisons. The BDP had no choice but to recall for 
emergency congress of the party to refill the places of its cadres who had been 
taken to prisons. 
On the other hand, military operations on the mountain of Qendil and areas 
where guerrillas have activities within Turkey were increased. Turkish air strikes 
bombarded a Kurdish village on the border between Iraq and Turkey and killed 
34 Kurdish young civilians in Roboski in the very last days of 2011. The HPG 
(armed branch of the KCK) promised to take revenge and increase its attacks 
on Turkish military bases with all its powers and techniques. It can be argued 
that such escalation somehow came from the government’s reaction to the 
announcement of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ projects by the KCK in 2011. This can 
be evidenced through the speech and argument of several Kurdish politicians 
and members of parliament in Turkey, (interview with A9 on 07/08/2011). 
They think that the reflection of this project made the government angry and 
caused them to take such actions, (A5&A6 on 28/07/2011). The process had 
never been called a peace process by the state until recently and for the first 
time was given this name after the assassination of three Kurdish activists in 
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Paris in January 2013. Therefore, changing the strategy and tactics of the KCK, 
made the state to rethink and take new actions. Thus, the project of 
“Democratic Autonomy” at least had an impact on the state’s steps in recent 
years. It is better to try to highlight the main points and aims of this project after 
presenting some detail about the project in order to have a proper 
understanding of it. The thesis in this section will also avoid criticising or 
analysing the project as the next section of this chapter will be dedicated to the 
detail of analytical discourse of this project of the KCK as a main actor of 
Kurdish national movement.  
Democratic Autonomy is a project that has been suggested by the DTK. As 
mentioned earlier, it is the main organisation that acts as an umbrella for all 
KCK’s activities in Turkey. The aim of the project is to “change the hardened 
mentality of the nation state that is meeting none of the needs of the people of 
Turkey and is becoming a burden on Turkish society, and remove this obstacle 
which prevents the people’s political, social, economic and cultural 
development, and thus to democratise the republic”, (DTK, 2011: 14). 
Therefore, according to the KCK, Democratic Autonomy will be a base for the 
process of democratisation not only in Kurdistan, but in Turkey also. This 
project tries to suggest a different model as a solution for the problems of the 
system in Turkey; it has suggested solution through eight dimensions as 
follows:  
1. Political Dimension 
The project tries to suggest a political model that gets its power from an 
organized democratic society and the community will get power from 
citizens through using individual rights together with the use of collective 
group rights. To the KCK, this can be an alternative for the strict centralist 
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model of the current state. It also can be a democratic political process that 
all segments of society will be able to participate in it and become functional 
within. Therefore, the notion of transparent, open and politically active 
communities will be the source of power for the change and for the 
promotion of the process of democratisation, (DTK 2011). This project 
rather than a top down model of government suggests a bottom up model of 
contribution of power from small community entities such as villages, towns 
and then to city councils. They will organise themselves in the form of 
confederate organisations and will have their democratically elected 
representatives at the congress of society. 
Moreover, it suggests that “the Democratic Congress of Autonomous 
Kurdistan community will send its representatives to the parliament of the 
democratic republic of Turkey and take part in the politics of the common 
homeland”, (DTK,2011: 19). Thus, the project can be an extension of and a 
source of promotion for an open, democratic and transparent political 
process in the country. Another point that has been highlighted is the type of 
autonomy that is requested for the Kurdish people within Turkey. It is not 
based on geography, ethnic or religious community. It is rather based on 
democracy and co-existence. It is based on democratic, fair and equal 
rights for all different ethnic and religious groups and communities in Turkey 
including Kurdish people with regards to their differences and specialties. 
Therefore, all cultural, ethnic, gender, and faith communities should be able 
to be organized “autonomously and authentically”, (DTK, 2011: 20). 
Communities such as Arabs, Armenians, Assyrian-Chaldeans, Azeries, and 
Turcomans and faith groups such as Christians, Ezidies and Alevies must 
be equally and openly given priority to represent themselves within the 
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Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan and within Turkey. According to the 
KCK, this is a requirement of moral and political societies, (DTK, 2011). 
2. Legal Dimension 
This dimension is suggested to show a legal status of the Kurdish people and 
Kurdistan as a legal entity within Turkey. “The status of Democratic Autonomy 
should be anticipated in order to end unlawful, inhuman attitudes, the policy of 
denial and the war of destruction against the Kurds and secure a peaceful, free, 
democratic union within the borders of the Turkish republic by constitutional 
change and legal means”, (DTK, 2011: 22). The legal status can be seen as a 
free will of Kurdish people to enjoy an equal life and voluntary unification with all 
other ethnicities including Turks, and must be ensured in the constitution and 
laws of the republic of Turkey. Moreover, in contrary to the current situation of 
human rights in Turkey and Kurdish areas within Turkey, this project calls for a 
legal and defined status for Kurdistan as a land. It also calls for several rights 
that do not exist in the current constitution of Turkey.  The DTK (2011) argues 
that, 
“the Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan and the whole of Turkey is 
based on human rights, the freedom of all since their birth regardless 
of their class, nation, religion, sex, ethnic group and, without 
discriminations any of race; their first generation rights concerning 
freedom of expression, thought and belief, freedom of association, 
assembly, demonstration, and education in mother tongue; their 
second generation rights concerning economic and social rights; their 
third generation rights concerning for freedom of the people to 
develop their cultural assets, survival and self-administration”, (DTK, 
2011: 23). 
All these rights must be ensured in the written document and constitution of 
both ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’ and the ‘Republic of Turkey’ as a main 
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and larger entity for all people in Turkey. Another important point that has been 
mentioned in this project is the issue of morals and ethics on the one hand, and 
the law and legal procedures on the other. According to the viewpoint of the 
KCK, the legal system of Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, “does not believe 
that the management of society is correct and possible solely by law, and 
communality should be protected by using both ethics and politics together 
without falling in to the dilemma of ‘either ethics or law’. Believing that a society 
which has lost its conscience is a lost society, it sees ethics as the integrity and 
the heart of society”, (DTK, 2011:23).  
3. Self-Defence Dimension 
Since this project was prepared for the Turkish people and within the 
umbrella of the Turkish legal system, the KCK does not want to focus on the 
army or guerrillas. In contrary to this, the concept of self-defence was 
described as the matter of protecting and promoting identity and cultural 
belongings. It is argued that self-defence is a protection policy for the moral 
and political society. “The self-defence dimension does not only mean military 
defence of society. In fact it means the protection of identity, politicisation and 
democratisation. Self-defence is based on the organised community. In other 
words, organised community is to implement self-defence. Self-defence is the 
‘sine qua none’ of all societies to protect their existence”, (DTK, 2011: 24). 
The KCK believes that in the whole long history of the Kurds, all their 
struggles were only self-defence to protect their existence. Thus, there is not 
any intention for occupation or attacking others in this project. It is also 
argued that, “with the acceptance of Democratic Autonomy, under the 
supervision of the democratic organs, the process of self-defence can be 
established not as military monopoly but for the external and internal needs of 
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the society.”, (DTK,2011: 25). Thus, for the KCK self-defence is protecting 
Kurdish and other minorities from assimilation and politicising them and 
increasing their awareness against fascist and genocidal attacks and could 
be seen as a resistance against any threat that wants to attack diversity and 
democracy, Olson (2011).  
4. Cultural Dimension 
The KCK believes that the notion of unity of the Turkish state as it was 
manifested in the Turkish principle of ‘one language one people and one flag’; 
has become an obstacle in front of celebrating diversity and promotion of 
cultural identities in Turkey. The Kurdish culture and language are two of the 
very first targets of such rigorous policy within the borders of Turkey. For a long 
time, speaking Kurdish and other minority languages were banned. Learning 
the Kurdish language was harshly prohibited in formal and legal arenas and in 
the public. Within the education system, the Kurdish language was banned by 
constitution and law even, Olson (2011). Despite a huge contradiction of the UN 
conventions and the European Union’s democratic norms and all other human 
rights standards - as prohibiting people’s culture and native language is a crime 
against humanity and defined as cultural genocide - Kurdish culture was under 
the threat of extinction through the process of assimilation, through the 
unification and the Turkification policy of the Turkish government in Kurdistan. 
As the DTK (2011) argues, the Turkish state “has aimed to create a society 
alienated from its native language, and culture, its mind and spirit has been 
assimilated. It has come to a point where a process of auto-assimilation has 
begun in Kurdistan”, (DTK, 2011: 26). What the KCK tries to criticise is turning a 
blind eye by the world - especially the EU countries and human rights 
institutions towards what is happening in Turkey. The project of Democratic 
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Autonomy calls for smooth progress using the Kurdish language in public and 
within the education system. All the barriers for the use of all languages of 
people in Kurdistan should be removed and those languages should become 
languages of education from kindergarten to university based on the area and 
demands of people. 
Also all legal and constitutional arrangements should be made in order to 
prevent cultural breakdown and provide opportunities for mother tongue 
education for the Kurdish people in the major cities of Turkey out of Kurdistan. 
In other words, the Democratic Autonomy project wants to make both the 
Kurdish and Turkish languages formal and official languages of Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan with regards to provide all opportunities to promote 
other minority languages such as Armenian, Arabic, and Assyrians-Syriac which 
could be languages of education for their native speakers alongside both official 
languages. Another important point that the project suggested is returning the 
original names of villages and towns and making the Kurdish a language for all 
services in Kurdistan, DTK (2011).  
5. Social Dimension 
According to the KCK who prepared this project, the aim of the state for the last nine 
decades, was to assimilate Kurdish society from its social values, culture and 
history. The state forced Kurdish people to evacuate Kurdistan to the major cities in 
western Turkey, aiming at deformation of Kurdish social texture and changing 
demographic structure, and by application of physical and cultural genocide their 
existence was targeted. Moreover, as the KCK argues, “ as part of the special war 
policy, women and youth sectors of society were estranged from the social struggle 
by sport, art, and social events under the name of social activities, and by spreading 
prostitution and drugs, the moral collapse of society is targeted”, (DTK, 2011: 28). 
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Ocalan as the leader and founder of the KCK argued that Kurdish women 
under the special war of the state that sometimes he called state terrorism; 
are still exposed to state terror and to sexism based mentality. Thus, in this 
condition, the family is formed as a little state that is run by men and plays an 
effective role in keeping women in slavery. The KCK suggests that according 
to the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ project, “family is not a social institution that can 
be overcome in this existing social reality, but can be converted. Thus, the 
laws and the concept of property on children and women which is based on 
hierarchy must be replaced”, (DTK, 2011: 28).  Therefore, the project wants to 
replace this current situation with such mentality to promote a society that is 
based on free will and the mentality of free women, youth and then free 
people as a whole. In order to deal with this issue and tackle the problem in an 
effective way, the KCK wants to start from establishing various civil institutions 
to organise women and youths based on individual choice and the principles 
of freedom combined with free collective will and working as integrated 
organisations within society as a whole. 
There are difficulties in directing youth towards freedom in the current situation 
in Kurdistan, because mainly youths pose many problems for the existing 
ruling system. Nevertheless, youths can play a great role in building a new, 
free and democratic society. The basic duty of the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ 
system is to create and implement positive projects for social and cultural 
development of all different strata within society, and in all aspects of social 
and cultural life. Therefore, the process of “re-establishment of the society in 
the ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’ will be actualized with the free 
organisation of labour, education, health, solidarity and similar units under the 
leadership of women and youths in particular”, (DTK, 2011: 30). 
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Thus, the notion of social dimension of this project has the potential to 
discuss, to take decisions, to re-establish and to operate and then for that 
reason to be a base for the other dimensions to be implemented. There is 
huge scope in this project for women and the status of women and youths in 
society. To regain their own deserved position in leading society once again, 
women and youths must play an important role in the establishment of 
freedom, democracy and with human rights principles through their energy, 
dynamism, and play a leading role in social changes. ‘Democratic 
Autonomous Kurdistan’ will regard any sort of exploitation of child labour and 
sexual harassment as crime and treated according to international laws 
conventions on children’s rights.  
6. Economic Dimension 
The KCK believes that as a result of the war, military occupations, political and 
economic colonisations of the external powers; Kurdistan became a land of a 
people who are dispersed all around the world. The land that was described in 
the texts of holy books as a cradle of civilisation and paradise land with 
enormous wealth has ended up a land of poverty and hunger. This project 
through its economic dimension tries to suggest a solution for this crisis. 
Those who occupied Kurdistan have destroyed the economic life of the people 
on this land and its people became easy prey and loyal to these hegemonic 
powers. People have been cultured to be dependent on occupation powers in 
Kurdistan. This condition affected Kurdish people’s personalities and they 
became weak and lost self-trust.  Such people cannot be fighters and 
founders of free, decent and democratic life and finally this became a fact and 
a destiny for the Kurds, Ocalan (2011). 
Based on this reality, the KCK argues that the creation of an economic basis for 
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a society is a key dimension for them to become a moral and political society. 
Therefore, the main point to “develop in the building of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ 
will be the creation of an economically viable society which achieves the 
elimination of unemployment and poverty”, (DTK, 2011: 32). The KCK wants to 
focus on the economy as an important aspect of bringing about a democratic 
and fair society. It has been a matter for discussion and has a significant place 
in the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’. However, implementing such ideas is 
far from possible under current circumstances, let alone the limitation and 
contradiction of the idea of tackling the issue of economic collapse in Kurdistan 
and in Turkey as a whole. The KCK mainly tries to look at the situation from the 
perspective of anti-capitalism and highlighting the role of women in promoting 
economic progress. 
It is argued by the KCK that the reason for economic problems is controlling 
women by men through capitalist institutions. Therefore, the class system, 
urbanisation and the power of the current state, made society alienated from 
the social economic and democratic values and faced deep structural problems. 
To the KCK, good economic policy needs “socialisation and democracy”, (DTK, 
2011: 33). This means that in order to conduct an economic policy that meets 
the needs of society, it must be through democratic and autonomous institutions 
of society. To promote the idea that Kurdistan has a potential to be the most 
developed and civilised society in the region and confront the reality. In reality it 
has become a deprived area and its society has faced huge economic collapse 
and economic genocide. Therefore, it will be very important for Kurdish society 
to “become an economically viable society by establishing its free and 
democratic life on the bases of ‘Democratic Autonomy’”, (DTK, 2011: 33).  
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7. Ecological Dimension 
Surprisingly, the KCK tries to show that ecology is as important as any other 
aspect of rebuilding Kurdistan and Kurdish society. It is argued that state power 
in Kurdistan deliberately focused on destroying Kurdistan's nature through 
several methods. In Turkey, due to the state hostility to the Kurdish areas and 
its society, the ecological destruction for militaristic, political and economic 
purposes has done serious damage to Kurdistan's areas and its social 
structure. 
As it has been mentioned earlier, more than three thousands of Kurdish villages 
and forests have been burned, residential areas demolished as a result of dam 
projects and other development plans jeopardize historic cultural monuments, 
and pastures were flooded with water. Many pastures have been left with no 
water and have turned into desert. Moreover, “thousands of square metres of 
farmlands have been planted with mines, making farming impossible”, (DTK, 
2011: 36). In addition to that, the culture of respecting nature and ecology is 
slightly diminished due to the problems and instability in Kurdistan as a result of 
the war and limitation of freedom and democracy. 
The KCK believes that a system in society cannot be regarded as moral and 
democratic if that system is not integrated with nature and does not respect 
ecology. The main reason for the ecological crises is the notion of capitalist 
greed that focuses on collecting profits only, regardless of moral, social and 
ecological outcomes of making interest and profits. Thus, the moral side of 
capitalism could be overwhelmed with an ecological approach. This can be 
effective only by having a policy that understands and respects the value of 
ecology. This means that, the issue cannot be tackled only through an 
environmental approach. 
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In this regard, the KCK wants to suggest a solution to tackle and reduce 
ecological disasters through cultural and social awareness. It argues that 
ecological awareness is necessary. Loving one's homeland and regarding the 
world as a homeland is an important principle. Thus, in order for society to have 
a healthy and clean environment, there is a crucial need for society to 
understand the sensitivities of ecology and its consequences. It is necessary to 
oppose the state policy of urbanisation that has damaged the ecological 
balance. The projects in Kurdistan that are called the Southeast Anatolian 
Projects, in Turkish, Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi “GAP”8, must be stopped as 
the aim of these projects is changing the “flora and the flooding of historical 
sites with water to wipe out the Kurdish people’s history”, (DTK, 2011: 36).  
8. Diplomatic Dimension 
 If Kurdistan becomes an autonomous region within Turkey, and has its own 
flag and constitution as this project calls for, then it could have a chance for 
making some diplomatic activities. According to the KCK’s understanding, 
diplomatic activities developed by the people, societies, different groups and 
finally by the states for the promotion of their own interests. Yet, the KCK 
criticises the notion of diplomacy within the framework of the nation- state as 
this notion only recognises states and pursuing diplomatic activities between 
nation-states. Thus, society and various groups are not predominantly 
respected. 
Therefore, this project has suggested an alternative paradigm for understanding 
diplomacy and promoting its activities within the notion of ‘Democratic 
Autonomy’ for societies in Kurdistan. According to this project, the diplomacy 
                                                 
8 GAP project is a multi-sector integrated regional development project based on the 
concept of sustainable development in the south east Turkey. The KCK argues that 
this project is mainly for diminishing Kurdish struggle and Kurdish society. 
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dimension is “based on mutual solidarity and interest between peoples, different 
groups and societies”, (DTK, 2011: 37). Considering the reality of Kurdistan that 
has been divided into four parts within four different countries, this projects 
suggests that diplomatic activities of ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’ could 
be a corner-stone for development and endorsement of peace and progress 
among neighbouring groups, societies and people of all parts of Kurdistan and 
people of those four countries. This project argues that through diplomatic 
activities, people of Kurdistan who live in diaspora or in the metropolis in west 
Turkey can have legal, direct and formal recognition that can direct them to 
have a positive connection with home. 
In the project that has been written by the KCK through these eight dimensions, 
‘Democratic Autonomy’ was described as the embodied expression of their 
previous suggested solution projects in order to participate in the process of 
democratisation of Turkey in order to make the republic of Turkey a democratic 
state, DTK (2011). It was also stated that ‘Democratic Autonomy’ respects the 
Turkish state and is not attacking the sovereignty of Turkish borders and “it will 
reinforce the brotherhood of peoples and their unity within the borders, which 
will end conflicts; the Kurdish people and Turkey will reach a new contract and 
launch a new era in Turkish-Kurdish relations”, (DTK 2011, 15). Therefore, this 
project cannot be dangerous and the cause of intimidation for the state and for 
the government of Turkey. 
 However, this was rejected by the state and the Turkish government. The state 
harshly responded and started to intensify its imprisonment operation against 
the ‘KCK’ members. The question here is why the state had a very negative 
reaction against this project? This is a serious dilemma in the political arena 
within the Turkish state towards the Kurdish question. The discourse of the 
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state is to create new problems but in the same direction as earlier perspectives 
in which the Kurdish question is only a matter of security and terrorism rather 
than the cultural, social and political will of a nation that is called Kurdish 
people. This is in order to sustain the current situation and continue its old 
discourse, Olson (2011). Thus, the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ with all 
limitations and contradictions in the detail of it; can be regarded as a positive 
turning point in the Kurdish national movement discourse in the northern part of 
Kurdistan and Turkey. This is due to its real choice and respecting of the status 
quo of the Kurdish situation within the international borders of those countries 
that Kurds living. 
On the one hand, the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ project has revealed itself as an 
alternative to the state, and the tyrannical and undemocratic state; on the other 
hand, it respects Turkish borders and brotherhood between Kurdish and 
Turkish people. This notion can be seen as a contradiction. This project is not 
dangerous for the Turkish people or the notion of Turkishness even; it only calls 
for cultural, social and political identity for the Kurds and other minorities within 
the borders of Turkey. It calls for equal rights and tasks for all. Nevertheless, 
this project presents some alternatives for the model and practice of the current 
state in Turkey. It calls for decentralisation and giving room to people in order to 
have voices and choices in participation of building public interest and 
empowering people to participate in writing their own destiny, rights in society 
and towards the state. 
Thus, it is mainly about people and their freedom, their choice and 
empowerment rather than the state and controlling methods as it is currently. In 
the next section of this chapter, this project will be analysed and criticised. A 
point that is worth mentioning here is that the ‘KCK’ has started to implement its 
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policy according to the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ as much as possible 
without waiting for the state to answer or refuse the project. By looking at the 
DTK and the BDP activities in Kurdistan, especially through civil and legal 
institutions that belong to the ‘KCK’, it could be obvious that the policy is on its 
way to being implemented. The best and most accurate examples in this 
respect can be seen through activities of social, cultural and legal channels. 
  
Democratic Autonomy: a Critical Examination 
This is a concept that has been brought to the social and political arena by the 
KCK as an alternative model of managing society to that of the centralist statist 
authority in Turkey. In the previous section, this project was described in detail. 
The whole project with the series of the KCK policy and practice was 
elaborated. Here, the limitations and ambiguities of the project will be critically 
discussed. It is difficult to discuss the suggestion of democratic autonomy since 
even the authors of the project seem to define it in contradictory terminologies. 
It is obvious that the project has been prepared in the shadow of the speeches 
and writings of Ocalan, mainly based on the Road Map that was presented 
earlier in this chapter. 
It can be argued that those who wrote this project did not understand exactly 
what Ocalan wanted to say. For instance, on the one hand, it is suggested as a 
democratic solution for empowering people without touching the border and 
sovereignty of the Turkish state. On the other hand, it is calling for establishing 
an entity for the Kurds that could be called ‘Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan’ 
that must have social, political, ecological self-defence, even diplomatic 
institutions, DTK (2011). Moreover, the project has been suggested for 
establishing a Kurdish entity within the borders of Turkey. However, it 
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recommends that Kurds across four parts of Kurdistan could establish their own 
autonomous entities under the notion of democratic autonomy. In addition to 
this, the project says that it is not based on ethnicity. Yet, it is calling for a formal 
parliamentary entity that has Kurdish as a formal language. It says that it is not 
limited only to Kurdistan, but for the whole of Turkey that must be divided into 
several regions or counties. However, there is not any clarification regarding the 
criteria on which the borders of the regions could be based. 
What is important here is to ask who, where and what will be autonomous? 
None of these questions are clearly answered by the project. On the one hand, 
the project can be seen as a societal initiative only for mobilizing Kurdish people 
to highlight their distinctiveness in order to get more social cultural and political 
rights. On the other hand, it can be seen as the KCK demand for establishing a 
confederalism “state” within the Turkish state. Even if the KCK does not name 
the entity as the “state”, the policy and practice of such an entity is similar to 
that which the state has. The Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan that the KCK 
calls for has institutions to manage all aspects of legal, political, cultural and 
social life. It is based on eight dimensions of political, legal, self-defence, social, 
economic, cultural, ecological and even diplomatic associations, DTK (2011). 
Similar to the majority of the KCK activities, the process of implementation of 
this project is unbearable by the Turkish state. This is not only due to the issue 
of the illegality of the KCK. It is due to the ambiguity of the project as a result of 
misunderstanding the calls of Ocalan through his books and defence letters via 
his solicitors from 2005 until 2011. In Ocalan’s piece of writing that mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. It was named as ‘the Road Map’ that has been recently 
published and translated to several languages. Ocalan calls for a democratic 
nation before any sort of power and governance. He argues that all nations in 
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the Middle East are suffering from a nightmare that he calls it the nation state. 
According to Ocalan, the nation state has prevented people living in peace and 
prosperity with autonomy and a decent democratic life, Ocalan (2012). 
Therefore, as it has been presented earlier, he suggested nine principles as a 
solution for the chaos that he mentioned. 
All these principles indicate that a democratic nation must be created. If 
democratic individuals, then groups and communities and then democratic 
society have been created, then the power and authority will be democratic and 
people can respect the government and the state. In the previous sections, the 
principles were presented and briefly analysed. Hence, the project of 
Democratic Autonomy has been suggested based on the Road Map. By looking 
at the principles of the Road Map and the dimensions of the Democratic 
Autonomy project, it can be clearly seen that they are all the same or at least 
similar. It can be argued that, the main limitation of the project comes from this 
point. The road map was written for analysing the problems of the Middle East. 
It was suggested as an alternative for the despotism of nation states. However, 
the project of Democratic Autonomy has been written for the Kurdish society 
and to some degree for the Turkish people. 
Therefore, at some points it is about Kurdistan and an autonomous entity for the 
Kurds. At other points, it is about the whole of Turkish society and creating 
decentralised and communal autonomy for the people across the country 
without harming its borders and sovereignty. At some points, it is about all 
Kurdish people across all parts of Kurdistan and making several democratic and 
autonomous entities within the borders of their countries in the Middle East.  It 
can be strongly argued that all this ambiguity has come from misunderstanding 
the discourse of Ocalan and the KCK in the communal and social arena of the 
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DTK and the BDP characters. Therefore, the project of the KCK has been 
misinterpreted by the state and by its activists as well. The result of this has 
been undertaking some steps that are not appropriate and became a reason to 
irritate the state and cause a negative reaction towards Kurdish activism within 
Turkey. 
On the other hand, the KCK through its different autonomous institutions and 
through its internal disharmony has made several mistakes that have negatively 
affected other parts of its policy and practice. For instance, the same day that 
Democratic Autonomy was declared in ‘Diyarbakir’, seventeen Turkish soldiers 
were killed in a town close to ‘Diyarbakir’ called ‘Silavn’. The same thing 
happened previously when Ocalan was in negotiation with president ‘Turgut 
Ozal’. In 1993, on the main road between Bingol and Alazig cities, thirty three 
on vacation soldiers were killed by the PKK, Tan (2011). Therefore, as a result 
of the ambiguous steps of the KCK through announcing the project of 
Democratic Autonomy; the state harshly reacted and started to activate 
operation of detaining the KCK members that was started since 2009. The 
operation was highly escalated straight after the announcement of the 
Democratic Autonomy project. 
The state was not sure what was happening. On the one hand, the DTK was 
claiming that it is only a cultural and social association that is holding some 
local and non-governmental activism. On the other hand, the DTK was 
calling for a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan that has all institutions 
similar to the state. The state thought that this new way of Kurdish national 
struggle would increase the credits to and legitimacy of the Kurds, making 
them closer to separation and establishing their own entity. The state knew 
that this was true but there was no choice but to deal with it. Therefore, they 
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returned to the old treatment of the Kurdish question. They went back to 
focus on the military solution and treating the KCK as terrorist entity. The 
Prime Minister clearly suggested that he never allows for any state within his 
state to be created. A senior KCK leader argued that “the Prime Minister has 
regarded the KCK as a state within his state”, (interview with A2 on 
23/09/2012). 
Therefore, the state answered the project by arresting the KCK members 
across Turkey. Thousands of Kurdish members have been arrested during a 
short period. Moreover, the undercover negotiation between the state and 
the KCK in Oslo-Norway has been ended. Ocalan has been harshly isolated 
and visits to Imrali have been totally banned for about two years. 
What is very significant in this respect is the power and hegemony of the 
KCK through its numerous institutions in Turkey to make people do what 
they do not even understand. As it was argued earlier, even the majority of 
the BDP and the DTK senior members do not understand what Democratic 
Autonomy exactly means. How people can be democratic and autonomous? 
Where exactly do the projects need to be implemented? It is very interesting 
that despite all limitations and ambiguities of the project, despite the 
impossibility of implementation of the project, it has had a controversial and 
huge reaction from the state. The KCK put the state into a circle so that it 
had no choice but to think of alternative ways of solving the question. After a 
long time of examining the military solution and treating the movement as an 
illegal, terrorist group and marginalising the Kurdish issue and limiting it to 
the terror and security issues only, the state had to accept the reality that this 
movement is wider and broader than they imagined. 
There has been an impact of the project and attempts to implement it even if it 
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is blurry and vague. It has made people move again and have hope that the 
status of the Kurds will be created. No matter what the project suggested, 
Kurdish people hope for having a status, no matter whether the status might be 
an independent state, or federal entity or some Kurdish autonomous entity 
within Turkey. However, the Democratic Autonomy project has come to reject 
the state with all its shapes and colours. It has come to focus on a democratic 
societal solution for the issues without interfering and touching states and using 
their tactics and strategies. This can be regarded as contradiction in the project 
that shows the limitation of the KCK policy. 
As a matter of argument, the project is the development of a series of ideas 
about democratic republic and democratic confederacies that was advanced by 
Ocalan based on his understanding of the principles of radical democracy. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of his understanding has become a different project 
that is rejecting states with all their shapes and colours. Moreover, it accepts the 
existence of the state as long as they are not interfering and allowing the 
democratic societal nations to manage themselves, Ocalan (2013). Therefore, it 
can be argued that the project is a post state or at best a parallel to the state. It 
is impossible to make the state give up the power and let people organise 
themselves through cultural, social and non-governmental associations. It is 
also not easy to make the state accept another powerful entity within the range 
of the state. This was the point that made the Turkish state harshly react 
against the project of Democratic Autonomy and the KCK itself. 
It is hard to understand what is going on. On the one hand, people and the KCK 
activists do not understand the project. On the other hand, they have started to 
implement it wherever they can, whatever they think it is. Hundreds of social, 
cultural and communal groups are performing their activism under the notion of 
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making diversity and creating status for people in the Kurdish areas in Turkey. 
The hegemony of the KCK has covered almost all aspects of people’s lives in 
the Kurdish areas. Every group directly or indirectly is under the power of the 
KCK. However, the KCK calls for democratic and autonomy for the people and 
for ignoring the power of the state. These are series of paradoxes that can be 
seen within the KCK and its various activisms. 
The KCK claims that it does not want any power. It only wants people to be 
empowered in order to reach a status to be able to have their own democratic 
nation. Two dimensions of building a democratic nation are presented in the 
Democratic Autonomy project. In order for the Kurds to have a democratic 
nation, these two dimensions are very crucial. The first one is the free 
perceptive or thinking dimension. Kurds must have collective democratic 
thinking and perspectives. For that, language, culture, history, moral, economic 
and all other aspects of their lives must be developed based on democratic 
thinking rather than the perspectives of power and hegemony as it has been 
seen in the case of nation state building. The second dimension of the 
democratic nation is physical. The Kurds must have democratic activism by 
any cost. They must examine and develop their language, culture, social, 
moral, economic and all other aspects of their lives based on democratic 
thinking. 
Ocalan (2013) argues that promoting the notion of a democratic nation could be 
achieved through two ways. The first one is through an agreement with the 
state that the democratic nation process does not harm the state and creates 
diversity and prosperity in society. Then the state will have better status as a 
result of the production of a democratic nation. The second one is through 
democratic activism of the nation and without waiting for states to allow the 
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Kurds to establish their own democratic nation. In this case, “it would be a 
confrontation with those states as it has been seen in the past. However, for the 
sake of freedom and democratic life there would be no choice but continue the 
struggle no matter what will happen”, (Ocalan, 2013:487).  Moreover, the 
project of Democratic Autonomy is organising society to follow political 
democratic steps. In the KCK’s discourse, politicizing society is important to 
reduce the power of the state. Ocalan (2013) claims that wherever, politics and 
democracy is strong, the state is weak and inevitably lets people be free. Thus, 
the KCK is not a form of the state. The main policy maker of the KCK is 
legislative council ‘Kongra Gel’. It is a democratic organ. It is an alternative to 
the progress of the process of nation building through the initiative of people 
rather than the senior politicians, elites and upper classes. The management 
council ‘Konseya Reveberi’ is not acting as the Ministers council in the case of 
state; it is coordinating the units of Kurdish activism among the people. 
However, through the practice and hegemony of the KCK on the people and 
groups within society, it is obvious that the KCK is a power that has parallels to 
the state. 
In point of fact, the Democratic Autonomy project is about to continue the 
struggle as the KCK knows that the state so far does not accept the reality of 
the Kurds. As a result of that, the struggle has changed and developed to the 
social, cultural and multi-dimensional in order to show the state that they must 
change their perspectives too. Thus, the KCK has examined its struggle without 
the permission of the state, Olson (2011). It has started a new stage of struggle 
from different dimensions towards a democratic nation. That stage is different 
from that which the PKK was following. It is not only a political party and 
guerrilla warfare. The task of the KCK through its diverse branches is rebuilding 
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the nation through all dimensions of the democratic nation model rather than 
building a nation state for the Kurds as it was the main aim in the era of the 
PKK. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite mentioning the theories of social movement less obviously in analysing 
the projects of the KCK in this chapter, it was clearly shown that the KCK can 
be regarded as the main actor of social movement since it has a multi faced 
struggle in Turkey and Kurdistan and became an umbrella entity for all political, 
cultural, social and societal activities. Moreover, since the KCK has plans and 
projects to widen its range of activisms and keep making people gather around 
its ideology, it can be regarded as a social movement, (McAdam, et al 1996: 
331). The suggested projects of the KCK made new ways for the Kurdish 
national struggle. The first project was the ‘Road Map’ that has been suggested 
by the KCK leader Ocalan in 2009 as a solution for the Kurdish question. The 
other project was the ‘Democratic Autonomy’ that has been suggested by the 
DTK and the BDP as legal faces of the KCK in Turkey. The second project has 
been prepared based on the Road Map for solving the model of the nation state 
and presenting the model of a democratic nation. 
The project of Democratic Autonomy as an alternative model to the state and 
the nation state model has impacted on the people and the state as well, no 
matter whether the project is clear or not. It has moved a significant amount of 
people on the one hand. It has also shaken the state policy towards the Kurds 
and their struggle in the south east of Turkey. No matter what the state reaction 
was, the project has made the state seriously think again. It has had an impact 
on the Turkish public on the other hand. There is a visible difference in the 
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Kurdish question and its struggle since the KCK has come to the stage. 
 Moreover, as a result of the KCK and its new approach to the Kurdish national 
struggle, celebrating diversity and communal activism through various ethnic, 
religious and cultural groups in Kurdish areas has been widely seen. In other 
words, the task of the KCK is rebuilding the nation through all dimensions of the 
democratic nation model rather than building a nation state for the Kurds as it 
was the main aim in the era of the PKK. 
 In the next chapter, the visible outcomes of transformation in the policy and 
practice of the KCK will be  discoursed. This means that the KCK as a multi-
dimensional system can be regarded as the main actor of social movement in 
the Kurdish part of Turkey. Borrowing some  arguments from Castells (2012), 
this is because the KCK can have power and policy in changing political, 
cultural, social and societal values within  Kurdish society in Turkey.  
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Introduction 
This chapter will critically discuss aspects of transformation from the PKK to 
the KCK. This will be examined through the KCK’s policy and practice, its 
political, cultural, social and societal activism. It will consider the KCK and use 
an examination of social movement theories in order to elaborate the extent of 
social movement elements within the KCK. Particularly, based on the notions 
of transformation and changing societal values which are the main tasks of 
social movements according to theories, the detail of the transformation of this 
main actor of the Kurdish national struggle will be examined. If a social 
movement’s main task as Castells (2012) argued is changing the values of 
society, producing and reproducing values in society, where is the change of 
values in Kurdish society since the KCK has been actively performing a role 
among Kurdish and Kurdistani societies? If it is argued that the KCK is a 
social system rather than a political movement, then the process of changing 
values, production and reproduction of values in Kurdish and Kurdistani 
societies should be seen. 
Debatably, the KCK as the main actor of the Kurdish national struggle has 
reached a point that can be regarded as a wide multi-dimensional movement 
that is focusing on the social and cultural aspects of struggle more than the 
political aspect only. In other words, it can be argued that at the current time, 
the Kurdish national struggle and the KCK as a main character of this struggle 
is a social movement. Moreover, all the changes that have happened recently 
were due to the existence of the KCK as a new social and communal 
phenomenon. As it has been stated several times,  the main point of  whole 
thesis is; why has the KCK shifted from its previous shape ‘the PKK’ to the 
new multi-faced entity ‘the KCK’? In the previous chapters, there was in detail 
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a presentation of the way that transformation from the PKK to the KCK has 
been taken place. In this chapter, there will be  more discussion about the 
reasons behind that transformation. In other words, it will clearly answer the 
main question of the thesis through presenting and critically examining the 
KCK as an innovative social movement.  
 
The KCK as a Social Movement 
By looking at the KCK from outside, the answer to the question could be 
superficial. One may say that due to the rapid changes in the world system 
affecting the Middle East and Turkey alike, the PKK had to reshape itself and 
find another entity. For instance, in the previous years there were several 
events such as collapsing the Soviet bloc and the Berlin wall, gulf war and the 
western policy of promotion of democracy rather than stability in the region. It 
can be argued also that due to imprisonment of their leader ‘Ocalan’, the PKK 
has been ordered to change its policy and objectives. All these events could 
have impacts to encourage the PKK to melt down itself and create another 
entity that has finally been known as the KCK. These can be regarded as 
arguments. Yet, these arguments cannot survive long enough. 
Through highlighting the construction of the Kurdish society on the one hand 
and by looking deeply into the PKK and the current KCK detail, it could be 
discussed that the shift is not coming only due to external opportunities. It can 
be argued that the change has deeper roots and internally some notions have 
commanded the PKK to understand that the road of struggle has reached a 
dead end. As mentioned earlier, the PKK never competed accordingly with the 
mainstream social theories. The theory of rational choice and political 
opportunities, Zald and Ash (1966), Eisnger (1973), Tarrow (1983), Zald and 
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McCarthy (1987) were not taken into account in the case of this movement. In 
contrast to that, the PKK and to some degree the current KCK took anti-rational 
choice steps during their start and their social and political struggles. Cemil 
Bayik as a founder of the PKK and current co-chair of the KCK argues that 
“through the mainstream mentality and logic, the movement cannot be 
understood. The reason behind that is that the KCK itself was not established 
based on the mainstream logic and mentality”, (Cudi, 2008: 476). 
Thus, understanding the KCK is rather difficult if it be looked at through the 
mainstream social theories. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the main dilemma 
of the Kurds is having a notion of collaboration with enemies against its own 
entity and struggle throughout history. The PKK was the only Kurdish political 
party that properly understood this dilemma and worked hard to tackle it. 
Ocalan (2013) argued that at that point, the movement was “established based 
on that notion and for tackling that dilemma”, (Ocalan, 2013: 431). Therefore, it 
started with challenging chieftains and landowners in Kurdistan at first. Then 
through landowners and local chieftains, it has challenged the state and the 
Turkish system. 
Despite its ideology that has been influenced by socialism and the classic 
version of Marxist Leninist socialism, yet the notion of Kurdishness and fighting 
for the Kurds and Kurdistan was the priority in its program. Thus, the PKK 
ideology was a Kurdish interpretation of socialism and the main goal was 
establishing the Kurdish independent socialist state, Ozcan, (2006). The reason 
for that was that the PKK could not overcome the mainstream understanding of 
the concept of socialism and nationalism. Therefore, it combined Kurdish 
nationalism with the notion of socialism in the frame of the nation state as the 
main and only frame for its struggle. Therefore, it can be argued that the PKK 
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was nothing, but a timely response to the state policy towards the denial and 
deleting the notion of Kurdishness in Turkey, Ocalan (2011). The trick was that 
the PKK wanted to do so through the same policy and practice as the state had 
undertaken. Therefore, the policy and practice of the PKK reached a dead end. 
Why was the PKK reshaped and the KCK established? In other words, why has 
the PKK shifted its ideology and the main goal from an independent Kurdish 
state to a democratic nation that can live in harmony with other nations in the 
region? All the details and explanations in the previous chapters, from the 
theories to the literature reviews, all were for the sake of preparation for 
answering the question of the transformation of the struggle of this movement. 
The shift in perspectives and ideology leads to the shift in practice and 
arrangement. Thus, the shift of ideology must have been happened in this 
respect. However, the shift of ideology became a cause of taking a different 
step. The new step was creating the different system ‘the KCK’ that has made a 
change in the values of Kurdish and Kurdistani societies.  
The KCK is a social movement by itself. In a better description, the KCK is the 
main character of the Kurdish national movement at the current time. Through 
the viewpoint of Castells (2012), the process of changing values, producing and 
reproducing social values is a main task of social movement. It can be argued 
that the KCK has accomplished a large amount of changed values and 
producing of social and societal values. It on the other hand can be argued that 
the KCK is regarded as a innovative social movement as it is focusing on multi-
dimensional sources and producing values, Touraine (1981). The KCK has 
started to pursue its struggle from multiple channels; not struggling only through 
political parties or guerrilla warfare as previously done by the PKK. It has 
developed its struggle through different cultural and social channels. 
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Through the beginning of the process, for the first time in the history of the 
Kurds, the PKK as a main actor of the Kurdish national movement has 
established Kurdish media means through the satellite television9. For the first 
time, Kurdish people could watch and listen to their own language with its 
several dialects and get news about different parts of Kurdistan. That was the 
first visible step of the movement towards promotion of cultural activism. At that 
time, the PKK was in the stage of rethinking its policy. As a matter of fact, since 
1993, the PKK and Ocalan have thought of change and making different 
policies and ideology. This step can be regarded as value production and a 
different way of cultural revival. Hutchinson (1987) argues that when the political 
and visible ways of national struggle have been depressed, a nation would 
bring about different notions and ways to continue its struggle. Since Kurdistan 
was not free as a land or state, Kurdish struggle tried to promote another way of 
the process of national struggle. Making a nation on paper and through media 
means, could be a new step for the Kurds to manifest their distinctiveness. 
Interestingly, this media corporation was established in Europe, far from 
Kurdistan. Yet, the programs and targets of the project were for the Kurdish 
people and Kurdish cause. 
As mentioned earlier, for a long time Kurds were working hard to create a nation 
state. To gain what other nations already have. Yet, it was not easy; it was 
almost impossible for them. However, this time, the struggle was not about the 
nation state. No matter, it is a hard or easy process. It is no longer about 
whether it is hard or not. It is about the new perspective which is the KCK 
believes that the project of the nation state in the region can no longer meet 
moral and democratic rights and the reality of the people in the region. Other 
                                                 
9 In 1995, broadcast of a Kurdish satellite ‘MED TV’ for the first time was established. 
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Kurdish political parties such as the KDP and the PUK were always fighting for 
their own regional Kurdish rights within the border of the state within which 
Kurds live. They called for autonomy of the federal system within Iraq or Iran. 
Their arguments for not calling for an independent nation state for the Kurds 
were coming from their weakness and the impossibility of that demand. ‘Jalal 
Talabani’, a famous Kurdish leader who recently became the Iraqi president has 
gone further by saying that establishing a Kurdish state is a dream of poets or 
the young novice. 
Yet, after long debates and analysis of the Kurdish situation and the struggle, 
the KCK leadership has come to the conclusion that the Kurdish people are the 
victims of the nation state. The nation state cannot answer the needs of 
diversity and equality within Kurdistani societies. Therefore, this time the KCK 
wanted to let alone the struggle for building a Kurdish state and start struggling 
for nation building and for democratic rights for the people and societies in the 
region alike. Therefore, the shift from the goal of the PKK which was to 
establish a Kurdish nation state to the policy of the KCK which is promoting a 
democratic Kurdish nation has come from the shift in the perspectives of the 
movement. If the PKK goal was a reaction to the Turkish state, the KCK is not a 
reaction to the PKK or the state. Ocalan (2013) claims that after a long process 
of thinking and analysing the phenomenon of the state and nation, the 
movement came to believe that the situation of the constructed socialist 
approach has helped and strengthened the liberalist capitalist approach. The 
reason for the collapse of the socialist bloc was the crisis of the state and power 
through the view of the nation state only. Therefore, as we saw from the 
experience of China and Russia, these states have become capitalist states in 
a way that is much worse than the western model. 
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As a result of this analysis, the KCK has decided to leave the notion of the 
nation state alone and develop its policy towards a democratic nation based on 
social justice and radical democracy where the power and resources are not 
limited in the hands of a few greedy elites, Ocalan (2013). Therefore, all aspects 
of the change from the PKK to the KCK essentially go through the shift from 
nation state to democratic nation. In other words, the KCK is a post-state entity 
not an anti-state entity. This means that the centralist state is no longer needed. 
People can be empowered in a way that they can be able to manage their own 
social, cultural and societal needs without the formal forms of the centralist 
state. Therefore, cultural and social aspects of people’s life are highlighted 
rather than the political aspect. Consequently, social and cultural nationalism 
have been promoted in Kurdistan and Turkey rather than political nationalism 
as such.      
As it is argued, focusing on the process of promotion of the nation building 
rather than nation state building is the main face of transformation. Therefore, 
this cannot be looked at as a political tactic but it is an ideological strategy. It 
is cultural strategy on the other hand. Promoting the notion of nation building 
comes from the idea of cultural nationalism rather than a political one. As 
Kohn (1946) in Hutchinson (1987) argues, “there are two forms of 
nationalism- political which is rational, and cultural, which is ‘mystical’- and 
that the dominance of one over other is related to the level of socio-political 
development of a community, (Hutchinson, 1987: 31). In fact, Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey has been shifted from political to cultural. The KCK 
argued that political nationalism is a fake one in Turkey. The outcome of that 
politically shaped nationalism is bringing about the unification of society. 
Unification of society that political nationalism brings about can be manifested 
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only in the shape of the nation state that has brought despotism rather than 
social justice. In the words of Hutchinson (1987), political nationalism can 
make a fake “unification of the community within a given territory”, 
(Hutchinson 1987: 30). Therefore, the KCK argued that the Kurdish nation 
does not need to experience the same mistakes as Turkish nationalism went 
through. Instead of that, Kurdish society must opt for cultural nationalism, 
based on radical democracy and autonomy of the different groups and 
colours of society. 
Despite the difficulties of understanding the new phase of the KCK, it wants 
to continue with the notion of a democratic nation rather than the nation state. 
It was not easy to persuade even senior members of the KCK about this new 
and radical change, let alone the Kurdish public. A senior member of the KCK 
has expressed the feeling about the difficulty of that shift by making an 
example of the prophet Mohammed and his people. He argued that this shift 
resembles the time when Mohammed came and told his people that all the 
Idols that they had worshipped were useless, (interview with C3 on 
16/09/2012). For a long time, the PKK told people that one day Kurds will 
have a state such as the Turks have. Kurdish people were obsessed by the 
idea of independence and having a Kurdish nation state. Suddenly the KCK 
came up with the idea that the nation state is the main source of the Kurdish 
disastrous condition. Therefore, it was almost impossible to persuade people 
about this change. 
When the KCK announced the “Democratic Autonomy” project as an 
alternative project for the nation state building, it was misunderstood by most 
Kurdish people. They thought that the KCK no longer had Kurdish national 
goals. As a matter of fact, through the new ideology and policy of the KCK, 
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the process of Kurdish and Kurdistani nation building has been promoted 
widely. This point can be regarded as a turning point of the KCK’s new policy. 
It was a transformation from independence and the notion of a statehood of 
Kurdistan to the autonomy and democratization of people in Kurdistan. 
Another aspect of changing values is the Kurdish perspective of women and 
their status within Kurdish society. The KCK has fundamentally worked to bring 
about a system that can respect women and treat them equally with men. In 
previous eras, women were treated as equipment, as babysitters and house 
servants in the best situation. However, in the KCK era, women have become a 
symbol of resistance and struggle. Women within the KCK system are no longer 
slaves or prisoners at home. They are leaders and active members of 
society.  At the current time, the presence of women in a very active way can be 
seen in every aspect of the KCK's struggle. The best example of this is the 
numbers and percentage of women within the KCK leadership and all 
organisations that are under the umbrella of the KCK. Simply, by looking at the 
present percentage of women within the KCK leadership, we can see almost 
fifty-fifty chances for taking positions. For instance, the KCK ‘Executive Council’ 
management comprises six people since the 9th conference of ‘Kongra Gel’; 
they are three women and three men. The co-leader system also always gives 
a chance to have a man with a woman holding leadership in all KCK 
organizations. 
In contrast to other parties in Turkish parliament, from members of all four main 
parties, it can be seen that the HDP as a Kurdish or pro-Kurdish party under the 
umbrella of the KCK has twice the percentage of women deputies than that of 
the Islamist AKP and Nationalist CHP and three times higher representation 
than the Ultra-Turkish Nationalist party MHP. Moreover, the presence of women 
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is not only due to the quotas as a decision of the KCK that must be 50 per cent 
or over. It is actually due to the real presence and active struggle by women that 
are inspired by the ‘Ideology of PKK’ within the KCK. Ocalan (2013: 497) 
argues that the old woman in Kurdish history has gone, and a new one 
appeared due to the KCK new phase. Women are no longer slaves or servants. 
They are leaders and freedom fighters in all aspects of life. 
Another value that has been touched due to the KCK and the new Kurdish 
social movement is treatment of the minority ethnics and religious groups within 
Kurdish society. In the previous era, Sunni Muslim Kurds as the majority were 
treating Alevis, Christians, and Yezidis as groups that did not deserve any 
respect. They were culturally, socially, even physically excluded. There was not 
any chance to make a close friendship between Sunni Muslims and those 
groups, let alone marriage or any other close relations with them. Yet, since the 
KCK and the new movement have power and influence on the Kurdish 
societies, there is very different treatment and respect towards such 
marginalised groups. These groups are no longer marginal. The best examples 
in this respect can be electing two deputies amongst the Kurds who are not 
Sunni Muslims. For the first time in the history of the Kurds, a female, Yazidi 
person became a member of the European Union Parliament. Her name is 
‘Feleknas Uca’. She is currently a famous figure within the Kurdish national 
movement. She is not a Muslim, not a male, not a daughter of any chieftains or 
religious men. She is a Yezidi, female, from an ordinary family. The main 
reason that she is one of the leaders of the movement is that she is an active 
and loyal member to the movement. 
Another example is ‘Erol Dora’. In the history of the new Turkish state, for the 
first time, a Christian deputy has entered the parliament of Turkey ‘TBMM’. This 
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has happened with the votes of the Kurds. Not in Istanbul or Ankara, but in the 
predominantly Kurdish city of Mardin. During the fieldwork for this thesis, Dora 
was interviewed and he told an interesting story. He argued that when he was a 
young boy, once he was hit by a Muslim friend in the neighbourhood. He was 
few years older than him and had few other friends. He told little Erol that he hit 
others only once because they were not respectful. But he hit him twice. Once 
because he was not respectful like other children and the second time because 
he was not a Muslim, he was ‘Flla’ Christian. ‘Erol Dora’ smiled and said that he 
is a deputy with forty five thousand votes of Muslim Kurds in Mardin. This is an 
indication that the main and important point for the people is the loyalty for their 
movement rather than their religious sects or ethnics. These are two simple 
examples in the reality of this movement as a very visible notion of changing 
values in Kurdish society10. In the next section, there will be attempts to critically 
investigate the faces and essence of transformation in the Kurdish struggle from 
the PKK to the time when the system of the KCK was established. 
  
Social Movements, the Essence of Transformation Due to the KCK 
Discussing social movement is different from new ways of implementing a 
social movement. Here the KCK can be seen as an innovative social movement 
with regards to its elements of multiple tasks and its multiple aspect character 
on the one hand, Touraine (1981), Kriese, et.al (1995). On the other hand, the 
KCK has been characterized by producing new values and creating a new 
personality for the individuals within Kurdistani societies and changing the old 
values of the people, Castells (2012). If this argument cannot be true for all 
Kurdish people or for the Kurds in the northern part of Kurdistan, it can be 
                                                 
10 In fact, there are plenty of examples in this respect. Within the KCK; several senior 
members are Alevies, Ezidies, Zazas and Turks. 
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surely true at least for the people who are under the umbrella of the KCK 
system directly and those who are influenced by the KCK. 
The KCK has successfully touched the long-constructed walls of the traditional 
structure of the Kurdish society and people that have become a huge barrier in 
front of the Kurdish national struggle. This movement has destroyed the wall of 
fear and weakness of Kurdish character. It has changed the reality of the 
Kurdish minds. Castells (2012) gave a brilliant quotation from an Egyptian 
demonstrator of Al-Tahrir Square. He wrote: “we have brought down the wall of 
fear; you brought down the wall of our house. We will rebuild our homes, but 
you will never rebuild that wall of fear”, (Castells, 2012: 218). The previous 
Kurdish minds thought that they could not do anything without external powers. 
For a long time, the Kurds thought that their destiny could only be under the 
hegemony of neighbouring states and commands forever. Through the 
manifestation of the projects of a democratic republic, then democratic 
confederacies and then through the project of Democratic Autonomy; the KCK 
has delivered at least theoretically, a successful alternative system to the reality 
of the Kurds in the Middle East and especially within the borders of the Turkish 
republic. Kurds no longer wait for the states to give them what they want. As a 
KCK senior member argued, “No-one will give anything to the Kurds. All that we 
need must be gained only through our own struggle”, (interview with A18 on 
19/04/2012). 
Nevertheless, the issue of implementation of these projects has faced and 
been facing a series of obstacles and limitations. The process of 
democratization of Kurdistani societies is not an easy task. As a matter of 
fact, the previous PKK failed in democratising its internal body as a practical 
political movement. Moreover, it failed in democratising society as a larger 
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entity than the movement itself. Therefore, the process of internal 
democratisation within the body of the KCK is unavoidable. This is the main 
and most serious challenge in front of the KCK that can be regarded as an 
essential point in relation to the changing of values and producing of new 
values. The KCK has taken several steps to change values and create new 
characters of society. Yet, the process of internal democratisation will be a 
king maker in terms of the implementation of the new values and the 
sustainability of the social movement alike. Yet, the KCK has bravely tried to 
start the process of democratisation within itself. The recent change of the 
leadership system can be regarded as a positive start in that respect. As a 
matter of fact, in the ninth congress of ‘Kongra Gel’ in July 2013, the model 
of co-leadership was adopted by the KCK organs from the very bottom to the 
very top. 
Moreover, some crucial figures such as the chief of the ‘Executive Council’ 
‘Murat Karaylan’ have been changed through an internal election of the 
‘Kongra Gel’ and both ‘Cemil Bayik’ and ‘Bese Hozat’ have been appointed 
as co-leaders of the ‘Executive Council’. It can be argued that this can be 
seen as a sign of starting to promote internal organisational democratisation 
within the KCK system. In this respect, the notion of comparison between the 
KCK and any other previous or current Kurdish or Turkish organisation 
cannot help. The issue of internal democratisation within the KCK must be 
scrutinised independently. Otherwise, the process of democratisation within 
parties such as the KDP as the main Kurdish party in the southern part of 
Kurdistan is undeveloped and much more limited than the previous PKK and 
the current KCK. Within Turkish parties such as the AKP, also, the same 
argument can be true. For more than a decade, the AKP has the same 
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leader and policy. Yet, the KCK needs to go through a series of 
democratisation processes in order to survive and develop during its journey. 
As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, the process of thinking about 
change started from 1993 within the movement. However, it was not as visible 
and mature as it was in 2005. Capturing Ocalan and having plenty of time 
behind the bars of Imrali Island gave him a golden chance to think of change 
and reshuffle the policy of the PKK and call for a change in practice. This shift 
has spearheaded the movement to reshape itself and establish itself as a new 
body that lately called the KCK. That was a positive step. Once again, having 
Ocalan alive and producing new ideas could lead the KCK to go through the 
process of democratisation and promotion of civil and legal activism. 
In all cases, the movement has been changed in several aspects. Nevertheless, 
more changes and transformations are still on the way. The series of changes 
that have happened so far can be investigated through the classification of the 
KCK activities in different aspects as follows: 
  
1. Transformation in the Policy ‘Ideology’ 
The KCK was established as a result of the deadlocked policy of the PKK. Clearly, 
Ocalan (2013) argues that the policy of the PKK was a reaction against the policy 
of denial of the Kurdish people and their culture, language and history. In other 
words, the PKK was a project for confronting the policy of Kurdish denial by the 
state. The reaction to the Turkish slogan that said: ‘how happy is he who says I 
am Turk’, ‘Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyene’ was the slogan of the PKK that said: 
Kurdistan will be the graveyard for the fascists, ‘Kurdistan Fasizme Mezar Olacak’. 
Analysing the discourse of the PKK through this slogan is very interesting. It 
makes the situation so clear that the discourse of the PKK was reactive in all 
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cases. Moreover, that policy was under the hegemony of the statist ideology. It 
came as a reaction and with the same mentality as the Turkish state had. 
The old policy focused on the confrontation of the state and its internal allies. It 
was a Kurdish interpretation of the left and socialist ideology with the pedagogy 
of Marxist Leninist and rather Stalinist dogma of revolutionary movement. This 
notion of the agenda led the party to stick with the authoritarian style of 
ideological commitment to the party. As a matter of fact, due to that 
authoritarian dogma, the PKK committed serious crimes that have negatively 
affected the Kurdish society, Kurdish revolution and the struggle of the 
movement alike. The notion of labelling terror on the PKK did not come from 
nowhere. There were some horrible incidents of activism by the PKK personnel 
against civil and non-armed officers in Turkey, especially in the 1990s, Marcus 
(2009). Of course the state was using every opportunity to create a negative 
image for the movement. For instance, there were several contra-guerrilla 
activisms that made a negative image for the PKK, (interview with A12 on 
03/08/2011). 
Yet, the notion of violence and the mentality of banditry were inside the heart 
and behaviour of plenty of the PKK cadres and commanders, Ocalan (2011). 
Therefore, the policy headed the movement to a limited stage that could not 
go any further. Ocalan (2013) has confessed that even in 2000, the PKK was 
dealing with all these new events with the mentality and policies of the 
seventies. Thus, the result was a sequence of harsh failures and the loss of 
huge amounts of their human resources and reputation. As a matter of fact, 
despite all such damages and negative outcomes, the PKK was always the 
first and only party in the northern part of Kurdistan. As Ozcan (2006) 
argues, the position of the PKK as the main actor of the Kurdish struggle 
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was intact. That was due to the lack of any other active or even less active 
alternative in the arena whatsoever. Therefore, there was a necessity for a 
change of policy. Yet, the change could not be achieved through an old and 
classic organisation such as the PKK. Therefore, the PKK had to be 
renewed. 
Consequently, the KCK was established. The policy of the KCK is not 
focused on the state. Its lines are not running parallel to the state lines and 
strategies. The policy of this new movement is overcoming the state and 
focusing on wider targets than the state targets. As mentioned earlier, the 
state policy is about the power. It is about highlighting the lines of centralist 
national power in a formal manner. However, this movement’s policy is about 
people. It is for people and their empowerment. It is about diversity and 
equality of opportunities. It is for the depressed and less-advantaged groups’ 
empowerment. The policy of the KCK has a multi-dimensional notion. The 
discourse of this new movement is to promote a communal democracy 
within the Kurdish nation and a culture of diversity among all different ethnic 
and religious groups alike. To the KCK, this type of promotion of democracy 
is the real and natural power and empowerment of society. 
In this sense, the policy of the KCK does not take central power and state 
hegemony into account. It is focusing on a sort of power that is coming from 
human and cultural resources to promote democracy and the respect of 
diversity by people themselves, Akkaya and Jongerden (2012). The outcome 
of this policy can bring about some sort of societal democracy amongst the 
Kurdish people to a certain degree. In terms of theory and policy, this notion 
can be developed and better organised by the KCK policy makers. However, 
in terms of the practice of this policy, there is a huge difficulty in 
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understanding and implementing such policies amongst Kurdistani people in 
Turkey. As a matter of fact, the process of mobilisation of the struggle of the 
KCK has been facing huge difficulties and obstacles. Therefore, the policy 
has not been explained to people as it is needed to be. 
Due to illegality of the KCK within Turkey, most of the people and activists who 
are under the umbrella of the KCK are facing several sorts of confrontation with 
the state and its prosecution channels. Therefore, the policy of the KCK has 
never been fully implemented yet. Despite the reality of the situation of the 
Kurds and the KCK system in Turkey and all obstacles, the notion of the KCK 
policy is not familiar and understandable in accordance to the mainstream 
policy or the systems and the state. The KCK claims that its system has nothing 
to do with the state and with power. Yet, this is a clear contradiction to the steps 
and the practice of the policy of the KCK. Internally, there is a strong 
organisation and connection between all parts of the system. Externally, there is 
a harsh competition between the KCK and other powerful entities such as the 
state and the AKP policy at the current time. There is a clear hegemony of one 
of these two main powers in Turkey; at least in the places where the Kurds live 
and the KCK has power. Life and all kinds of collective or even individual 
activities in Kurdistan and those areas in which Kurds live are divided into two 
different styles and perspectives. 
From the viewpoint of the KCK, life has been divided into the life and activities 
of, the people (Gel) and the perspective of the state (Sistem). Anything in a 
major city such as Diyarbakir has been divided into the style of living according 
to the people or belonging to the state that they call it (System). On the other 
hand, in the same place and time, according to the state and perspective of the 
government, life has been divided into  the life of ‘terrorists’, the “KCK people” 
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or the life of ‘legal people’, “people who are belonging to the state”. This is a 
very uniquely odd classification that has occupied all angles and parts of life in 
Kurdistan. This means that the KCK has not so far been able to bring about an 
atmosphere that can provide a notion of freedom and prosperity. Despite its 
claim that the policy of the KCK is post state and focusing on the promotion of 
cultural and social areas rather than politics and power seeking, the policy of 
the KCK is not free from the statist notion and politics. 
  
2. Transformation in Politics 
 The concept of politics has its rather specific meaning from political scholars 
and has been practiced in certain ways by political activists, parties and states. 
Yet, this concept was differently understood by the previous PKK. Since the 
PKK was a practical, political one-dimensional party, Ocalan (2011), it was only 
focused on the state and power. Therefore, the aim was confronting the Turkish 
state and establishing an independent socialist Kurdistan state. Without 
understanding the reality and opportunities of the Kurdish society, such 
demands were very irrational and far from any achievement. In contrary to all 
expectations, the PKK survived and developed its struggle to a certain degree. 
However, the rehearsal of the ideological and political views forced the party 
into a dead-end. Therefore, “the matter of sustainability” (McAdam, et al 1996: 
340-341), of political vision could not be guaranteed in the case of the PKK. 
On the other hand, the viewpoints of the KCK towards politics are wider and 
much more realistic. In the era of the KCK, politics cannot be glued into 
ideological commitment. The politics must be rather pragmatic and strategic. 
Therefore, the KCK does not put all its focus on politics only. It has only a small 
committee to deal with politics, power and the state. As a matter of fact, even 
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the majority of political characters within the KCK are dealing with the cultural, 
educational and ideological aspects of the struggle rather than politics as such. 
When the KCK discovered that the previous PKK approach was limited to 
mainly focus on politics and armed struggle, it started to pay less attention to 
politics. By looking at the legal political character of the KCK within Turkey, it is 
clear that the majority of activism of that party is not political for itself. 
Undeniably, the HDP and the BDP have political activism; however, its political 
notion has some moral and cultural flavour. The KCK understood that the 
challenge of the state cannot be managed by taking similar steps as the state 
takes. Therefore, it changed the notion of the politics of the previous PKK. 
The KCK has examined politics through its ideological understanding that a 
change in the perspectives of the people could be the starting point of 
democratic politics rather than focusing on the political characters that are in the 
arena. Therefore, to the KCK, fighting with the system is important, not the 
government personnel or prime ministers and head of the army of the Turkish 
state. This means that, for the KCK, the challenge is with the mentality of the 
state and the notion of unity and hard-core nationalism in Turkey. Borrowing a 
terminology from Smith (2001), the struggle of the KCK is to think of national 
state rather than the nation state in Turkey. A national state has a wider and 
diverse notion. It is not about the Kurdish or Turkish ethnics. It is a national 
entity that includes all the different colours and voices of the people in the 
country; free from exclusions and discriminations. Thus the political struggle of 
the KCK is distinguished from the one of the previous PKK and the current 
Turkish state through the idea of refusing direct power for the direct characters. 
That is one of the social movement’s characters that there could be no 
particular leader. As Castells (2012) argues, when there is no leader, it means 
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all of the people are leaders. It is not important who the leader is. It is important 
which political ideology and perspective has power upon the people and 
society. As a senior leader of the KCK argues, “that is why the KCK system 
calls it democratic politics rather than hegemonic and authoritarian politics”, 
(interview with A2 on 23/09/2012). In the words of a senior member of the KCK, 
“when the power has been created from communal bases rather than political 
élites, the notion of politics will be democratic and closer to the fair politics”, 
(interview with A1 on 22/09/2012). 
Nonetheless, in a social and political atmosphere such as the one in Turkey 
and Kurdistan, everything is politicised. Therefore, all social and cultural 
activities certainly have the notion and flavour of politics. However, the 
notion of politics is framed and limited to the practice of communal and social 
empowerment. At least theoretically, there is no politics and hegemony of 
the people’s will. In contrary to this, there is always people’s will and power 
in the politics and decisions that have been taken by the politicians and 
policy makers within the KCK. In terms of practice nevertheless, the politics 
activists are managed by a few characters that are dedicated for the task by 
the KCK decision makers. 
For that, the power and hegemony of the KCK on political activism comes 
from the senior committee that is in the mountains of Qendil. Thus, the notion 
of power and politics is still regarded as important and run somewhat centrally. 
It is argued that there is a decent amount of autonomy for the political legal 
characters such as the BDP managers within Turkey. However, most of the 
crucial decisions come from the mountain of Qendil or Imrali prison. That is a 
contradiction to the notion of Democratic Autonomy and empowerment of 
society which are in the policy of the KCK. This can be regarded as a main 
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criticism in the KCK’s inconsistency during the practice of its policy, especially 
with regards to the practice of power and political activism. 
 
3. Transformation in the Social Sphere 
The PKK has touched the long-built wall of social injustice from the very 
beginning of its struggle. The first activism started by bringing about just 
treatment to the peasants and workers by the chieftains and landowners. 
Despite the harsh, premature and limited ideology behind that act, the notion 
behind this attempt was to show sympathy for the depressed and 
disadvantaged people in society. Therefore, the social aspect of the struggle 
was important from the very start of this movement. 
Notwithstanding, the PKK was not responding to the needs of the people on the 
level of social sphere. That was due to the countless problems of the people 
that were the victims of the Turkish harsh policy of assimilation, unification and 
Turkification across the whole of the twentieth century. Moreover, the tools and 
the apparatus of the PKK to confront the state policy were weak and 
inappropriate. It was a premature reaction and with the same tools as the state 
used, but very limited and weak compared to the state capacities. Therefore, 
the PKK only could do limited work for Kurdish and Kurdistani society on the 
social level. Moreover, due to the reaction of the harsh policy of the state, the 
PKK had left very little room for the promotion of democracy and accepting 
serious debate and criticism within the movement. 
As a Leninist party, the PKK believed that democracy and other critical issues 
such as free debate and institutional democracy must be postponed for the era 
after the triumph of the revolution. The PKK argued that “Democracy should 
follow revolution rather than coming first”, (Marcus, 2009:91). That was one of 
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the critical issues that drove the PKK to an impasse and dead end. This was 
also a mistake that made the PKK lose significant amount of human and social 
resources. Plenty of good intellects and democratic members and sympathisers 
were lost due to the harsh and undemocratic approach of the PKK. Since it was 
a reaction to the state, it was taking the same undemocratic steps as the state 
took. Therefore, the PKK had no vision to focus on the social aspect of the 
struggle as was needed. Subsequently, changes became a certain necessity. 
Nevertheless, the KCK has come with a different notion that the social aspect 
must be very much focused on and to a certain degree and the political aspect 
must be diminished in the process of change and liberation. The KCK argues 
that bringing freedom and liberation for the Kurds does not come from outside 
of society and as a gift from outsiders. “It is a process of individual and 
collective feelings and preparation of people on the social level to accept and 
start their serious struggle for it”, (interview with A2 on 23/09/2012). It will come 
with the notion of social empowerment to bring about diversity and equality for 
people. Therefore, the KCK on a wide and diverse level has suggested focusing 
on civil society activities more willingly than keeping to politics only. 
As mentioned earlier, there are hundreds of small, medium and large 
organisations under the KCK umbrella. Ergo, social and cultural activities have 
been prioritised in the struggle of the KCK. All these social and cultural activities 
have come from the fact that the KCK is spending the majority of its social, 
financial and human resources on the process of education and changing the 
values of society. A senior member of the KCK argues that “more than %85 of 
the power of this movement is going for education, the rest is about visible 
activities, such as assemblies, conferences and media activities”, (interview with 
C3 on 16/09/2012). 
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These educational processes are not very visible in Turkey. This is what made 
the Turkish state irritated and create a wide operation for detaining members of 
the KCK, especially since 2009. The state has named the operation afterwards as 
the ‘KCK operation’. However, the KCK has continually been pursuing its social 
activities across Kurdish areas and some major cities such as Istanbul and 
Ankara. As a matter of fact, these activities are not only for the Kurdish people in 
Turkey; it is for all peoples of Turkey alike. As mentioned earlier, recently Ocalan 
has called for establishing a new entity to undertake activities of the KCK outside 
of the Kurdish areas in Turkey. Consequently, the new organisation named as the 
‘Democratic People’s Congress’ HDK has been established firstly as a successor 
of the DTK and BDP in case of closure. However, it has become a wide ranging 
organisation to cover non-Kurdish activism outside of the Kurdish areas in Turkey 
- under the umbrella of the KCK.  In other words, it is parallel to the Democratic 
Society Congress DTK that is active in Kurdistan. Thus, the HDK is Turkey’s 
version of the DTK. Also the ‘Democratic People Party’ HDP within the HDK has 
been established. The HDP is the main party for whole Turkey while the BDP is 
for the Kurdish region within the DTK11.  
The purpose of this was that the KCK wanted to show Turkish people that their 
struggle is not only for the Kurds, but for all people in Turkey and for the sake of 
promoting democracy and respecting diversity and equality on the basis of social 
justice in Turkey. Nevertheless, all these activities cannot make the KCK free 
from the label of violence in the eyes of the Turkish public and social and political 
elites. Moreover, the notion of Kurdishness as the main character of the KCK 
struggle remains as a point of the movement that will never be in a position of 
                                                 
11
 In April 2014, within the ‘TBMM’ also, the BDP deputies switched their fraction to the 
HDP fraction. It is to show that the HDP is a wider party for all Turkey and the BDP 
(name changed to DBP) is a party only for the Kurdish part of Turkey. 
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acceptance by the majority of Turkish society. Therefore, the steps towards 
change by the KCK remain limited. 
 
4. Transformation in the Cultural Sphere 
 Mainly the cultural aspect has a much intertwined link with the social one. 
The only specialisation that the cultural aspect has is focusing on the points 
that are specifically dealing with different ethnic and religious groups within 
society. Since the PKK was the movement that finally the KCK was born 
from the ashes of; it can be argued that all aspects of notions and activisms 
are those which existed within the PKK to an incomplete and certain degree. 
Nonetheless, the KCK was established as a response to the mistakes and 
limitations of the PKK. Therefore, all aspects of the previous PKK can be 
seen in the KCK in a better form, somehow more mature and appropriate. 
However, due to the one-dimensional activism of the PKK, there was a lot of 
necessary cultural activism that was never implemented by the PKK. 
Cultural education and activism was slightly approached by the PKK. 
Respect to Armenians, Christians, Ezidies, Aleves, non-Kurds and non-
Muslims were always appreciated within the PKK. Yet, it was never a matter 
of full appreciation. Respect for women and female empowerment was 
visibly respected likewise. Despite the notion of the nation state and aiming 
at the Kurdish independent state, always within the PKK, there was a 
respect for the others who would be living within the potential Kurdistan state 
eventually. As a matter of fact, due to the limited information of the PKK’s 
members including Ocalan himself; about the reality of Kurdistan and its 
history, geography, social and cultural life, there was no real understanding 
of the importance of cultural diversity and respecting others. 
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However, despite all its limits, from the first day, the PKK wanted to understand 
the reality of the Kurds. The main difference between the PKK and other 
movements in the world can be seen in the manner of recruiting members. For 
other movements, members must be patriotic, and then they join the 
movements and become revolutionary. In the PKK’s case this was the opposite. 
Members of the PKK did not even know that they were Kurdish when they 
started to join the revolutionary group of the PKK. The power of assimilation 
and Turkification harshly affected people’s personality, culture and nature. 
Therefore, the PKK could not promote the cultural aspect while there was that 
huge wave of assimilation and unification on the one hand. On the other hand, 
the PKK and its members including Ocalan himself were products of that 
assimilated society. Thus, they lacked all the necessary elements to start the 
revolution, let alone the importance of cultural and social aspects. 
Consequently, the PKK could only challenge the wave and let some part of the 
Kurdish people at least understand that they were Kurds. In other words, the 
PKK had a challenge to stop the process of Kurdish denial and start whispering 
the words of Kurdistan and freedom of the Kurds amongst the people. However, 
promoting the Kurdish language as an important part of the culture of the 
nation; was almost totally ignored by the PKK. At the time, the PKK was arguing 
that people must recognise that they were Kurds first, no matter which language 
they use. That was one of the biggest mistakes that the PKK made and it has 
had negative effects until today’s date. As a matter of fact, the majority of the 
Kurds in Turkey cannot speak, read and write in Kurdish. Moreover, almost all 
Kurds in Turkey including Ocalan himself can speak, read and write Turkish 
better than Kurdish. 
The KCK, nonetheless, has deeply understood the importance of the cultural 
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aspect and promoting diversity and equality in society. Therefore, it has focused 
mainly on civil and societal engagements and working on the revival of the 
depressed and excluded and marginalised groups in society. The notion of a 
multi-dimensional struggle is very visibly manifested in the KCK’s cultural 
activism. There are wide networks across the Kurdish areas and some parts of 
major cities in Turkey where the KCK has cultural activism via its several non-
governmental organisations. For the very first time in one hundred years in 
Turkey, some depressed and ignored minorities have been revitalized and 
started to recognise themselves once again and struggle for bringing about self-
esteem for their own groups. 
Very recently for instance, the Armenian Church in Diyarbakir has been 
renovated, and referring to Armenian culture has been making a slight return. 
Aleves also, through establishing their own organisations and private worship 
houses that are called the “house of congregation” ‘Cem Evi’, have started to 
have their own religious and cultural rituals despite state hostilities. What is very 
interesting here is that the KCK has argued in agreement and through the 
projects of ‘Democratic Autonomy’ that power and choice must be brought back 
to the peoples and communities. Thus, to a good extent, there is an autonomy 
and respectful notion for the diversity amongst peoples and communities. It is 
necessary to reinforce the fact that there is a difference between the KCK’s 
attempt to promote democracy and autonomy amongst the people; and the 
process of democratisation within the KCK personnel as such. Until very 
recently and only after establishing the KCK, one can say that there is some 
sort of attempt toward democratisation within the KCK. 
However, the outcome of the KCK’s cultural activism is very visible in that a 
reasonable amount of Kurdistani people have been going through a set of self-
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recognitions and democratisation together with the notion of autonomy and 
openness for Kurdistani societies. That is the face of transformation and change 
of the values that the KCK has brought about. Nevertheless, the hegemony of 
the KCK and Ocalan himself, as a main and powerful character on this stage, 
often shows itself and threatens the notion of openness and autonomous 
democracy in society. In other words, despite all the claims of the KCK that it 
does not want power as such, the hegemony of the KCK can be felt everywhere 
within Kurdistani societies in the northern part of Kurdistan. The substance of 
cultural framing in this respect, once again, is under the hegemony and 
influence of the KCK. This means that, the KCK is the policy maker and 
decision taker for the majority of cultural phenomenon that is recently taking 
place in the predominantly Kurdish areas in Turkey. By any cost, the Kurdish 
and Kurdistani people have been seeing diverse and colourful cultural activism 
since the KCK has been established and started to implement its policy within 
Kurdistani communities. 
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter was very important since it was critically discussed the main 
points of the Kurdish national struggle and the reasons behind the process of 
transformation from the PKK to the KCK. In other words, the current KCK 
through its new approach that has recently been manifested as the Democratic 
Autonomy project has shifted the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. The shift 
of the Kurdish national struggle that has happened was from building a Kurdish 
nation state by the PKK similar to other nations and especially mirroring the 
Turkish nation state, to the process of building a democratic nation without 
focusing on the state by the KCK. Therefore, the KCK has attempted to change 
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the struggle from political to multi-dimensional activism. For the KCK, social and 
cultural dimensions of the struggle were mainly focused on. Moreover, 
education and promoting awareness through diverse groups that are under the 
KCK were taken into account. Women's rights and the active presence of 
women within Kurdish society and the KCK activism have been promoted 
widely due to the shift of the struggle of the KCK. Moreover, as a result of the 
KCK and its new approach to the Kurdish struggle, celebrating diversity and 
communal activism through various ethnic, religious and cultural groups in 
Kurdish areas has been widely seen. The project of Democratic Autonomy as 
an alternative model to the state and the nation state model has impacted on 
the people and the state as well. 
However, the KCK has several different limitations in relation to its policy and 
practice alike. Whatever the claims of the KCK are, and whatever the policy of 
the project of Democratic Autonomy is, the reality of the Kurdish national 
struggle has been changed. The social and cultural dimensions of the Kurdish 
struggle have been widely improved. Therefore, the KCK and its recent project 
have made an enormous change to the status of the Kurds in Turkey. It has 
also affected the state and its policy and practice towards the Kurds and the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. It can be argued that the KCK has shown several 
aspects of transformation in the Kurdish national struggle in the recent years. 
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The purpose of the entire thesis was to examine the recent transition that has 
happened to the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey, with the emergence of the 
KCK as a key actor in Turkey and in the northern part of Kurdistan. As a result 
of this transition, the Kurdish national struggle mutated into a different kind of 
movement, that can be described as self-aware and moving towards self-rule. 
The KCK has recently suggested the project as an alternative model for the 
long term dream and struggle for establishing an orthodox nation state for the 
Kurds. Through the project of ‘Democratic Autonomy’, this time the Kurdish 
national movement wants freedom and self-sufficiency over a different entity. In 
contrary to all other Kurdish movements and entities, due to the KCK' a new 
struggle, the Kurdish movement in the northern part of Kurdistan now wants to 
have cultural, social and societal autonomy rather than a Kurdish state that is 
parallel to the Turkish state. 
The main focus for the thesis was to examine the reasons behind this 
transformation; why the PKK has been replaced by the KCK? The thesis has 
argued that the KCK was established as a result of the deadlocked policy and 
practice of the PKK. The PKK was a political project for confronting the policy of 
Kurdish denial by the Turkish state. Nonetheless, focusing on the process of 
promoting nation building rather than nation state building is the main face of 
transformation. Therefore, this cannot be looked at as a political tactic but rather 
as an ideological transition and strategic policy as well as a cultural strategy.  
Throughout the whole thesis, it has been argued that the Kurdish national 
struggle in South-Eastern Turkey/Northern Kurdistan has undergone a 
transformation from a purely political movement of armed struggle in pursuit of a 
state, to one which is more social movement oriented about promoting values 
and identities rather than violence, Castells (2012). This thesis has argued that 
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the KCK is a movement that cannot be fully understood via mainstream policies 
and theories. The Kurdish national struggle in Turkey under the KCK did not 
start and does not operate according to resource mobilization theory per se. 
Instead, this thesis has suggested that in the special circumstances and within 
an exceptional cultural framework such as the Kurdish society, the national 
movement could grow and achieve some goals without following the steps of 
rational choices and political opportunities. The PKK was not able to achieve 
these objectives through its political agenda, and therefore the pursuit of the 
Kurdish national struggle required the development of a multi-dimensional 
approach to promote the Kurdish notion of building a democratic and 
autonomous nation rather than creating a Kurdish nation state. Promoting the 
notion of nation building comes from the idea of cultural nationalism rather than 
a political one, (Hutchinson, 1987: 31). As part of this argument, the thesis has 
put forward the idea that the main task of the social movement is changing the 
values of society, Touraine, (1981), Castells (2012). Therefore, the KCK, 
through its steps towards changing values of the Kurdish society, is regarded in 
this thesis as a social movement rather than a political movement as was the 
case in the era of the PKK. The notion of transformation has been manifested 
by the practice of several aspects. Mainly, the KCK has broadened its range of 
the struggle from political and guerrilla combat to cultural, social and societal 
struggle within Kurdish and Kurdistani societies. 
The range of this thesis has focused on the social, cultural and political 
transformation in the limited period between 2005 and 2011 only. The thesis 
has argued that through the policy and practice of the KCK, the Kurdish 
movement is struggling for democratic autonomy rather than a nation state per 
se, despite the fact that until today’s date, the Kurdish national struggle has not 
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achieved total autonomy and independence for the Kurds. It has also not 
achieved social, cultural and political rights for the Kurds within the legal 
framework in Turkey. However, the Kurdish national struggle under the KCK 
has taken tangible steps towards autonomy including social, cultural and 
political rights in Turkey. This has been achieved essentially due to the new 
approach to the Kurdish national struggle since the KCK was established. The 
process of denial of the Kurds was clogged during the course of the harsh 
struggle of the PKK in previous decades; however, the process of Turkification 
has been effectively confronted by the KCK in recent years. Moreover, the 
process of revitalisation of the notion of Kurdishness has actively been put 
under-way through the start of the multi-dimensional struggle that the KCK has 
brought about.   
Despite these changes, the Turkish state continues to view the ‘Kurdish issue’ 
through the lens of state security. In the last ninety years, the Turkish state has 
treated the Kurds and the Kurdish question only as a matter of security and 
dealt with it through military solutions. The response of the Turkish state to the 
Kurdish question was the process of Turkification, Unification and Assimilation. 
Likewise, at the current time the state has almost the same policy and approach 
to the Kurdish question. Presently, there are semi-open negotiations with the 
leadership of the KCK and Abdullah Ocalan himself in his prison in Imrali Island. 
However, all the process is managed through security and intelligence arm chief 
personnel “Hakan Fidan” rather than the Prime Minister or any other civil 
personnel. This means that all achievements by the Kurdish national struggle 
so far, is the harvest of their hard work and resistance rather than the state 
appreciation of promoting democracy and human rights for its Kurdish citizens 
in Turkey. 
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Therefore, the Kurdish national struggle no longer wants to wait for the state to 
give some rights to the Kurdish people. Through the KCK, the Kurdish national 
struggle has started to recognise its rights by itself and promote self-awareness 
and democratic autonomous entity for the people in the Kurdish areas of 
Turkey. This has happened despite the state’s obstacles and barriers. Hence, 
this struggle has been pursued outside of the frame of the state. The KCK has 
touched the base of values that were built long ago. Changing values and 
producing new, different values are emphasised by the KCK. Promoting 
diversity and equality, empowering women and depressed groups of ethnic and 
religious minorities have been focused on by the KCK. 
The impact of the KCK struggle has not only been on Kurdish society; the 
impact has been on the Turkish public and the state as well. Despite the 
obstacles of the state, the KCK has pursued its struggle and become an 
effective policy maker in the predominantly Kurdish areas of Southeast Turkey, 
acting in parallel to the formal state. This has threatened the state since it has 
comprehended that an invisible set of institutions, mirroring those of the state, 
are active within South-Eastern Turkey. This has forced the state confront the 
KCK and severely depress most of its active arms within Turkey. Shortly after 
the announcement of the Democratic Autonomy project of the KCK, the state 
intensively started to detain the KCK members. However, the impact of the 
struggle of the KCK has finally made the state to think of negotiations. 
This thesis also represents one of the first attempts to examine the KCK as a 
social movement outside of state derived security lenses. This thesis has 
argued that the transformation from the PKK to the KCK has delivered on 
specific potentialities to expand cultural, social and societal rights for the Kurds 
and other depressed ethnic and religious groups in Turkey. The Kurdish 
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struggle has been transformed essentially in terms of value changes rather than 
superficial changes of names and political parties. The values of the Kurdish 
people have been improved. Their personality and values have been touched 
and changed. As was elaborated, the project of Democratic Autonomy is about 
to continue the struggle as the KCK knows that the state so far does not accept 
the reality of the Kurds. As a result of that, the Kurdish national struggle has 
changed and developed to the social, cultural and multi- dimensional in order to 
show the state that they must change their perspectives too. Therefore, the 
KCK has examined its struggle without the permission of the state. 
During a period of nine years, this change has visibly occurred through 
establishing hundreds of civil, cultural, social and political autonomous 
organisations that have different aims and structures and all are under the 
umbrella of the KCK. All these organisations are autonomous on one hand and 
under the umbrella of the KCK on the other hand. Thus, it can be interpreted 
that the KCK has relatively succeeded in implementing its new policy of 
Democratic Autonomy. However, it is less successful in the process of internal 
democratisation within its structure. Moreover, the thesis pointed out that the 
KCK has a vague and blurry policy that has become the cause of 
misunderstanding by the public, the state and by its own activists as well. 
However, despite that vague policy; it has played effectively and made huge 
changes within the Kurdish people and their struggle in recent years. It has also 
had the effect on the state to think of solutions for the long term Kurdish 
question. 
To conclude, it must be admitted that there are several related issues and 
aspects of the KCK and the Kurdish national struggle that this thesis did not 
have a chance to examine. For instance, this thesis did not examine the matter 
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of current negotiations between the Turkish state and the KCK indirectly and 
between the state and Ocalan directly. The process has certainly started as a 
result of the struggle of the KCK and the certainty of the state that the long term 
policy for solving the Kurdish problem is no longer applicable. Moreover, this 
thesis did not have scope to examine the role of the KCK in promoting the 
policy of democratisation in Turkey through establishing a multi-faceted 
communal entity the ‘HDK’ and the multi-colour party in Turkey the ‘HDP’. Both 
entities are under the umbrella of the KCK and were established directly with 
the command of Abdullah Ocalan. These points can be elaborated by future 
academic works. Furthermore, analysing the process of implementing the 
notion of Democratic autonomy in Syria that is directly connected to the KCK 
through it Syrian Kurdish actors such as the PYD, YPG and YPJ is another area 
of this thesis that could be highlighted in future academic researches. The last 
statement of this thesis is that the Kurdish national struggle has been 
transferred from political to social movement due to the KCK as the main actor 
of the Kurdish national struggle in Turkey. Likewise, the process of 
democratisation of Kurdish and Turkish societies and communities has been 
influenced by the KCK. 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS 
Apart from secondary sources, I undertook several interviews for this research 
that were conducted between June 2011 and Sept 2012. The majority of 
interviews were recorded and saved. However, a few interviewees that gave 
information through a long meeting did not want me to record their voices. Due 
to the sensitivity of the research, anonymity of the interviewees was taken into 
account. Some of the interviewees agreed to be named. However, I have 
decided to keep all names anonymous. I have used codes for the interviews. I 
have put letter (A+Number) for those who are from Turkey or living in Turkey, 
(B+Number) for those who are from Iran, I met my (B) interviewees in Europe 
and Iraqi Kurdistan since I did not need to travel to Iran during this research. I 
have put letter (C+Number) for interviewees from Iraq and letter (D+Number) for 
Syrian Kurds. I met my (D) interviewees in Europe and Iraqi Kurdistan likewise. 
I have correspondingly put the letters (M) for male interviewees and (F) for 
females. I have shown the date and place of interviews with some information 
that helps the reader to understand which kind of interviewees they are. 
Interview with A1, a senior member of the KCK, (M), Brussels: 22/09/2012 
Interview with A2, a senior member of the KCK, (M), Brussels, 23/09/2012 
Interview with A3, a member of Turkish Parliament (M), Diyarbakir 25/03/2012 
Interview with A4, a former member of the PKK (M), London, 14/09/2012 
Interview with A5, a member of Turkish Parliament (M), Ankara, 28/7/2011 
Interview with A6, a member of Turkish Parliament (M), Ankara, 28/7/2011 
Interview with A7, a member of European Parliament (F), Diyarbakir 05/08/2011 
Interview with A8, senior member of the KCK (F), Diyarbakir, 06/08/2011 
Interview with A9, a senior member of the BDP, (M), Diyarbakir, 07/08/2011 
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Interview with A10, a member of Turkish Parliament and political party leader 
(M), Ankara, 02/09/2011 
Interview with A11, a member of Turkish Parliament and political party Leader 
(M) Ankara, 04/09/2011 
Interview with A12, a deputy political party leader (M), Diyarbakir, 03/08/2011 
Interview with A13, a senior member of the KCK, (M), Istanbul, 17/04/2012 
Interview with A14, a senior member of the KCK, (M), Diyarbakir, 26/07/2011 
Interview with A15, human rights activist and KCK citizen, (M), Van, 17/06/2012 
Interview with A16, a senior member of the AKP, (M), Diyarbakir, 22/04/2012 
Interview with A17, human rights activist and journalist, (F), Diyarbakir, 
21/03/2011, 04/08/2012 and 25/04/2012 
Interview with A18, a senior member of the BDP and KCK, (F), Istanbul, 
19/04/2012 
Interview with B1, a senior member of PJAK and a political party leader (M), 
Brussels, 21/09/2012 
Interview with B2, a senior member of PJAK, (M), Suleimaniah-Iraq, 25/10/2011 
Interview with B3, a journalist, (M), Suleimaniah-Iraq, 27/09/2011 
Interview with C1, a member of Iraqi parliament and senior Kurdish politician, 
(M), Erbil-Iraq, 27/02/2012 
Interview with C2, a senior member of the PCDK, (M), Suleimaniah-Iraq, 
10/07/2011 
Interview with C3, a senior member of the KCK, (M), Brussels, 16/09/2012 
Interview with C4, a senior member of the PUK, (M), Suleimaniah-Iraq, 
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22/02/2012 
Interview with D1, a senior member of the PYD and political party leader, (M), 
London, 20/06/2012 
Interview with D2, a member of the PYD, (M), Brussels, 03/06/2012 
Interview with D3, Kurdish human rights activist and journalist, (M), 
Suleimaniah-Iraq, 13/07/2011. 
